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Non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) substantially govern and inﬂuence trade outcomes. They
include a diverse range of policy and non-policy measures that directly or indi-
rectly divert trade and are predominantly implemented on food and agricultural
products. While multilateral negotiations of NTBs within the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) are a slow process, countries are more conﬁdent in accelerating
the reduction and regulation of NTBs within free trade agreements (FTAs). Thus,
considering NTBs might be of importance in analyzing potential eﬀects of FTAs.
This cumulative dissertation includes six articles addressing current research ques-
tions in agricultural economics on the identiﬁcation of NTBs and their eﬀects on
trade and the evaluation of FTAs that explicitly consider NTBs. In all empirical
analyses, the focus is on the agro-food sector. The ﬁrst two articles serve as the
foundation for policy analysis. The following articles draw on a two-step empirical
approach to thoroughly assess regional trade liberalization by integrating economet-
ric results from the theory-consistent gravity model into the computational general
equilibrium (CGE) model Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) given a perfect
match of data.
The ﬁrst article presents an overview of NTBs and discusses methods to identify and
measure the eﬀects of NTBs. The empirical part of the article applies the inventory
approach to identify countries that are most prevalent in using NTBs. Frequency
and coverage ratios suggest that the prevalence of NTBs in the agro-food sector is
very high and that developed countries and especially emerging countries dominate
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the application of NTBs worldwide. The article closes with an idea of how to further
extend the comprehensive analysis of NTBs.
The second article further extends the assessment of NTBs. It also elaborates on
the WTO's approach in regulating NTBs and their role during the recent economic
crisis. By applying diﬀerent indicators for NTBs on a yearly basis from 2002 to
2012, the evolution of NTBs over time and their impacts on agro-food trade are ana-
lyzed. Data demonstrate the increasing relevance of NTBs, and estimations reveal
negative eﬀects on trade; however, the performance varies greatly across indicators
and between imports and exports. The article ends with a requirement to further
enhance data availability and quality on NTBs and to strengthen the awareness of
the trade-distorting nature of NTBs, especially in times of economic crisis.
The third article assesses the new orientation in Turkish foreign policy towards the
Arab world by comparatively analyzing the potential impact of Turkey's membership
in either the European Union (EU) or the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA).
The gravity border eﬀect approach and cross-sectional data for 2007 are employed to
obtain ad-valorem tariﬀ equivalents (AVEs) of NTBs. Before NTBs are integrated
into the GTAP model, they are benchmarked to the integration level of comparable
FTAs. Turkey would gain unambiguously from EU membership, whereas Turkey's
gains from GAFTAmembership would be more limited. The article presents that the
welfare gains from the removal of NTBs are of considerable importance and would
generally be greater than the gains stemming from the elimination of tariﬀs.
The fourth article addresses the question of whether the relevance of NTBs by jointly
using the border eﬀect approach in gravity modeling and CGE analysis in assessing
FTAs can be conﬁrmed for a diﬀerent case study. Speciﬁcally, the EU-India FTA is
analyzed. The gravity border eﬀect approach suggests high AVEs of NTBs. After
benchmarking the NTBs, they are implemented into the GTAP model to derive
economy-wide eﬀects. Again, the overall level of welfare gain stemming from NTB
reduction is much higher compared to the ones coming from tariﬀ elimination.
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In contrast to the two previous articles, the ﬁfth article tests a diﬀerent strategy in
gravity modeling to identify NTBs. An FTA categorical variable captures integra-
tion levels negotiated by FTA partners in the past. The gravity equation is applied
to cross-sectional data for 2010 to estimate the eﬀects of NTBs. NTBs are used to
perform CGE simulations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and United States (US). TTIP simula-
tion results indicate considerable gains for the EU and US that are predominantly
driven by the reduction of NTBs, whereas third countries gain from spillover eﬀects
and are only moderately aﬀected by trade-diverting eﬀects.
The sixth article explores how diﬀerent data aggregation levels aﬀect the gravity
estimates of NTBs in the agro-food sector and examines their related impacts on
policy simulations of an expansion to the EU that would include Turkey. Two sets
of AVEs of NTBs are calculated by using the gravity model with the FTA dummy
approach to disaggregated and aggregated data for 15 GTAP agro-food sectors. A
panel data framework for the period 1988 to 2011 is employed. AVEs of NTBs
vary substantially across products. Utilizing aggregated data primarily leads to
an overestimation of the eﬀects of NTBs. Transferring overestimated AVEs to the
GTAP model directly aﬀects the simulation results.
The empirical analyses presented illustrate and reaﬃrm the high relevance of NTBs
in the agro-food sector that by far exceeds tariﬀs. The use of diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of the gravity model and alternative identiﬁcation strategies supports the stability of
results. The joint econometric-CGE approach oﬀers an appropriate and comprehen-
sive framework for analyzing the eﬀects of the reduction of NTBs in the process of
economic integration. Extending the CGE model and augmenting the database with
econometrically estimated parameters increase the quality and conﬁdence of CGE-
based assessments of deep FTAs. The reliability of the results is further increased
by considering the most disaggregated level of data.
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Future research analyses might apply even more disaggregated data and rely on
direct measures of NTBs by employing information from newly emerging databases
on NTBs. To conduct CGE policy analyses, theory-consistent aggregation methods
could be applied to obtain AVEs of NTBs at the CGE sector level. The composite-
method approach that was selected for this thesis could be transferred to other case
studies of regional trade liberalization. In addition, the method could be used to
construct a detailed database of AVEs of NTBs for the CGE framework. This would
enable one to conduct reliable and precise plurilateral and multilateral liberalization




Nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse spielen eine bedeutende Rolle in der Steuerung
und Beeinﬂussung des internationalen Handels. Sie umfassen vielfältige politisch
und nicht-politisch motivierte Maßnahmen, die direkt oder indirekt den Handel
verzerren. Insbesondere der Handel mit Agrar- und Ernährungsprodukten ist von
nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen betroﬀen. Multilaterale Verhandlungen über
nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse innerhalb der Welthandelsorganisation sind ein
sehr langwieriger Prozess. In der Regel sind Länder zuversichtlicher, den Abbau
von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen und die Angleichung von Vorschriften und
Regularien in regionalen Freihandelsabkommen umzusetzen. Dadurch ergibt sich
die Notwendigkeit und Wichtigkeit, nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse in der Analyse
von Freihandelsabkommen zu berücksichtigen.
Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation enthält sechs Artikel, die sich mit ak-
tuellen Forschungsfragen aus der Agrarökonomie beschäftigen. Im Speziellen geht es
sowohl um die Identiﬁzierung von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen und Messung
der Handelseﬀekte als auch um die Auswertung von regionalen Liberalisierungssze-
narien, in denen nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse explizit berücksichtigt werden.
In allen empirischen Analysen liegt der Fokus auf dem Agrar- und Ernährungs-
bereich. Während die ersten zwei Artikel als eine Basis für die Politikszenarien
dienen, wird in den folgenden vier Artikeln eine empirische Analyse regionaler
Handelsliberalisierung in zwei Schritten umgesetzt. In diesem Zwei-Schritte-Ansatz
werden ökonometrische Ergebnisse aus dem theoretisch basierten Gravitationsmo-
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dell in das allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodell Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
integriert.
Der erste Artikel präsentiert einen Überblick über nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse
und diskutiert Methoden zur Identiﬁzierung und Messung der Eﬀekte. Der em-
pirische Teil des Artikels verwendet die Bestandsmethode, um diejenigen Länder
zu erkennen, die überwiegend nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse einsetzen. Verhält-
niskennzahlen zu Häuﬁgkeit und Deckungsgrad zeigen, dass die Verbreitung von
nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen im Agrar- und Ernährungssektor sehr hoch ist
und dass Industrie- und Schwellenländer weltweit die höchste Prävalenz aufweisen.
Abschließend wird eine Idee zur Ausweitung der Analyse nicht-tarifärer Handels-
hemmnisse vorgestellt.
Der zweite Artikel schließt hier direkt an, indem er die Analyse von nicht-tarifären
Handelshemmnissen erweitert. Dieser Artikel erarbeitet ferner die Herangehensweise
der Welthandelsorganisation in Bezug auf nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse und die
Rolle dieser Maßnahmen in der jüngsten Weltwirtschaftskrise. Verschiedene Indika-
toren für nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse für einen Zeitraum von 2002 bis 2012
werden herangezogen, um die zeitliche Entwicklung und deren Auswirkungen auf
den Handel mit Agrar- und Ernährungsprodukten zu analysieren. Die Daten zeigen
eine steigende Relevanz der nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnisse, und ökonometrische
Schätzungen decken negative Eﬀekte auf den Handel auf. Allerdings hängt das
Ergebnis stark von den Indikatoren ab und variiert zwischen Importen und Ex-
porten. Der Artikel schließt mit der Notwendigkeit einer verbesserten Datenver-
fügbarkeit und qualität und mit der Forderung nach Erhöhung des Bewusstseins
für die handelsverzerrenden Wirkungen von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen, vor
allem während wirtschaftlich turbulenten Zeiten.
Der dritte Artikel bewertet die neue Orientierung der türkischen Außenhandels-
politik in Richtung der arabischen Welt. Hierbei wird eine komparative Analyse
durchgeführt, indem die potentiellen Auswirkungen der Mitgliedschaft der Türkei
entweder in der Europäischen Union oder in der Größeren Arabischen Freihan-
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delszone untersucht werden. In der ökonometrischen Analyse mit dem Gravita-
tionsmodell werden der Grenzeﬀekt-Ansatz und Querschnittsdaten für das Jahr
2007 angewandt, um Zolläquivalente von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen zu
bestimmen. Bevor die nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnisse in das GTAP Modell
zur gegenüberstellenden Politikanalyse integriert werden, werden sie hinsichtlich
eines Integrationsniveaus vergleichender Freihandelsabkommen normiert. Die Tür-
kei würde eindeutig im Falle einer Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union gewin-
nen, während die Gewinne aus der Mitgliedschaft in der Größeren Arabischen Frei-
handelszone nur beschränkt sein würden. Die Wohlfahrtsgewinne, welche aus der
Reduktion von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen resultieren, sind von erheblicher
Bedeutung und generell höher als die Gewinne aus der Zolleliminierung.
Der vierte Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob die hohe Relevanz von nicht-
tarifären Handelshemmnissen in der Bewertung von Freihandelsabkommen mit Hilfe
des kombinierten Methodenansatzes auch für eine andere Fallstudie bestätigt wer-
den kann. Im Speziellen wird das Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen
Union und Indien untersucht. Die Gravitationsanalyse mit dem Grenzeﬀekt-Ansatz
weist hohe Zolläquivalente von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen auf. Nach deren
Normierung, werden sie in das GTAP Modell integriert, um ökonomische Aspekte
der Freihandelszone abzuleiten. Die Ergebnisse dieser Politikanalyse bestätigen die
hohe Bedeutung von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen. Die Wohlfahrtsgewinne,
die aus der Reduktion von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen hervorgehen, sind
höher im Vergleich zu den Gewinnen, die aus der Eliminierung von Zöllen stam-
men.
Im Gegensatz zu den vorherigen Artikeln, prüft der fünfte Artikel eine alterna-
tive ökonometrische Strategie zur Identiﬁkation nicht-tarifärer Handelshemmnisse.
Eine kategorische Variable erfasst verschiedene Integrationsniveaus, die von Part-
nern einer Freihandelszone in der Vergangenheit verhandelt wurden. Die Gra-
vitationsgleichung wird auf Querschnittsdaten für das Jahr 2010 angewandt. Im
zweiten Schritt wird die Transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft
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zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Vereinigten Staaten mit dem GTAP
Modell analysiert. Die Simulationsergebnisse zeigen erhebliche Gewinne für beide
Partner auf. Diese werden hauptsächlich durch die Reduktion von nicht-tarifären
Handelshemmnissen erklärt. Drittländer proﬁtieren von positiven Spillover-Eﬀekten
und sind entsprechend nur moderat von handelsumlenkenden Eﬀekten betroﬀen.
Der sechste Artikel untersucht inwieweit unterschiedliche Datenaggregationsebe-
nen die Schätzungen von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen mit dem Gravitations-
modell beeinﬂussen und prüft die entsprechenden Auswirkungen auf die Politik-
simulationen einer möglichen Erweiterung der Europäischen Union um die Türkei.
Zwei Datensätze von Zolläquivalenten von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen wer-
den berechnet. Hierfür werden disaggregierte und aggregierte Paneldaten für 15
GTAP Agrar- und Ernährungssektoren im Zeitraum von 1988 bis 2011 herangezo-
gen. In der ökonometrischen Strategie erfasst eine binäre Variable alle positiven Ef-
fekte, die sich aus der Reduzierung von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen und der
Angleichung von Vorschriften in regionalen Liberalisierungsprozessen ergeben. Zoll-
äquivalente von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen variieren erheblich auf dem Pro-
duktniveau. Dabei führen aggregierte Daten hauptsächlich zu einer Überschätzung
der Eﬀekte von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen. Die Übertragung dieser über-
schätzten Zolläquivalente in das GTAP Modell wirkt sich beachtlich auf die Simu-
lationsergebnisse aus.
Die in dieser Arbeit präsentierten empirischen Analysen veranschaulichen eine hohe
Relevanz von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen im Agrar- und Ernährungsbereich.
Die Eﬀekte sind höher als bei Zöllen. Die Verwendung verschiedener Speziﬁkationen
des Gravitationsmodells und alternativer Identiﬁkationsstrategien bestätigt die Sta-
bilität der Resultate. Der verwendete Ansatz durch die Kombination von ex-post
und ex-ante Analysen bietet eine angemessene und umfassende Methode, um die Ef-
fekte von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen in regionalen Liberalisierungsprozessen
zu analysieren. Die Erweiterung des Gleichungssystems und der Datenbasis des all-
gemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells mit ökonometrisch geschätzten Parametern erhöht
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die Qualität der Simulationsergebnisse von allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodellen. Die
Reliabilität der Ergebnisse wird weiter erhöht, wenn sowohl die ökonometrischen
Analysen als auch die prospektiven Simulationen auf dem höchst möglichen Disag-
gregationsniveau erfolgen.
Zukünftige Studien könnten noch stärker disaggregierte Daten und direkte Messun-
gen von nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen verwenden, um die Eﬀekte zu schätzen.
Hierfür könnten die Informationen aus den aktuell aufkommenden Datenbasen zu
nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen einen Beitrag leisten. Zur anschließenden Poli-
tikanalyse mit allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodellen könnten theoretisch-konsistente
Aggregationsmethoden verwendet werden, um Zolläquivalente von nicht-tarifären
Handelshemmnissen auf der Ebene der allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodelle zu er-
halten. Die Zwei-Schritte Analyse könnte auf andere Fallstudien regionaler Han-
delsliberalisierung übertragen werden. Künftig könnte auch mit der hier in der
Arbeit gewählten Methode eine detaillierte Datenbasis von Zolläquivalenten von
nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen für die Rahmenstruktur des allgemeinen Gleich-
gewichtsmodells erstellt werden. Dadurch könnten zuverlässige und präzise Analy-






In recent decades, the multilateral trade negotiations of the General Agreement on
Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) and the successor World Trade Organization (WTO) have
led to a considerable reduction in tariﬀs. Accordingly, other trade measures, particu-
larly non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs), are now playing an increasing role in governing and
inﬂuencing trade outcomes. NTBs include a diverse range of policy and non-policy
instruments that directly or indirectly divert trade with respect to composition,
regional orientation and size. Speciﬁcally, agro-food trade is heavily aﬀected by
NTBs, so that NTBs are a central topic of discussions in agricultural and trade poli-
cies. Most NTBs are of regulatory nature and are justiﬁed by following legitimate
national regulatory interests, e.g., social, product and environmental standards or
consumer protection regulations. However, they are characterized by complex and
non-transparent designs and lack conceptual clarity. In addition, there are no com-
prehensive and eﬀective control mechanisms, so they can easily and arbitrarily be
misused by governments for protectionist and discriminatory purposes. Further-
more, diﬀerent regulatory systems across countries further complicate smooth trade
ﬂows.
Policymakers and economists are aware that harmonization and mutual recognition
of regulatory systems will lower trade costs and enhance commercial exchange. How-
ever, this requires deep institutional changes and is on the multilateral level both a
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tedious and resource-intensive process. Instead, countries are more conﬁdent about
the potential to overcome NTBs and trade restrictions in form of regulatory diver-
gence if they are considered within free trade agreements (FTAs). In fact, NTBs are
one of the most important points in FTA treaties because future trade and welfare
gains are expected through the reduction of restrictive NTBs and the harmonization
or mutual recognition of regulatory systems.
How important are NTBs to international trade? How can NTBs be empirically
measured and made to be useful for policy analysis of FTAs? Do FTA policy out-
comes change if the reduction of NTBs is considered? There are many studies in the
literature that try to empirically answer these questions by using either econometric
approaches or applied partial and general equilibrium models. Combinations of both
modeling approaches, econometric and equilibrium-based models, are rarely found.
Predominantly, quantity-based econometric approaches are utilized to measure the
trade eﬀects of NTBs. Subsequently, econometric estimates can be used to calculate
ad-valorem tariﬀ equivalents (AVEs) which are applicable in equilibrium model-
based policy analysis. Existing studies reveal high relevance of NTBs for trade by
suggesting high AVEs of NTBs that mostly exceed tariﬀs. However, negligence in
theoretical-sound derivations, empirical misspeciﬁcations to identify NTBs and data
quality issues often lead to inconsistencies and discrepancies in estimation results.
Yet, consistent and unbiased estimates of NTBs are particularly important when
using them as inputs in further model-based policy impact analysis. While partial
equilibrium models oﬀer a powerful and eﬃcient technique, computable general equi-
librium (CGE) models are preferred because of their ability to derive economy-wide
eﬀects of the reduction of NTBs.
Tariﬀ modeling in CGE frameworks is well established. In contrast, modeling of
NTBs has only recently been employed in trade policy analyses. Because CGE
models do not cover NTBs in their frameworks, they need to be speciﬁcally imple-
mented in the equation system of the CGE model. While resource-wasting NTBs
are modeled as eﬃciency losses, rent-generating NTBs are modeled as import tariﬀ
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or export tax equivalents beyond the actual import tariﬀs and export taxes. In the
past, studies considered mainly a uniform economy-wide eﬃciency improvement to
model NTBs. Recently, studies have integrated econometrically estimated NTBs
in CGE frameworks to model the potentials of deep FTAs. These studies focus on
modeling NTBs as eﬃciency losses. Indeed most NTBs are of regulatory nature
and increase the resources and hence costs of production, yet, a certain proportion
of NTBs generates rents. Only very few studies examine and apply both modeling
approaches. Simulation results of studies considering NTBs in FTA policy analysis
suggest high overall welfare gains for the respective FTA trade partners, which are
primarily driven by the reduction of NTBs. However, many studies do not allow
for spillover eﬀects to third countries or apply a homogenous design. Finally, the
agro-food sector is mostly neglected or considered at a highly aggregated level, al-
though NTBs are predominantly implemented on food and agricultural products
and aggregation bias is of concern in trade policy analyses. How important is the
distinction between diﬀerent types of NTBs for FTA policy analysis? Do NTBs in
food and agriculture and well-constructed spillover eﬀects make a diﬀerence in eva-
luating FTA policies? How does data aggregation level inﬂuence econometric results
of NTBs and hence simulation outcomes? These aspects are only rarely discussed
in the literature, but are important for thorough trade policy analysis.
Against this background, the objective of this cumulative dissertation is to exa-
mine speciﬁc research questions in international agricultural economics by combining
econometric-based ex-post analysis and CGE-based prospective evaluation given a
perfect match in the data. Particularly, the thesis relies on the theory-consistent
gravity model of trade and the CGE model Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
that both are successfully and extensively applied in trade policy analysis. The thesis
emphasizes two critical issues, namely, the eﬀects of NTBs on food and agricultural
trade and the assessment of FTAs by speciﬁcally considering the agro-food sector
and allowing for simultaneous reduction of tariﬀs and NTBs. In addition to these re-
search questions from the international agricultural economics ﬁeld, methodological
purposes are also followed. With respect to the econometric approach, the explicit
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objectives are ﬁrst to relate the theoretical gravity model to trade and other relevant
data and current estimation techniques. In particular, the selection, gathering and
processing of appropriate data to conduct gravity model analyses, the identiﬁcation
of current estimation techniques, and the establishment of the technical framework
to conduct gravity model analyses are pursued. Furthermore, the thesis aims to as-
sess estimation strategies to identify NTBs and diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the gravity
model to judge the stability of the results. In addition, alternative empirical designs
to determine the levels of NTBs that are reducible in FTAs are evaluated. The aim
is also to conduct empirical analyses at diﬀerent data aggregation levels to investi-
gate the eﬀect of aggregation bias on estimation results. With respect to the CGE
approach, the speciﬁc objectives are to identify the theoretical framework to imple-
ment and decompose diﬀerent types of NTBs in the CGE equation system and to
establish the technical framework to perform liberalization scenarios in FTA policy
assessments with the GTAP model. Finally, theoretical considerations of spillover
eﬀects associated with NTBs and the practical advancement are covered.
1.2 Organization of the thesis
The thesis includes six articles that provide the basis for the cumulative dissertation.
The articles are in the context of the above-described research objectives. While the
ﬁrst two articles serve as the foundation for the policy simulations by providing
information on the prevalence and relevance of NTBs, the following four articles
focus on the combination of ex-post econometric studies and ex-ante CGE analyses
to assess the eﬀects of NTBs in speciﬁc case studies. The following table presents the
full list of the respective articles, the authors and the journals in which the articles
have been published or to which they have been submitted.
The ﬁrst article, Methoden zur Messung von nichttarifären Handelsmaßnahmen:
Welche Möglichkeiten bietet die bisherige Forschung? (chapter 2), provides an
overview on NTBs and discusses methods to identify and measure NTBs. The
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inventory approach is applied to discover countries that are most prevalent in em-
ploying NTBs. The article was published in WiSt Heft 6 (2011) and contributes
insights to the high prevalence of NTBs in the agro-food sector worldwide.
Table: Overview of articles
Chapter Title Authors Published in/Submitted to
2 Methoden zur Messung von
nichttärifaren Handelsmaßnah-
men: Welche Möglichkeiten bie-
tet die bisherige Forschung?
Tanja Befus and Janine Pe-
likan
WiSt Heft Vol. 6, 2011, p. 301-
307
3 Proliferation of Non-Tariﬀ Mea-
sures and the Impacts on Food
and Agricultural Trade




4 Moving toward the EU or Mid-
dle East? An Assessment of Al-
ternative Turkish Foreign Poli-
cies Utilizing the GTAP Frame-
work
Tanja Engelbert, Beyhan Bek-
tasoglu and Martina Brock-
meier
Food Policy Vol. 47, 2014, p.
46-61
5 Analyse des Freihandelsabkom-
mens zwischen der EU und
Indien unter Berücksichtigung
von nicht-tarifären Handels-
hemmnissen im Agrar- und
Ernährungsbereich
Tanja Engelbert and Martina
Brockmeier
Schriften der Gesellschaft für
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissen-
schaften des Landbaus e.V.,
Vol. 48, 2013, p. 297-308




Brockmeier and Joseph Fran-
cois
American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics, October 2014
7 The Eﬀect of Aggregation Bias:
An NTB Modeling Analysis of
Turkey's Agro-Food Trade with
the EU
Beyhan Bektasoglu, Tanja En-
gelbert and Martina Brock-
meier
Review of World Economics,
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The assessment of NTBs is further extended in the second article entitled Proli-
feration of Non-Tariﬀ Measures and the Impacts on Food and Agricultural Trade
(chapter 3). This paper, which was submitted to Agricultural Economics, also ela-
borates the WTO's approach to regulating NTBs and their role during the recent
economic crisis. Based on panel data and a gravity-like model, the paper detects
the evolution of NTBs over time and estimates their impacts on agro-food trade.
The third article, Moving toward the EU or the Middle East? An Assessment of
Alternative Turkish Foreign Policies Utilizing the GTAP Framework (chapter 4),
assesses the new orientation in Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world by
analyzing the potential impact of Turkey's membership in either the European Union
(EU) or the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). A joint econometric-CGE
5
Introduction
assessment is conducted by using the gravity border eﬀect approach to obtain NTBs
for detailed agro-food sectors and the GTAP model to perform policy simulations.
The paper was published in Food Policy 47 (2014) and contributes insights to the
role of the agro-food sector and the importance of NTBs in determining the outcome
of FTA policy simulations.
Whether the relevance of NTBs by jointly using the border eﬀect approach in gra-
vity modeling and CGE analysis in assessing FTAs can be conﬁrmed for a diﬀerent
case study is analyzed in the fourth article entitled Analyse des Freihandelsabkom-
mens zwischen der EU und Indien unter Berücksichtigung von nicht-tarifären Han-
delshemmnissen im Agrar- und Ernährungsbereich (chapter 5). The paper was
published in Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
des Landbaues e.V., Herausforderungen des globalen Wandels für Agrarentwicklung
und Welternährung 48 (2013) and analyzes the potential eﬀects of the EU-India
FTA considering simultaneous reduction of tariﬀs and NTBs in detailed agro-food
sectors.
The ﬁfth article, Agriculture in the TTIP - A Joint Econometric-CGE Assessment
(chapter 6), which was submitted to American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
examines the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the
EU and US. The joint econometric-CGE analysis in this paper is extended compared
to the two previous studies to consider diﬀerent aspects in terms of NTB modeling
and impacts. Estimated NTBs from gravity modeling are diﬀerentiated between
resource-wasting and rent-generating NTBs and are accordingly implemented into
the GTAP model. The CGE application is further advanced in that it also assesses
spillover eﬀects for third countries and bases the analysis on the econometrically
obtained elasticity of substitution including the related conﬁdence intervals to ge-
nerate a distribution of the model's results. The simulation results contribute to a
better understanding of the meaning of diﬀerent types of NTBs and spillover eﬀects
associated with NTBs on overall welfare analysis.
6
Introduction
The sixth article, The Eﬀect of Aggregation Bias: An NTB Modeling Analysis of
Turkey's Agro-Food Trade with the EU (chapter 7), explores the potential impact of
data aggregation on gravity estimates of NTBs in the agro-food sector and examines
their related impacts on policy simulations of an expansion to the EU that would
include Turkey. The article was submitted to Review of World Economics and
contributes insights into aggregation bias in gravity estimation and its consequences
on CGE simulation results.
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following the introductory chapter, chap-
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Nichttarifäre Handelsmaßnahmen sind ein häufig ge-
nutztes Instrument der Handelspolitik. Daher ist es
von besonderem Interesse, diese Maßnahmen zu iden-
tifizieren und deren Bedeutung im internationalen
Handel zu quantifizieren. Das Ziel dieses Beitrags be-
steht darin, Methoden zur Messung von nichttarifären
Handelsmaßnahmen aufzuzeigen und zu diskutieren.
Hierdurch soll der Einstieg in die Literatur zu diesem




nisse, Trade Restrictiveness Index
1. Einleitung
Multilaterale, regionale und bilaterale Handelsabkommen
haben in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten in vielen Berei-
chen zu einer Liberalsierung des Warenhandels geführt.
Während die Höhe der Zollprotektion im internationalen
Handel abnimmt, gewinnen nichttarifäre Handelsmaßnah-
men (non-tariff measures, NTMs) immer mehr an Bedeu-
tung. Diese Maßnahmen sind definiert als alle Handelsre-
gulierungen, die nicht den tarifären Maßnahmen zugeord-
net werden können. Zu den NTMs zählen mengenmäßige
Beschränkungen wie beispielsweise Importquoten oder
administrative Vorschriften wie technische und sanitäre
Standards. Ein Unterschied zu den tarifären Maßnahmen
besteht darin, dass keine Staatseinnahmen in Form von
Zollabgaben entstehen. Im Gegensatz zu Zöllen können
NTMs den Handel fördern indem sie zu mehr Transpa-
renz, zu einer größeren Kompatibilität mit den heimischen
Produkten oder zu einer Risikoreduzierung beitragen.
Vielfach wirken diese Maßnahmen allerdings als nichtta-
rifäre Handelshemmnisse (non-tariff barriers, NTBs)
und lenken den Handel ab oder verhindern ihn sogar voll-
ständig.
Infolge der Finanzkrise ab 2007 hat die Nutzung von
NTBs zum Schutz der Märkte wieder an Bedeutung ge-
wonnen. Die EU-Kommission (2009, S. 6) berichtet von
223 handelsbeschränkenden Maßnahmen, die innerhalb
eines Jahres (Oktober 2008 bis Oktober 2009) weltweit
geplant oder umgesetzt wurden. Durch eine Obergrenze
für Zölle, die durch die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO)
festgesetzt wurde, ist der Spielraum vieler Länder für Zol-
lerhöhungen sehr eingeschränkt. Nichttarifäre Maßnah-
men sind aufgrund ihrer vielfältigen Ausgestaltung und
der direkten und indirekten Wirkungen wesentlich schwe-
rer zu regulieren und bieten daher die Möglichkeit, Märkte
zu protektionieren. Dennoch gibt es auch hier Regulierun-
gen durch die WTO. Eine Umwandlung bzw. Tarifizierung
der klassischen NTBs (z. B. Importkontigente) in Zoll-
äquivalente und die Erfassung und Überwachung von
technischen Standards und sanitären sowie phytosanitären
Maßnahmen sind Elemente, die seit der letzten Verhand-
lungsrunde (Uruguay-Runde, 1986–1994) im Regelwerk
des multilateralen Handelssystems der WTO enthalten
sind. Während die Anwendung der klassischen NTBs in-
folgedessen zurückgegangen ist, haben sich neue Maßnah-
men der nichttarifären Protektion entwickelt. Deren Ein-
satz wird häufig mit dem Schutz von Menschen, Tieren
oder Pflanzen gerechtfertigt. Vielfach ist jedoch die wahre
Intention einer Maßnahme nicht eindeutig zu identifizie-
ren. Beispielsweise hat China infolge des H1N1-Grippevi-
rus zusätzliche Tests für Schweinefleischimporte aus der
EU und eine Desinfektion von Containern angeordnet. Die
EU-Kommission befürchtet, dass hierdurch der Handel
mit China vollständig verhindert wird, da die geforderten
Tests sehr aufwendig sind (Agra Europe, 2009, S. 3–4). In
solchen Fällen ist es schwer zu entscheiden, ob die be-
trachtete Maßnahme zum Schutz der Konsumenten oder
aus protektionistischen Motiven implementiert wurde.
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Nichttariffäre Handelsmaßnahmen auf der detaillierten Zolllinienebene
Bestandsaufnahme
Frequency und Coverage Indizes
Messung der Handelsrestriktivität 















Abb. 1: Methodenüberblick zur
Messung von nichttarifären
Handelsmaßnahmen
Solange das vorrangige Ziel einer Maßnahme nicht eindeu-
tig identifiziert werden kann, ist es schwierig nichttarifäre
Maßnahmen zu regulieren. Für Politik und Wissenschaft ist
es daher von besonderem Interesse, die Bedeutung der nicht-
tarifären Maßnahmen im internationalen Handel zu messen
und ihre Wirkungen zu identifizieren. An dieser Stelle setzt
der vorliegende Beitrag an. Es wird gezeigt, welche Metho-
den für die Quantifizierung der NTMs zur Verfügung stehen
und welche Möglichkeiten und Grenzen diese Methoden
aufweisen. Während sich einzelne Studien häufig nur auf die
theoretische oder empirische Darstellung einer Methode be-
schränken, erfolgt in diesem Artikel eine Gesamtschau ver-
schiedener Konzepte. Darüber hinaus wird dargestellt, wie
die einzelnen Methoden miteinander kombiniert werden
können. Hierdurch soll der Einstieg in die Literatur zu den
NTMs erleichtert und der Forschungsbedarf in diesem The-
menbereich deutlich gemacht werden. Schließlich werden
zwei Indizes empirisch berechnet. Da NTMs häufig im Zu-
sammenhang mit dem Handel von Agrargütern implemen-
tiert werden, wurde in dem vorliegenden Beitrag ein An-
wendungsbeispiel aus dem Agrarbereich gewählt.
2. Übersicht über die Messmethoden
In Abb. 1 sind Methoden dargestellt, die in der Literatur
zur Messung von NTMs beschrieben und angewendet wer-
den. Die Auswahl der geeigneten Methode ist dabei von
der jeweiligen Fragestellung, der Form und Ausgestaltung
der NTMs sowie der Datenverfügbarkeit abhängig. Es
wird zwischen Methoden unterschieden, mit denen eine
Bestandsaufnahme möglich ist, und Methoden, mit denen
NTMs bzw. deren Zolläquivalente anhand ihrer Handels-
wirkung mit Hilfe des preis- oder mengenbasierten Ansat-
zes ermittelt werden können. Darüber hinaus gibt es die
Möglichkeit NTMs anhand ihrer Handelsrestriktivität zu
bestimmen und sie in Form von Indizes zu quantifizieren.
Weitergehende Analysen ermöglichen die Bewertung von
NTMs aus wohlfahrtstheoretischer Sicht oder die Wir-
kungsanalyse auf verschiedene ökonomische Faktoren,
wie beispielsweise Handel, Produktion oder Wohlfahrt.
Die Bewertung (Evaluierung) von NTMs wird häufig mit
dem Instrument der Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse durchge-
führt während bei der Wirkungsanalyse partielle oder all-
gemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle Anwendung finden. Der
vorliegende Beitrag beschränkt sich auf die Methoden zur
Messung von NTMs. Aufbauend auf diesen Konzepten
kann dann eine Evaluierung oder Wirkungsanalyse durch-
geführt werden. Ein guter Einstieg in die Literatur zur Be-
wertung von NTMs mit Hilfe der Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse
bietet van Tongeren et al. (2009). Unterschiedliche Mög-
lichkeiten zur Abbildung von NTMs in partiellen oder all-
gemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodellen werden von Fugazza/
Maur (2008, S. 475 ff.) dargestellt.
3. Bestandsaufnahme
Eine Bestandsaufnahme von NTMs kann mit Hilfe des
Frequency und des Coverage Indexes durchgeführt wer-
den. Der Frequency Index misst die Häufigkeit der An-
wendung von NTMs. Der Coverage Index misst ebenfalls
die Häufigkeit der Anwendung von NTMs, gewichtet die-
se Information jedoch mit Hilfe von Handels- oder Pro-
duktionswerten. Beide Indizes ermöglichen eine Identifi-
kation der Sektoren und Länder, in denen NTMs konzen-
triert sind und lassen somit einen intersektoralen und inter-
regionalen sowie einen intertemporalen Vergleich zu. Au-
ßerdem können die Indizes als Inputs in ökonometrischen
Analysen Verwendung finden.
Die Handelsrestriktivität oder die handelsfördernde Wir-
kung einzelner NTMs kann mit der Bestandsaufnahme aller-
dings nicht erfasst werden. Zudem wird nicht berücksichtigt,
dass einige NTMs nur gemeldet werden, aber keine Wirkung
für den Handel haben bzw. gar nicht in Kraft treten.
3.1 Frequency Index
Der Frequency Index beschreibt das Verhältnis zwischen
der Anzahl der NTMs eines Landes und der Gesamtanzahl
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der Produkte, die von diesem Land importiert werden.
Laird (1997, S. 51) berechnet den Frequency Index (FIj,t)









wobei Di,j,t eine Dummyvariable darstellt, die den Wert
Eins annimmt, wenn mindestens eine nichttarifäre Maß-
nahme auf das Produkt i mit i = (1,......,n) des Landes j im
Jahr t angewendet wird. Ansonsten ist diese Dummyvari-
able Null. Ui,j,t ist ebenfalls eine Dummyvariable, die den
Wert Eins annimmt, wenn Importe des Produktes i des Im-
portlandes j im Jahr t stattfinden.
Ist die Protektion eines Landes prohibitiv hoch, gibt es kei-
ne Importe in diesem Bereich und die NTMs gehen nicht
in die Berechnungen des Frequency Indexes ein. Dieses
Problem wird auch als Endogenitätsverzerrung bezeichnet.
Als Ergebnis ergibt sich ein nach unten verzerrter Fre-
quency Index. Um der Endogenitätsverzerrung entgegen-
zuwirken, nutzt die OECD (1996, S. 11) beispielsweise
zur Berechnung des Frequency Indexes die Anzahl aller
von NTMs betroffenen Produktlinien, ungeachtet dessen
ob sie importiert werden oder nicht. In diesem Fall wird
Ui,j,t immer als Eins definiert, auch wenn es keine entspre-
chenden Importe gibt. Hierbei kann allerdings die Gesamt-
anzahl der Produkte, die von NTMs betroffen sind, die An-
zahl der importierten Produkte eines Landes übersteigen.
Darüber hinaus besteht die Gefahr einer Fehlinterpreta-
tion, da nicht davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass
sich jeder Null-Import positiv entwickelt, wenn die NTMs
abgeschafft werden. Der größte Nachteil des Frequency
Indexes besteht in der Gleichgewichtung aller Produkte
ungeachtet dessen, welche Bedeutung sie für den Handel
haben. Hierdurch ist die relative Wichtigkeit der NTMs für
die Exporteure im Ganzen als auch für die einzelnen
Exportgüter nicht zu erkennen (Laird, 1997, S. 51).
3.2 Coverage Index
Der Coverage Index misst die Häufigkeit der Anwendung
von NTMs, gewichtet diese Information allerdings mit
Hilfe von Handels- oder Produktionswerten und ermög-
licht hierdurch die Berücksichtigung der relativen Wich-
tigkeit von Handelsflüssen. Laird (1997, S. 50) berechnet









wobei Di,j,t eine Dummyvariable ist, die den Wert Eins an-
nimmt wenn mindestens eine nichttarifäre Maßnahme auf
das Produkt i mit i = (1,......,n) des Landes j im Jahr t ange-
wendet wird. Mi,j,t ist der Wert der gesamten Importe des
Produktes i des Landes j im Jahr t. In den meisten Litera-
turquellen wird der Coverage Index, wie in der hier vorge-
stellten Formel, mit den Importwerten gewichtet. Hierfür
werden die bilateralen Importwerte oder die Importe aus
der gesamten Welt herangezogen. Durch die Gewichtung
mit den Welthandelswerten wird solchen Produkten ein
höheres Gewicht gegeben, die im internationalen Handel
eine wichtige Stellung einnehmen. Außerdem kann hier-
durch die Endogenitätsverzerrung reduziert werden, da
nicht alle Importländer das gleiche Produkt mit NTMs be-
legen. Allerdings sind die Weltimporte nicht immer reprä-
sentativ für die Importstruktur des betrachteten Landes
(Laird, 1997, S. 50). Die idealen Importwerte für eine Ge-
wichtung wären diejenigen, die in der Abwesenheit von
NTMs existieren würden. Um diese zu bestimmen, müsste
allerdings ein komplettes Importnachfragemodell ge-
schätzt werden. In der Regel lässt die Datengrundlage auf
der detaillierten Zolllinienebene (Produktebene) die Schät-
zung eines solchen Modells nicht zu.
Eine alternative Gewichtung kann über Produktionswerte
erfolgen. Hierbei wird der Anteil der heimischen Produk-
tion gemessen, der von NTMs betroffen ist. Auf diese
Weise kann der produktionsgewichtete Index einen Hin-
weis darauf geben, inwiefern NTMs die heimische Pro-
duktion schützen (Andriamananjara/Nash, 1997, S. 5).
Ein Problem der Gewichtung mit Produktionswerten be-
steht darin, dass die Produktionsdaten nicht so detailliert
vorliegen, wie die einzelnen Produktinformationen in den
internationalen Zolltabellen.
4. Wertzolläquivalente
Die Quantifizierung der NTMs erfolgt in der Literatur
häufig auf der Basis von Wertzolläquivalenten. Diese er-
möglichen einen Vergleich der Protektion zwischen Län-
dern und Sektoren. Darüber hinaus können sie für weitere
Analysen in Simulationen von partiellen und allgemeinen
Gleichgewichtsmodellen Anwendung finden.
Die Wertzolläquivalente werden dabei direkt über den
Preisvergleich oder indirekt über den Mengenvergleich er-
mittelt. Beim direkten Preisvergleich erfolgt die Berech-
nung der Wertzolläquivalente arithmetisch oder ökono-
metrisch. Beim indirekten Mengenvergleich werden die
Wertzolläquivalente dagegen ausschließlich mit Hilfe von
ökonometrischen Modellen geschätzt. Dabei wird der po-
tenzielle Handel zwischen Ländern ermittelt und mit dem
aktuellen Handel verglichen. Allerdings kann die Um-
wandlung der Handelsmengen in Zolläquivalente nur mit
Hilfe zusätzlicher Informationen und Annahmen erfolgen.
Bei der Ermittlung von Wertzolläquivalenten kann sowohl
beim Preis- als auch beim Mengenvergleich berücksichtigt
werden, dass ein Teil der Handelsrestriktivität durch Zölle
entsteht.
4.1 Preisbasierte Methode
Die Methode des direkten Preisvergleichs basiert auf der
Annahme, dass NTMs die Transaktionskosten im Handel
Pelikan/Befus, Nichttarifäre Handelsmaßnahmen
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erhöhen, so dass der Inlandspreis im Importland im Ver-
gleich zu einem Referenzpreis steigt. Zwischen dem In-
landspreis und dem Referenzpreis entsteht auf diese Weise
eine Differenz, ähnlich zur Situation bei einem Importzoll.
Diese Preisdifferenz beinhaltet die Nettoeffekte von allen
NTMs, die auf einem Markt existieren.
Der ideale Vergleich wäre zwischen dem unverzerrten
Preis des Importgutes, der ohne NTMs bestehen würde,
und dem Preis, der im Inland bei Vorliegen von NTMs
herrscht. Da unverzerrte Preise nur schwer zu ermitteln
sind, wird in der Literatur häufig der cif (cost-insurance-
freight)-Preis des importierten Gutes pf als Referenzpreis
gewählt und mit dem Inlandspreis pd verglichen. Damit
kann das Wertzolläquivalent (TE) als prozentualer Unter-





Durch die Auswahl der Preise werden die Transportkosten
zwar berücksichtigt, nicht jedoch die Zollprotektion.
Die Nachteile der direkten Preismethode bestehen darin,
dass erstens die einzelnen Maßnahmen nicht separat be-
rücksichtigt werden können, sondern als Aggregat vorlie-
gen. Zweitens kann der berechnete Effekt überschätzt wer-
den, da Preissteigerungen überall entlang der Wertschöp-
fungskette entstehen, ohne dass NTMs vorliegen müssen.
Drittens können Preisunterschiede durch die unterschied-
liche Fähigkeit der Preisdiskriminierung von ausländi-
schen und einheimischen Unternehmen begründet sein, so
dass die Preisdifferenz Renten reflektiert und weniger die
Auswirkungen von NTMs. Viertens liegt die Annahme der
perfekten Substitution vor, die nicht immer berechtigt ist,
da häufig Qualitätsunterschiede zwischen heimischen und
importierten Gütern bestehen (Ferrantino, 2006, S. 11 f.).
In der Literatur sind allerdings Erweiterungen der preisba-
sierten Methode zu finden, welche die Nachteile dieses
Ansatzes teilweise beheben. Yue et al. (2006) erweitern die
Methode beispielsweise um die imperfekte Substitution
zwischen heimischen und importierten Gütern.
Zu den konzeptionellen Schwächen kommen datentechni-
sche Probleme hinzu. Informationen über die Preise der
importierten Produkte sind relativ einfach zu bekommen,
jedoch erweist es sich als schwierig, die entsprechenden
Preise auf dem heimischen Markt zu erfassen, vor allem
auf dem disaggregierten Niveau. Wegen der beschriebenen
Datenproblematik ist die Methode für viele Produkte und
Länder ungeeignet. Aus diesem Grund wird sie nur bei
einzelnen Fallstudien mit ausgewählten und relativ stan-
dardisierten Produkten angewendet (Beghin/Bureau, 2001,
S. 113).
Um die Handelseffekte von NTMs für eine Vielzahl von
Produkten oder Sektoren in vielen Ländern simultan zu er-
halten, werden zunehmend ökonometrische Preisschätzun-
gen durchgeführt. Dabei werden systematische Gründe he-
rangezogen, warum Preise in einigen Ländern und für eini-
ge Produkte höher sind und wie diese auf NTMs zurückzu-
führen sind. Die Schätzungen sind anspruchsvoller als ein-
fache arithmetische Berechnungen. Allerdings stellt auch
hier die Datenverfügbarkeit ein Problem dar. Ein weiterer
Nachteil dieser Methode besteht darin, dass die Ergebnisse
sensitiv gegenüber ökonometrischen Spezifikationen und
Techniken sein können (Ferrantino, 2006, S. 9 ff.).
4.2 Mengenbasierte Methode
Bei der mengenbasierten Methode werden NTMs über die
Handelsmengen quantifiziert. Das Ziel besteht darin, den
Handel zu schätzen, der ohne NTMs existieren würde, und
diesen dann mit dem Handel zu vergleichen, der tatsäch-
lich vorherrscht. Mit Hilfe von Importnachfrageelastizitä-
ten (Kee et al., 2009, S. 172 ff.) oder Substitutionselastizi-
täten (Anderson/van Wincoop, 2003, S. 178) wird dann der
Handelseffekt in Wertzolläquivalente umgerechnet.
In der Literatur finden sich verschiedene empirische An-
sätze zur ökonometrischen Schätzung von NTMs, die häu-
fig Varianten von Gravitationsmodellen sind. Der Gravi-
tationsansatz wird für eine Vielzahl von Fragestellungen
genutzt, um bilaterale Handelsflüsse zu analysieren und
vorherzusagen. Er basiert auf Newton’s Gravitationsge-
setz, welches besagt, dass die Gravitationskraft (GFij) zwi-
schen zwei Objekten von den jeweiligen Massen (Mi, Mj)





i ≠ j (4)
Tinbergen (1962) und Pöyhönen (1963) haben unabhängig
voneinander herausgefunden, dass dieser Zusammenhang
auch auf die internationalen Handelsflüsse übertragen wer-
den kann. Hierbei hängt das Handelsvolumen zwischen
zwei Ländern positiv von deren ökonomischer Größe und
negativ von den Transportkosten ab. Die klassische Gravi-
tationsgleichung lautet
Qij = α
GDPiβ 1 GDPjβ 2
Dijβ 3
(5)
mit Qij als Handelsmenge zwischen Land i und j anstelle
der Gravitationskraft, GDPi,j als Bruttoinlandsprodukt des
Landes i und j anstelle der Massen, und Dij als die Distanz
zwischen den beiden Ländern, die den Transportkosten
entsprechen soll. α ist die Konstante der Gravitationsglei-
chung und β 1, β 2, β 3 sind die Koeffizienten der Variablen.
Durch Logarithmierung wird die Gravitationsgleichung in
ein lineares Modell überführt (Reinert, 2009, S. 567 f.).
Dadurch wird Gleichung (5) zu
lnQij = ln(α ) + β 1lnGDPi + β 2lnGDPj + β 3lnDij. (6)
Die Berücksichtigung eines Fehlerterms erlaubt eine
Schätzung mit der Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regres-
sionsmethode. OLS ist die typische Schätztechnik für Gra-
vitationsmodelle. Der Vorteil besteht in der Einfachheit
und der Standardisierung dieser Schätztechnik. Allerdings
werden die Ergebnisse verzerrt oder inkonsistent, wenn für
bestimmte Produkte oder Länder keine Handelsströme
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Abb. 2: Frequency Index von
NTMs im Agrarbereich
vorliegen oder die Annahme der Homoskedastizität (glei-
che Varianzen der Residuen) nicht erfüllt ist. Daher wer-
den in der Literatur vermehrt alternative Schätzmodelle
diskutiert und angewendet. Hierbei wird versucht, die Ver-
zerrungen der OLS-Schätzung mit einer Pseudo-Maxi-
mum-Likelihood-Schätzung (Santos Silva/Tenreyro, 2006,
S. 641 ff.) oder mit einer Poisson fixed-effects-Schätzung
(Burger et al., 2009, S. 167 ff.) zu beheben.
Die klassische Spezifikation der Gravitationsmodelle bie-
tet eine gute Anpassung für die meisten Datensätze der re-
gionalen und internationalen Handelsflüsse. Dennoch fehl-
te es an theoretischer Fundierung. In den letzen Jahrzehn-
ten haben viele Ökonomen die Gravitationsgleichung for-
mal abgeleitet und Verbindungen zu wichtigen Handels-
theorien hergestellt. Einen Überblick über die einzelnen
Arbeiten in diesem Bereich findet sich in Reinert (2009,
S. 567 ff.). Die Erkenntnis, dass das Gravitationsmodell
mit verschiedenen Handelsmodellen konsistent ist, ver-
stärkt dessen Anwendung in der Vorhersage von potenziel-
len Handelsflüssen. Das klassische Gravitationsmodell
wurde nach und nach um weitere erklärende Variablen er-
weitert. Besonders häufig werden Landescharakteristika,
wie das Vorliegen einer gemeinsamen Sprache und kolo-
niale Verbindungen, das Teilen einer gemeinsamen Lan-
desgrenze oder die gemeinsame Mitgliedschaft in einer
Freihandelszone als Dummyvariablen in die Gleichung
eingebracht. Darüber hinaus können Zölle und Subventio-
nen in der Gravitationsgleichung berücksichtigt werden
(Winchester, 2009, S. 821).
Die NTMs werden dann mit dem Residuenansatz durch den
unerklärten Teil der Regression implizit quantifiziert. Der
Vorteil des Residuenansatzes liegt darin, dass nicht nur die
von der erklärenden Variablen ausgehende Komponente des
Handelseffekts berücksichtigt wird. Vielmehr ist es mit die-
sem Ansatz auch möglich, die Handelswirkungen einer Viel-
zahl von NTMs auf jedem bilateralen Handelsweg zu erfas-
sen (Philippidis/Sanjua´n, 2006, S. 267).
Alternativ können NTMs auch über Handelskosten approxi-
miert werden. Diese Kosten werden durch eine Dummyvari-
able, welche die internationalen Grenzen beschreibt, erfasst.
Hierbei wird der Einfluss von Ländergrenzen auf den Han-
del durch den Vergleich zwischen internationalen und inlän-
dischen Handelsflüssen gemessen (McCallum, 1995,
S. 616). Der Koeffizient dieser „Grenz“-Dummy kombiniert
mit Substitutionselastizitäten ermöglicht es dann, Wertzoll-
äquivalente von NTMs zu berechnen (Anderson/van Win-
coop, 2003, S. 178; Winchester, 2009, S. 826).
Die mengenbasierte Methode hat jedoch auch Einschrän-
kungen, die bei der Anwendung berücksichtigt werden
sollten. Neben den Nachteilen der ökonometrischen Schät-
zungen beschreiben Bora et al. (2002, S. 7) als hauptsäch-
liches Problem die Endogenität zwischen Handelsbarrie-
ren und Importen, da die Kausalitätsrichtung zwischen
Handel und NTMs häufig nicht eindeutig ist. Hierdurch ist
es schwierig zu erkennen, ob die Handelsbarrieren die Hö-
he der Importe bestimmen oder ob die Höhe der Importe
die Anzahl der Handelsbarrieren bestimmt.
5. Alternative Indizes
Für die Messung der Zollprotektion haben Anderson/
Neary (1994, S. 151 ff., 2003, S. 627 ff.) den Merkantilis-
tischen Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI) und den
Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) entwickelt. Während
der MTRI die importäquivalente Protektion misst, stellt
der TRI einen wohlfahrtsäquivalenten Index dar. Die Indi-
zes geben an, welche Handelsrestriktionen auf aggregier-
tem Niveau zu der anfänglich disaggregierten Protektions-
struktur import- oder wohlfahrtsäquivalent sind. Für den
TRI heißt dieses beispielsweise, dass ein aggregierter Zoll
aus mehreren einzelnen Zöllen abgeleitet wird, welcher in
der Summe den gleichen Wohlfahrtsverlust hervorruft, wie
die Gesamtheit der einzelnen Zölle.
Kee et al. (2009, S. 172) berechnen den TRI und MTRI erst-
mals für NTMs. Hierfür schätzen sie die Wertzolläquivalen-
te mit ökonometrischen Modellen und aggregieren diese
entsprechend des TRI- und des MTRI-Konzeptes (vgl.
Abb. 1). Für die zukünftige Forschung wäre jedoch auch
eine direkte Berechnung des TRI und MTRI ohne den Um-
weg über die Berechnung von Wertzolläquivalenten denk-
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Abb. 3: Coverage Index von
NTMs im Agrarbereich
bar. Hierfür müssten Modelle spezifiziert werden, welche
die Berechnung wohlfahrts- oder importäquivalenter
NTMs ermöglichen. Anderson/Neary (2005, S. 131) lie-
fern hierfür erste Ansätze indem sie die Handelsrestriktivi-
tät von Zollquoten und inländischen Subventionen theore-
tisch ableiten. Das Konzept der Handelsrestriktivität bietet
noch viele Möglichkeiten für die weitere Forschung. Die
Grenzen dieses Konzepts liegen allerdings in der mangel-
haften Datenverfügbarkeit für empirische Berechnungen.
6. Anwendungsbeispiel
Abschließend wird der Frequency und der Coverage Index
am Beispiel von Agrarprodukten empirisch berechnet. Auf
der Grundlage der UNCTAD-TRAINS-Datenbasis konnten
150 verschiedene Maßnahmen für 97 Länder erfasst werden.
Die Ergebnisse sind in den Abbildungen 2 und 3 dargestellt.
Beide Indizes werden auf der Basis der bilateralen Importe
ermittelt. Dabei erfolgt keine Berücksichtigung der prohibi-
tiven Handelsbarrieren. Hierdurch wird die Häufigkeit der
NTMs im internationalen Agrarhandel unterschätzt.
Beide Indizes weisen relativ ähnliche Werte aus und zei-
gen, dass NTMs im internationalen Agrarhandel eine gro-
ße Bedeutung haben. Besonders häufig werden NTMs
hiernach in Lateinamerika und Australien angewendet. Für
viele andere Länder, wie beispielsweise die USA und Ka-
nada weist der Coverage Index einen höheren Wert als der
Frequency Index auf. Dies zeigt, dass in diesen Ländern
insbesondere Produkte, die im Handel eine große Bedeu-
tung haben, von NTMs betroffen sind.
Obwohl die zugrunde liegende Datenbasis sehr umfang-
reich ist und viele Informationen zu NTMs liefert, gibt es
drei wesentliche Kritikpunkte, die bei der Interpretation
der Ergebnisse berücksichtigt werden sollten. Erstens lie-
gen den Länderdaten unterschiedliche Basisjahre (1993
bis 2005) zugrunde. Hierdurch ist ein Ländervergleich auf
der Grundlage des gleichen Basisjahres nicht möglich. In
dem Anwendungsbeispiel wurde daher immer das aktu-
ellste Jahr gewählt. Zweitens weisen die Länder ihre
NTMs auf unterschiedlich detaillierter Ebene aus. Um
einen konsistenten Vergleich auf der gleichen Zolllinien-
ebene zu ermöglichen, wurden im vorliegenden Beitrag
die detaillierten Daten auf die kleinste gemeinsame Ebene
aggregiert. Drittens sind die Länder in vielen Bereichen
nicht dazu verpflichtet, ihre NTMs zu melden. Hierdurch
spiegeln die Daten auch das Meldeverhalten der Länder
wider und sind dahingehend verzerrt.
Ein Teil der beschriebenen Datenproblematik kann mit wei-
teren Quellen, wie beispielsweise der WTO-Datenbank oder
der Datenbank der United States International Trade Com-
mission (USITC), ausgeglichen werden. Dennoch stellt die
Datenverfügbarkeit eine der größten Restriktionen für die
Messung der NTMs dar. Daher zeigt dieser Beitrag auch
Methoden auf, die eine indirekte Messung der NTMs er-
möglichen. Dadurch kann die Höhe der Handelsrestriktion
auch ohne direkte Informationen abgeschätzt werden.
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With decreasing tariﬀs, the importance of non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs) is rising
and profoundly distorting international trade ﬂows. Most of the implemented
NTMs are legitimate and support the purpose to reduce negative externalities.
However, complex designs and hidden intentions make them perfect tools for
disguised protectionism, especially in times of economic crisis. NTMs are not
comprehensively documented, leading to lower quality data. In recent years,
there was an attempt to considerably improve databases of NTMs. We make
use of this improvement and gather diﬀerent indicators on NTMs on a yearly
basis to analyze their evolution and impacts on trade using a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel
model. We particular focus on food and agriculture because this sector is mainly
aﬀected by NTMs. Based on our empirical results, we conclude that NTMs do
have signiﬁcant, negative eﬀects on agro-food trade; but this greatly depends on
the chosen indicator and the income level of the countries.
JEL classiﬁcation: Q17, Q18, F14
Key words: non-tariﬀ measures, food and agricultural trade, economic
crisis, panel data, ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation
11 Introduction
Non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs) are an integral part of agricultural trade policies and have
become even more important since the recent economic crisis. While tariﬀs loose rele-
vance due to commitments in multilateral frameworks of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and in preferential trade agreements, NTMs increasingly gain in importance
and by far outweigh the relevance of traditional trade policies in distorting free trade
ﬂows (WTO, 2012). Traditional NTMs such as import quotas and voluntary export
restraints are purely protectionist and controllable. In contrast, new instruments re-
sulting from divergent regulatory systems and diﬀerent perceptions of hazards and risks
represent a major challenge for the future of liberalized trade, especially in sensitive
sectors such as food and agriculture. These NTMs are mostly instruments to meet
policy interests and objectives of the general public like the correction of market fai-
lures resulting from information asymmetries or imperfect competition. NTMs are also
used to pursue non-economic goals like the protection of human and animal life and
the environment (Bacchetta and Beverelli, 2012). Though trade-hindering, these mea-
sures can be useful and vital for both welfare and trade reasons. But NTMs are less
transparent than tariﬀ measures and consequently harder to identify and to discipline.
That is why governments easily abuse NTMs for protectionist purposes in order to
shield domestic producers from world markets, especially in times of economic crises
and national policy challenges. Indeed, Baldwin and Evenett (2009) and Evenett and
Wermelinger (2010) refer to NTMs as the dominant form of protectionism during the
recent crisis. The slow redemption of these measures and unintended side-eﬀects could
aggravate the unstable economic situation and cause long-term trade-relation troubles
of global nature.
For decades analysts have struggled to estimate the trade costs of NTMs to empirically
reveal and to verify their impacts on trade. Contrary to tariﬀs, NTMs are diﬃcult to
tackle because of their complexity in design and high dimensionality in implications.
Another central problem is in obtaining accurate data on NTMs. Adjustments in
tariﬀ schedules are well documented in publicly available databases and hence ready to
analyze. In contrast there is no comprehensive reporting requirement for NTMs. Other
reasons for missing data are the private nature of information such as of measures
dealing with trade secrets of a business and because it is not possible to measure
2them directly. Publicly available data sets are limited and incomplete in terms of
time and country coverage or there is no distinction for goods (Anderson and von
Wincoop, 2004). However, NTMs vary considerably across goods and countries and
indicate upward shifts in economically turbulent times. Besides, most data sets report
recordings; but give no indication for the restrictiveness for the measures. On the
one hand, more and more studies infer the eﬀects of NTMs through comparisons of
prices or trade quantities using gravity-like models, and on the other hand, there are
more eﬀorts in improving databases on NTMs on the global scale. In particular there
are comprehensive data collection eﬀorts by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, the World Economic Forum and the
International Trade Center which aim for transparency and sustainability of NTM data.
There is an increasing literature evaluating the eﬀects of NTMs on trade using diﬀerent
direct indicators. However, we are unaware of any attempts made in comparing the
performance of diﬀerent proxies of NTMs and diﬀerentiating between eﬀects on imports
and on exports for the agro-food sector. We address this issue by making use of the
improvement of databases and compose data on diﬀerent indicators for NTMs on yearly
basis to assess the eﬀects on exports and imports separately. In general, we can conclude
that trade costs are high and aﬀect imports more than exports. Time to trade and
burdensome customs procedures have the strongest impact on trade. We structure the
remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 gives an overview about the features and
prevalence of NTMs. It also sketches WTO's approach to NTMs and examines their
relevance in the recent economic crisis. Section 3 presents our data set and Section 4
describes the estimation methodology. The estimation results are presented in Section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Review on Non-Tariﬀ Measures
2.1 Deﬁnition and Measurement of NTMs
Non-tariﬀ trade measures include all policy instruments other than tariﬀs that can
inﬂuence international trade ﬂows. They distort commercial exchange by increasing
trade costs. NTMs comprise a wide and diverse range of policy and regulatory mea-
3sures. They can be divided into border measures and behind-the-border measures. The
ﬁrst category encompasses all measures impacting imports and exports such as quotas
and other prohibitions, import licensing, customs procedures and other administra-
tive fees, export taxes, export subsidies, and voluntary export restraints. The second
category incorporates measures implemented in the domestic market such as domes-
tic legislation in terms of food safety, animal and plant health, technical, labor and
environmental standards, internal taxes or charges (Staiger, 2012). There are several
other ways to categorize NTMs. The most detailed taxonomy on NTMs is served by
UNCTAD classifying NTMs into 16 chapters and multiple subcategories (UNCTAD,
2013).
Diversity, complexity in design and lack of transparency in application make them very
attractive to substitute tariﬀ protection and challenge researchers in analyzing their
eﬀects on trade. A generally accepted and uniﬁed approach to evaluate NTMs does
not exist. Analysts evaluate NTMs in studies using either qualitative or quantitative
approaches. In addition, cost-beneﬁt analyses provide systematic assessments of costs
and beneﬁts of NTMs as a basis for a policy decision making process (van Tongeren
et al., 2009). Qualitative studies mostly consists of case studies and surveys examining
speciﬁc countries, products or instruments and do not allow for drawing general con-
clusions. In terms of quantitative approaches, there are diﬀerent methods and data to
assess NTMs, including simple frequency and coverage ratios, price comparison mea-
sures and quantity impact measures based on gravity-type models. While the ﬁrst
group of measures only identiﬁes countries and products where NTMs are most preva-
lent, the comparison measures bring all eﬀective NTMs to one metric by calculating
tariﬀ equivalents. In that way the restrictiveness of NTMs is obtained that is directly
comparable to tariﬀs.1 This is the reason why simple frequency and coverage ratios
for measuring NTMs have become less important. Instead, the theoretical and empi-
rical exploration of methods to derive tariﬀ cost equivalents of NTMs was intensiﬁed.
The most ambitious study in terms of theoretical framework as well as country and
product coverage is performed by Kee et al. (2009). They estimated ad-valorem tariﬀ
equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs using the information of NTMs from the UNCTAD Trade
Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database. The authors conclude that for
1See Deardorﬀ and Stern (1997), Ferrantino (2006) and Carrère and De Melo (2011) for a review on
methods to evaluate non-tariﬀ trade measures.
4the most products AVEs of NTMs are higher than the actual tariﬀ. Also, other studies
both empirical and qualitative conﬁrm that NTMs are substantial barriers to trade,
especially for developing countries (e.g. Anderson and von Wincoop, 2004; Chen and
Novy, 2012; Hoekman and Nicita, 2011).
2.2 WTO and NTMs
On a multilateral level, NTMs have become an increasing concern for the WTO. While
the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) adopted a marginal approach
in treating NTMs, the WTO had to adapt this approach because of increasing rela-
tive dominance and global relevance (Staiger, 2012). After the success in decreasing
tariﬀs to a minimum, the WTO is now aware of the danger of NTMs in distorting
trade that erodes the long lasting eﬀorts in trade liberalization. The conclusion of the
Uruguay Round involved a tariﬁcation process to eliminate traditional welfare-reducing
instruments such as quotas and voluntary export restraints. In addition, shortly after
conception in 1995 the WTO implemented several agreements in order to strengthen
the prohibition of some measures and to make the usage of NTMs more transparent. To
support these measures, the WTO created the The Safeguard Agreement and the Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement to regulate border measures. Behind-
the-border measures are regulated in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sa-
nitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreements. Nevertheless, there are many
loopholes and ﬂexibilities which allow governments to circumvent the rules and imple-
ment certain instruments as trade distorting measures. Though best implemented in
a non-discriminate way and in justiﬁed cases, the reality shows that often the purpose
is to protect domestic markets and to discriminate among trade partners. In addition,
Long et al. (2013) show that the growing activity on food safety and animal and plant
health issues in the last few decades is used as a substitute for traditional tariﬀ barriers.
Hence, regulating NTMs on multilateral level seems to be minimal and doubtful. The
only promising progress in terms of NTMs regulation was made in the framework of the
Trade Facilitation package within the Doha round negotiations. The perspective is to
make trade easier by reducing trade costs resulting from complicated trade procedures,
divergence in commercial rules and non-transparent information and procedures. In
case of a conclusion of the Trade Facilitation talks, the trade community expects sub-
5stantial gains through market access and more competitiveness (Carrère and De Melo,
2011).
In contrast to this relatively weak performance on the multilateral level, bilateral and
regional agreements in terms of NTMs are more binding and hence allow deeper trade
integration than in multilateral arrangements by covering a wide range of measures
that are not issued on the multilateral framework. Hence, countries prefer negotiations
on a bilateral level. On the one hand, it is easier to reach mutual recognition and
harmonization of NTMs between two trade partners and hence foster trade within
a special region. Considering spillover eﬀects, regulatory systems are automatically
spread oneself and could in some areas gradually lead to comprehensive regulatory
convergence in world trade (CEPR, 2013). On the other hand, preferential agreements
may contain the risk of creating unnecessary restrictive regulations, if asymmetric
bargaining power exists.
Because of the lack of strict rules regarding non-tariﬀ protection, NTMs are likely to
be the reason for trade conﬂicts. On the multilateral level, WTO member countries
are able to resolve trade quarrels under the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (WTO,
2013a). The DSB provides a platform upon which member countries may bring cases
against other member countries for violations against agreements for commitments
made in the WTO. Recording the disputes allows tracking the amount of incoming
cases, the complaining countries, the respective agreements and the topics of trade
conﬂicts. With the start of the Dispute Settlement Procedure in 1995, the number
of cases increased rapidly and peaked in 1997 with 50 cases. After that there was a
downward trend till 2005 with an exception in 2002. Since the recent ﬁnancial and
global economic crisis the amount of cases stagnated around an average of 16 cases and
experienced a strong increase in 2012 with 27 cases (WTO, 2013b).
2.3 Economic Crisis and NTMs
There is a considerable amount of activity in the research community aimed at analy-
zing the features of the recent global crisis in general, and the origins and consequences
of the trade collapse in particular (e.g., Anderton and Tewolde, 2011; Behrens et al.,
2011; Eaton et al., 2011; Freund, 2009; Levchenko et al., 2010; OECD, 2010). Bems
et al. (2012) present a thorough study on the causes for the trade breakdown based on
6a survey of the recent literature and conclude that changes in trade policies only have a
marginal role in explaining the trade collapse, at least at the aggregate level. Also, Kee
et al. (2013) assess trade policies during the economic crisis but diﬀerentiate between
manufacturing and agriculture. They agree that protectionist measures did not cause
the trade breakdown and they also conclude that protectionism did not rise due to eco-
nomic downturn. However, they apply a narrow deﬁnition of trade policies considering
only tariﬀs and trade defense measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties
in their analysis, excluding all other forms of non-tariﬀ policies. Other authors ﬁnd evi-
dence that many countries responded to the unstable and worrisome conditions of the
economic crisis with protectionist policy instruments (e.g., Bussière et al., 2011). Brock
(2009) states that policy makers tend to drift back into old habits by implementing
protectionist measures in challenging policy situations. Also, Eaton et al. (2011) show
that increasing trade barriers independently contribute to the alarming trade picture.
Although changes in trade policies were heterogeneous across countries and relatively
muted, they still have a strong impact. Evenett and Wermelinger (2010) emphasize
that for speciﬁc sectors or trade partners increase in protectionist instruments might
have been enormously involving signiﬁcant changes in future trade policy agendas. Fur-
thermore, it is argued that protectionism can be accounted as a reinforcing mechanism
which challenges and aggravates the economic recovery. Hence, protectionist activity
should neither be ignored nor understated. That is why the WTO and other organi-
zations also call for alertness in terms of protectionist trade policies and their future
resistance.
Generally, countries increase trade barriers in economic turbulent times to protect their
domestic industries from foreign competitors and to boost local production (Basu et al.,
2012). This time there were strongly contrasting developments as a result of the ac-
companied upward spike in the international food prices. Net importers of agro-food
products reduced import barriers and net exporters raised export barriers, both with
the aim of reducing the domestic price of food (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012). Though
meant as short-term reaction to the crisis, there is a consensus that governments do
not easily remove trade barriers and that protectionism is likely to persist in long-term
jeopardizing more free trade in the future (e.g., Evenett, 2013). The leading indus-
trial countries are aware of the danger of intensiﬁed protectionism for future economic
growth and political relations. That is why the G-20 leaders publicly committed to
7open trade and investment regimes, resist protectionism and to expand markets. In
order to have a control of these commitments, they authorized the WTO, UNCTAD
and OECD to jointly monitor trade and investment policy measures adopted all over
the world. The last report on that series was published in June 2013 and covers the
review period mid-October 2012 to mid-May 2013. In that period more than 100 trade
restrictions were recorded, which cover around 0.5% of G-20 imports, or equivalently
0.4% of world imports. The most frequent measures implemented during mid-October
2012 and mid-May 2013 were the initiation of trade defense actions, in particular, anti-
dumping investigations, followed by tariﬀ increases. In spite of the slowdown in the
imposition of new trade restrictive measures, these measures add to the set of restric-
tions put in place since the outbreak of the global crisis. Most of these measures are
still eﬀective in distorting trade ﬂows (WTO, 2013e).
The recent economic crisis led to the establishment of new databases to globally monitor
the use of NTMs during the crisis and thereafter. Speciﬁcally, there are the Trade
Monitoring Database as an initiative of the WTO and the Global Trade Alert (GTA)
project providing information on policies that aﬀect world trade since the outbreak
of the crisis. According to the Trade Monitoring Database, import related measures
(229) make the majority of implemented trade restricting measures, followed by trade
defense actions (76) and export related measures (69). The initiation of other measures
(2) constitute the smallest group of adopted trade distorting measures (WTO, 2013d).
According to WTO estimates, the trade coverage of all import restrictions implemented
since 2008, excluding those that have been withdrawn up to mid-May 2013, is around
3.6% of world imports, and around 4.6% of trade of G-20 countries. The slow removal
of previous trade restrictions leads to the accumulation of trade restrictions. This
development is of severe concern because the beneﬁts of trade openness will be slowly
and incrementally undermined (WTO, 2013e).
GTA database oﬀers information on measures taken by governments during the last
global economic downturn that are likely to aﬀect cross-border trade. This initiative
not only identiﬁes countries implementing policies but also the trading partners that
could potentially be harmed by these measures. The independent GTA team divides
the measures according to the traﬃc lights color system, whereby green indicate low
discriminatory power of the implied measures and red the highest discriminatory power
(GTA, 2013a). Since January 2008 over 4,200 measures were implemented of which
8nearly 2,500 are protectionist measures. Manufacturing is the most aﬀected sector,
followed by the agro-food sector and services. The majority of applied protectionist
measures comprise trade defense measures (524) as well as bailouts and state aid mea-
sures (519) (see Table 1).
Table 1: Global Trade Alert Measures
Measure Type Total Measures Green Measures Amber Measures Red Measures
Bail out / state aid measure 577 4 54 519
Competitive devaluation 6 0 0 6
Consumption subsidy 18 4 8 6
Export subsidy 116 3 29 84
Export taxes or restriction 216 57 37 122
Import ban 83 11 21 51
Import subsidy 14 4 9 1
Intellectual property protection 14 5 6 3
Investment measure 301 124 65 112
Local content requirement 89 4 32 53
Migration measure 212 85 31 96
Non tariﬀ barrier (not otherwise speciﬁed) 289 69 45 175
Other service sector measure 49 9 20 20
Public procurement 94 3 38 53
Quota (including tariﬀ rate quotas) 76 14 23 39
Sanitary and phytosantiary Measure 39 9 13 17
State trading enterprise 8 1 0 7
State-controlled company 32 3 4 25
Sub-national government measure 12 0 5 7
Tariﬀ measure 863 455 135 273
Technical barrier to Trade 49 17 14 18
Trade defense measure 911 7 380 524
Trade ﬁnance 151 1 28 122
Source: GTA (2013b).
Russia, Argentina, India, Belarus and Germany are at the top of applying the most
protectionist measures since the outbreak of the crisis. In general, the EU is the
most active region in adopting protectionist measures. The country that is most af-
fected by protectionist measures is China. About 45% of all protectionist instruments
implemented worldwide negatively inﬂuence Chinese trading activities. In terms of im-
plementing liberalizing and transparency-improving measures, Russia and Brazil are
exemplary with over 100 measures (GTA, 2013b). Despite these high numbers, the
GTA researchers conclude in their last report that there is an underestimation of the
true extent of government interventions during the crisis due to hidden and obscured
instruments. Furthermore, the time lag in reporting protectionist measures hides the
jump in protectionism. As such, quarterly data show that there is a relatively stable
number of implemented measures, partly with a decreasing rate, with two peaks, in
the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 and in the fourth quarter of 2012. First, this makes it clear
that countries continue to implement harmful trade-related measures. However, the
9decreasing rate might give the impression that countries are eager to remove harmful
measures. Because of the reporting lags, this development is misleading. GTA re-
searchers conclude that there is an upward trend in protectionist measures and that
there are no or only weakened eﬀorts in withdrawing them aﬀecting the long-term
global trade picture (Evenett, 2013).
3 Estimation Strategy
To assess the relevance of trade barriers for food and agricultural trade, we apply a
gravity-like equation. The gravity model is widely used in the international trade litera-
ture to assess diﬀerent trade-related policies. The standard model explains bilateral
trade ﬂows by the sizes of the trading countries and other variables that aﬀect the costs
of trading between the two countries (e.g., distance, import tariﬀs, cultural adjacency,
etc.). Anderson (2011) and Head and Mayer (2014) oﬀer a thorough review of the
theoretical and empirical developments of the gravity model. We adapt the standard
speciﬁcation of the gravity model in that we use aggregated trade ﬂows from each
country to the world. Speciﬁcally, we regress measures of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ protection
on the yearly level of food and agricultural imports and exports within each country.
We apply a panel estimation for 141 countries covering the years 2002 to 2012. One
major problem that can occur when estimating the eﬀect of trade barriers on the
level of agricultural trade is witnessing unobserved heterogeneity between countries.
Unobserved heterogeneity causes biased and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we use
panel data to control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries to ensure unbiased
and consistent estimators. The basic regression equation reads as follows:
ln(TRADEit) = β1 + β2 ln(TARIFFit) + β3 ln(NTMit) + (1)
β4 CONTRit + Y Dt + ci + it.
Here, ln(TRADEit) denotes the logarithmized imports or exports of food and agri-
cultural trade. The variable ln(TARIFFit) is the log of 1 plus the ad-valorem tariﬀ
on food and agricultural products and ln(NTMit) denotes the logarithmized measure
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for non-tariﬀ protection. CONTR denotes a vector of control variables and Y D is a
yearly time dummy variable. ci is a country ﬁxed eﬀect and  is a random error term.
The subscript i corresponds to the country dimension of our panel and t is the corres-
ponding time subscript. Within our set of control variables, we try to capture factors
other than tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ trade barriers that inﬂuence the level of trade in the
agro-food products in countries. The most important aspects concern the country's
level of industrial development. Fluctuations in macroeconomic activity do not aﬀect
diﬀerent sectors within the production equally. The impact of economic expansion
and recession upon trade in general and especially in the agro-food sector is rather
asymmetric. An increase in the food and agricultural production enlarges the amount
to be oﬀered while the expansion of industrial production can reduce the number of
workers as well as other resources like soil for the agro-food sectors. This eﬀect may
be most pronounced in lower income countries that are more likely to impose tariﬀs.
We try to catch these eﬀects through two control variables; the GDP growth in per-
cent and the population density. In addition, we consider the political status of a
country, the corruption perception and agricultural policy costs. This is supposed to
capture eﬀects of policy-driven dispersion of trade levels due to subsidies and external
political pressure. Finally, we also control for trade eﬀects resulting from regional trade
agreements (RTAs). RTAs tend to increase trade among signatory countries because of
duty-free commerce and harmonization of standards and regulations. The construction
and sources of these variables are explained in the following section.2
To estimate speciﬁcation (1) consistently, we have to be aware of the fact that a corre-
lation between the country ﬁxed eﬀect ci and the random error term  cannot be ruled
out completely. Even if the diﬀerent control variables used reduce the correlation we
cannot be sure that no heterogeneity is left unexplained. Therefore, we have to choose
an estimation method that allows a correlation structure between the country ﬁxed
eﬀect ci and all other explanatory variables: the estimation of ﬁxed-eﬀects panel data
models. It has to be kept in mind that ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation only use within-variation
for the estimation. However, our panel spreads enough variation over time to ensure
the identiﬁcation of the variables of main interest. We estimate speciﬁcation (1) for all
trade measures by ﬁxed-eﬀects.
2Except for the GDP growth, all control variables enter the model in logarithmic form.
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4 Data Set
We compile a panel data set containing information on trade ﬂows, tariﬀs and NTMs
and important control variables for the years 2002 to 2012 on a country-level. We source
data on total agricultural import and export ﬂows (in 1,000 US$) from the United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) database and average agricultural
tariﬀs from UNCTAD TRAINS database using the World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) software (World Bank, 2013b). Since there is no unique database on NTMs
measures, we employ diﬀerent available indicators from several sources. First, we use
indicators on the prevalence of trade barriers and customs burden which come from
the Global Competitiveness Dataset of the World Economic Forum (World Economic
Forum, 2013). The data for constructing the indices was gathered through an executive
opinion survey. In terms of prevalence of trade barriers, the respondents were asked In
your country, to what extent do non-tariﬀ barriers (e.g., health and product standards,
technical and labeling requirements, etc,) limit the ability of imported goods to compete
in the domestic market? The answer options scale ranges from 1 (strongly limit) to
7 (do not limit at all). In terms of customs burden, respondents were asked In your
country, how eﬃcient are the customs procedures (related to the entry and exit of
merchandise)? The answer options scale ranges from 1 (not eﬃcient at all) to 7
(extremely eﬃcient). We multiply the indicators by -1 for interpretation reasons. Se-
cond, we use indicators from the Doing Business Dataset of the World Bank that oﬀers
country speciﬁc information on the costs (excluding tariﬀs) associated with exporting
and importing a container by ocean transport (in US$ per container), time (in days)
and the number of documents necessary to complete the transaction (World Bank,
2013a). Third, we use the number of notiﬁed SPS measures to the WTO from the SPS
Information Management System (WTO, 2013c). Availability of data on yearly basis
from 2002 to 2012 restrict our analysis to these indicators of NTMs.
To control for other factors that inﬂuence trade ﬂows, we include variables that mea-
sure a country's economic and social performance. Speciﬁcally, we use data on GDP
growth and population density (people per km2 of land area) which are obtained from
the World Bank. Information on political freedom is taken from the Freedom House.
The index ranges from 1 (very good) to 7 (very bad). Hence, the higher the indices
the more political constraints the countries experience (Freedom House, 2013). For
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interpretation convenience we multiply this index by -1. Additional controls are the
total number of existing RTAs and an index of corruption perception. Information
on RTAs is taken from de Sousa (2014) and on corruption from Transparency Inter-
national (International Transparency, 2014). Finally, we also include an indicator for
agricultural policy costs which come from the Global Competitiveness Dataset of the
World Economic Forum. The data for constructing the index was gathered through an
executive opinion survey in which respondents were asked In your country, how would
you assess the agricultural policy? The answer options scale ranges from 1 (excessively
burdensome for the economy) to 7 (balances well the interests of taxpayers, consumers,
and producers) (World Economic Forum, 2013). Also here, we multiply the indicator
by -1 for interpretation reasons.
All data is available on a yearly basis for 141 countries all over the world.3 According
to the World Bank classiﬁcation, 48 of all countries are high-income countries, 93
are middle- and low-income countries. Detailed summary statistics on all variables
separated for these groups of countries are presented in Table 2.
Our data set shows that high income countries have the highest trade ﬂows compared
to middle and low income countries. In terms of tariﬀ protection, the applied weighted
average tariﬀ increases with the income level. More interestingly, the variance of tariﬀs
is higher for high income countries than for the other group of countries referring
to problems concerning tariﬀ peaks and tariﬀ dispersion in industrialized countries.
Analyzing the competitiveness on the basis of the two available variables from theWorld
Economic Forum that are related to NTMs, it is obvious that the competitiveness is
better in high income countries than in middle and low income countries. In the same
spirit, the Doing Business database measures on trading across borders reveal that high
income countries have the lowest trade costs in terms of both imports and exports. This
is particularly the case for the time indicator, where middle and low income countries
have an almost three times larger value than high-income countries. In terms of the
number of SPS notiﬁcations, high income countries notify on average four times more
new SPS measures than middle and low income countries. The remaining variables
reveal the characteristic diﬀerences between industrial and developing countries.
3Due to issues with data unavailability, we lack data for some countries in some years and therefore,
we must adopt an unbalanced panel.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
High-Income Countries
Mean Std Min Max Obs
Import value 1.31e+07 1.95e+07 25057.9 1.13e+08 511
Export value 1.09e+10 2.04e+10 37548 1.45e+11 576
Weighted average tariﬀ 5.329 11.5381 0 113.55 511
Time to import 12.744 7.1797 4 45 402
Documents to import 5.3532 2.0394 2 13 402
Cost to import 1079.535 419.7685 367 2780 402
Time to export 12.8532 5.6947 6 30 402
Documents to export 4.4801 1.4749 2 10 402
Cost to export 957.0373 331.6923 400 2595 402
Prevalence of NTBs 5.1894 .6506 3.4739 6.6587 339
Burden of customs procedures 4.8097 .7444 2.4660 6.4695 293
SPS notiﬁcations 35.1254 44.9570 0 410 542
Population density 674.8507 2498.632 .1372 19885.11 647
Total Nr of RTAs 34.1797 22.1018 0 71 612
GDP growth 2.9430 4.9365 -17.9550 27.4987 579
Corruption perception index 6.5460 1.9415 1.7 9.7 404
Freedom index 1.9625 1.7471 1 7 587
Agricultural policy costs index 4.0493 .6552 2.5156 6.1339 339
Middle- and Low-Income Countries
Import value 1942206 5220842 741.694 8.72e+07 859
Export value 3.38e+09 8.20e+09 295 8.28e+10 876
Weighted average tariﬀ 10.4347 7.8003 0 76.93 859
Time to import 32.8867 19.3212 8 104 1024
Documents to import 8.3506 2.5716 3 21 1024
Cost to import 1763.452 1177.977 317 9800 1024
Time to export 28.7949 16.6092 8 102 1024
Documents to export 7.0918 2.0638 3 15 1024
Cost to export 1471.479 939.495 295 8450 1024
Prevalence of NTBs 4.1927 .5248 2.2229 5.7356 572
Burden of customs procedures 3.6015 .6454 1.8256 5.5908 500
SPS notiﬁcations 9.2799 22.6791 0 196 636
Population density 119.7271 163.4581 1.5996 1188.41 1311
Total Nr of RTAs 15.9454 14.1875 0 71 1412
GDP growth 4.9093 4.6078 -17.6690 34.5 1264
Corruption perception index 3.0306 1.0254 .8 7.1 978
Freedom index 3.8346 1.7309 1 7 1412
Agricultural policy costs index 3.7630 .5717 1.5863 5.4868 572
Source: Authors' calculations.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Development over Time
To analyze the evolution of tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ trade measures over time, we observe
the average tariﬀ and diﬀerent proxies for NTMs. We particularly consider the trade
cost measure oﬀered by the World Bank to assess overall costs of trade policies (World
Bank, 2014). The symmetric bilateral trade cost index which is expressed in tariﬀ
equivalents is derived from the inverse gravity framework and indirectly infers trade
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barriers from observable trade data. It summarizes all impediments at the border
leading to the discrepancy between bilateral and domestic trade and hence represents a
comprehensive measure of trade barriers (Novy, 2013). Figure 1 displays the develop-
ment of tariﬀs and overall trade costs for two diﬀerent income level countries. In
general, there is a downward trend in the tariﬀ both in high-income countries and in
lower income countries. But the tariﬀ in high-income countries is lower and is more
characterized by falls and peaks. In contrast, lower income countries did not respond
aggressively with tariﬀs during the economic crisis with an exception in 2007. In
terms of trade costs, there is also a downward trend after 2004/2005. Even during the
economic crisis there is no evidence of increases in trade costs. Very remarkable is the
rise in trade costs for high-income countries in 2011.
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Source: Authors' illustration. Data from World Bank (2013b, 2014).
We evaluate the development of NTMs over time using the indicators on import and
export costs of cross-border trade from the Doing Business Database. The development
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is not clear cut. In terms of the absolute costs of ocean transport as a proxy for NTMs,
both high-income and lower income countries experience an upward trend in imports
and exports, whereas the costs to ship a container are much higher for lower income
countries. In both income groups there is jump in trade costs in 2008 that might be
an indication for protectionist responses in the economic crisis. However, in terms of
the time to trade, there is clear downward trend; especially for lower income countries.
With the onset of the economic crisis, trade costs stagnated in terms of time to trade.
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Note: HIC = High-Income Countries; MILC = Middle- and Low-Income Countries
Source: Authors' illustration. Data from World Bank (2013a).
5.2 Estimation Results
Now we turn to the discussion of the results obtained from the estimations that were
previously elaborated. Table 3 reports the results for ﬁxed-eﬀects panel regressions
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of the logarithmic imports on tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ trade measures of each country.
Equivalently, Table 4 exhibits results using logarithmic exports as dependent variable.
The sample comprises all countries for the years 2002-2012. Tables A1 to A2 and Tables
A3 to A4 in the Appendix show the results for subsamples according to income level.
All columns include a set of control variables described above. Columns 1-6 contain
the results for diﬀerent proxies for non-tariﬀ trade measures. In column (1), NTMs are
measured by the time to import in days. Column (2) and (3) present estimates of the
same model replacing the NTM indicator by the number of documents to import and
the absolute cost to import. Column (4) and (5) employ the indicators on the prevalence
of trade barriers and on burden of customs procedures, respectively. Finally, in column
(6) we present estimation results using the number of SPS notiﬁcations as NTM proxy.
All control variables mostly show the expected signs and magnitudes of the eﬀects,
though they are not always signiﬁcant. The higher the population density and the more
RTAs countries have signed, the more they are expected to trade. In contrast, GDP
growth and corruption tend to decrease import ﬂows considering the whole sample.
Exceptionally, higher corruption tends to increase trade for high-income countries. In
terms of export ﬂows, GDP growth has a positive eﬀect; but the eﬀect is mostly not
signiﬁcant. As expected agricultural policy costs decrease trade. Unexpectedly, more
political freedom decreases trade. In regressions where we ﬁnd a positive sign, the
eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Turning to the results of trade measures in the whole sample regression, we ﬁnd a ne-
gative eﬀect of tariﬀs on food and agricultural imports throughout all six speciﬁcations.
But the tariﬀ eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. This result is in accordance with the trade litera-
ture that indicates tariﬀs as trade barriers. It also conﬁrms the literature that tariﬀs
are no longer signiﬁcant impediments for trade. More importantly, we ﬁnd a negative
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of non-tariﬀ protection for four NTM indicators. Estimation
results from speciﬁcation (1) and (2) show that time and the number of documents
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the imports. Contradictory to our expectations, increased import
costs have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on imports. Also, using the indicator for
the prevalence of NTBs and the number of SPS notiﬁcations reveal a positive eﬀect.
But this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. In terms of NTMs related to customs procedures, the









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A 1% increase in NTMs is expected to decrease imports by 0.34% to 0.55% on average.
NTMs that are proxied by the number of documents have the lowest impact and
burdensome customs procedures have the highest impact on imports. Due to the
variables on time to import, documents on import and customs burdens only capture a
fraction of all existing NTMs, the lower eﬀects are reasonable. A possible explanation
for the positive and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for the prevalence of NTBs and the number
of SPS notiﬁcations might be the countervailing eﬀects of standards and technical
regulations captured in these indicators. On the one hand, they can be trade beneﬁcial
in that they eliminate information asymmetries and hence expand demand. But on
the other hand, they can work as trade barriers because of increasing compliance costs
to meet the standards and regulations.
Analyzing the eﬀects on exports, a similar picture appears, with the exception that the
negative eﬀect of tariﬀs is highly signiﬁcant and much greater in magnitude. In terms
of NTMs, there is a change in signiﬁcance for the prevalence of NTBs and customs
burdens and a change in the sign of the coeﬃcient for the number of SPS notiﬁcations.
Hence, customs procedures seem to be onerous for importing but not for exporting
agro-food products. In contrast, a high prevalence of NTBs against foreign products
signiﬁcantly aﬀects exports. Estimation results on trade barriers using subsamples
according to income levels show mixed results (Tables A1 to A4 in the Appendix). Im-
ports of lower income countries are mainly restricted by arduous customs procedures,
followed by time consuming procedures and the amount of paperwork needed to facili-
tate importing. The same eﬀects are observable for exports. Interestingly, the number
of SPS notiﬁcations increase imports of lower income countries signiﬁcantly. For high
income countries only the time to trade is a signiﬁcant restrictive factor. Thereby,
exports are more aﬀected than imports. Interestingly, high prevalence of NTBs in high

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper analyzes the prevalence and the evolution of non-tariﬀ trade measures and
their impact on trade. Special focus is given to food and agricultural trade because
protectionism is mainly concentrated in this sector. Using rich data from diﬀerent
sources, we can take advantage from a panel data set on yearly basis for most countries
in the world. The estimation of ﬁxed-eﬀects models enables us to control not only for
observed heterogeneity, but also for unobserved heterogeneity.
In our empirical analysis NTMs are measured either as an indicator of the prevalence
of NTBs or of customs procedures provided by the Global Competitiveness Dataset
of the World Economic Forum or by proxy variables such as the number of days to
trade, the number of documents that are needed to complete the transaction and the
costs to ship a standardized container across the border from the World Bank Doing
Business Database. We also use the number of notiﬁed SPS measures to the WTO
as a proxy for NTMs. In terms of evolution over time we also consider the trade
cost index from the World Bank. Indicators for NTMs do not appear clear-cut in the
development over time. While the costs of trading a container increased over time, the
indicators of number on days and documents show the opposite development in the
same time period. Also, the overall trade cost index is more likely to show a downward
trend in trade costs. Instead, the competitiveness measures indicate an increase in
NTMs starting with the economic crisis. Also, examining the data from the Trade
Monitoring Database of the WTO and according to the analysis of the GTA project
there was an increase in NTMs in recent years as implication of the economic crisis.
In terms of trade impacts, our estimation results show that tariﬀs decrease imports in
the agro-food sector, but this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. In contrast, negative eﬀects of
tariﬀs on exports are highly signiﬁcant. This indicates that tariﬀs in individual agro-
food sectors harm the total agro-food exports more than imports through creating
false incentives in diverting resources to protected sectors and neglecting the export
industry. Additionally, we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of non-tariﬀ trade measures on imports
and exports in most speciﬁcations. A 1% increase in NTMs is expected to decrease
imports by 0.34% to 0.55% on average. Most measures indicate a drop in trade when
NTMs are increased. The strongest impact is expected when applying the time cost
measure and the lowest eﬀect is observable when using the number of notiﬁed SPS
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measures as a proxy for NTMs. The prevalence of standards and technical regulations
as well as the number of notiﬁed SPS measures do not reveal clear eﬀects on trade.
In diﬀerentiating the eﬀects according to income level of countries the results become
mixed in that the performance for imports and the subsample of middle and low income
countries is generally better. Our results show that conclusions drawn with respect to
the eﬀects of NTMs on trade are sensitive to the chosen indicator for NTMs.
Our paper contributes to a large literature on the evolution and eﬀects of non-tariﬀ
trade measures in the agro-food trade and it conﬁrms the high relevance of these
measures for international trade. Enhancing databases in terms of quality and com-
prehensiveness will foster the development of a consistent picture of NTMs and helps
to understand their eﬀects. However, our study aﬃrms that more resources on data
quality and collection are necessary to increase transparency and deﬁniteness of NTMs,
especially in times of economic crisis. Our study not only addresses the issue of data
quality but also has implications for policy makers in pursuing the rules-based approach
for NTM reduction on the multilateral level. There is a need to increase the awareness
of the drastic and reinforcing eﬀects of non-tariﬀ protectionism on future structures
of global trade. Since international trade is an engine for economic growth prevention
of further implementation of protectionist trade barriers and the removal of existing
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Computable General Equilibrium modeling
Global Trade Analysis ProjectThis paper assesses the new orientation in Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world by analyzing
the potential impact of Turkey’s membership in either the European Union (EU) or the Greater Arab Free
Trade Area (GAFTA). We utilize the most recent version of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data-
base, its global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, and the gravity border effect approach to
estimate the ad-valorem tariff equivalents (AVEs) of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In our overall analysis, we
account for 24 various sectors. However, in our evaluation, we focus primarily on the food and
agricultural sectors because this sector is characterized by high tariff and non-tariff protection. In the
CGE simulation analysis, we consider the removal of tariffs and NTBs simultaneously. After projecting
the GTAP framework to 2020, we conclude that Turkey would gain unambiguously from EU membership,
whereas Turkey’s gains from GAFTA membership would be more limited. The paper also presents that the
welfare gains from the removal of NTBs are of considerable importance and would generally be greater
than the gains stemming from the elimination of import tariffs.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Whether Turkey should be referred to as a European, a Middle
Eastern or an Asian country has always been a crucial question.
In recent years, this ongoing debate has attracted even more
attention. The long-standing membership negotiations with the
European Union (EU) and Turkey’s so-called ‘‘axis shift’’ toward
the Middle East have underscored the importance of this issue.
There appears to be a trend in which Turkey is loosening its ties
with the West and tightening its ties with the East.
The ﬁrst step toward the integration of Turkey into the Euro-
pean community occurred in 1963 with the Ankara Association
Agreement. The 1995 Customs Union Agreement continued this
process with Turkey becoming an EU candidate country in 1999
and beginning its accession negotiations in 2005. Up until now
the EU has always been Turkey’s most important trading partner,
accounting for 42% of Turkey’s total trade in 2012 (Turkstat,
2013). Meanwhile, the EU continued to expand growing to its
current size of 28 member countries. Since 2002, the Turkishgovernment has restructured the direction of its foreign policy
strategy becoming more politically aligned with the Arab world.
The literature on Turkey’s recent foreign policy seems to conﬁrm
this political shift and increasing involvement with the Middle East
(e.g., Adam, 2012; Babacan, 2011; Candar, 2009; Ciftci and Ertugay,
2011; Evin et al., 2010; Sanberk, 2010). Turkey’s Islamic roots, cul-
tural and historical ties with the Arab world as well as its legacy to
Ottoman Empire are identiﬁed as main triggers for this ‘‘axis shift’’
(e.g., Alessandri, 2010; Aybar, 2012; Habibi and Walker, 2011;
Taspinar, 2008; Walker, 2011). This political realignment has
directly affected the country’s trade strategy. Although, the Turkish
government claims that no exclusive policies are set for the Middle
East and implementation of consistent foreign policies for different
parts of the world are intended (Foreign Policy, 2010; Kara, 2011),
the evidence clearly shows the opposite. Free trade agreements
(FTAs) signed by Turkey in the last 10 years have mainly included
countries in the Arab world. Currently, Turkey has eight FTAs with
Middle Eastern countries.
Against this backdrop, we compare two options of the Turkish
foreign policies by employing a global Computable General Equi-
librium (CGE) model enriched with econometrically estimated
ad-valorem tariff equivalents (AVEs) of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
Our aim is to contribute to the debate regarding whether Turkey
will gain more from its political realignment toward the Middle
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Trade Area (GAFTA)1) over its potential EU membership.
There is an extensive body of literature assessing the potential
impacts of Turkey’s EU membership using CGE analyses (e.g., Acar
et al., 2007; Eruygur and Cakmak, 2008; Philippidis and Karaca,
2009). However, only a small number of studies evaluate Turkey
in terms of its FTAs as well as its integration with the Arab world
(e.g., Acar and Aydin, 2011; Onthman et al., 2010; Sonmez et al.,
2007). Recent literature indicates it is becoming more common to
conduct a two-stage analysis by estimating the effects of NTBs and
then implementing them in CGE models (e.g., Chang and
Hayakawa, 2010; Fugazza and Maur, 2008; Philippidis and
Sanjuán, 2006, 2007; Winchester, 2009). However, to the best of
our knowledge, only Lejour and Mooij (2004) have utilized this
approach to examine Turkey’s potential EU membership.
Zahariadis (2005) also considers technical barriers, althoughhedoes
not use a gravity model to estimate the effects of NTBs. Moreover,
none of the aforementioned studies reﬂect the economic effects of
Turkey’s relationship with Middle Eastern states. Therefore, this
paper adds to the existing studies by assessing the impact of Tur-
key’s relationship with its Eastern and Western neighbors and by
simultaneously analyzing the removal of import tariffs and NTBs.
We particularly focus on the food and agricultural sector, because
in general this sector is characterized by high tariff and non-tariff
protection, has therefore proven to be highly sensitive in negotia-
tions of FTAs and is often left out when concluding an agreement
of an FTA. The food and agricultural sector is also known for its het-
erogeneity in the tariff and non-tariff protection.We thereforework
at the most disaggregated sector level to avoid aggregation bias in
tariffs and NTBs (Brockmeier and Bektasoglu, 2014). Utilizing the
gravity border effect approach and the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) framework (Version 8), we compare Turkey’s potential
accession to the EU with its potential membership in GAFTA.
Our analysis is divided into two parts. In Section ‘Introduction’,
we use the gravity border effect approach to estimate the effects
of NTBs on the Turkey-EU and Turkey-GAFTA trade ﬂows and con-
vert the resulting effects into AVEs. In Section ‘Overview of the
Turkish trade structure and agreements’, we incorporate these
AVEs into the GTAP framework and derive economy-wide results
for the enlargement of the EU and GAFTA to include Turkey. Accord-
ingly, this paper is organized as follows. Following this introduc-
tion, we include a brief overview of the trade structure, focusing
on the trade ﬂows between Turkey and both the EU and GAFTA.
We also consider Turkey’s protection structure and its FTAs. In
Section ‘Econometric estimation with the gravity approach’, we
provide the theoretical and empirical framework that can be uti-
lized to estimate AVEs of NTBs. In Section ‘Simulations with the
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) framework’, we explain how
we integrate our results into the GTAP framework and present
our ﬁnal results. We concludewith Section ‘Qualiﬁcation of results’.Overview of the Turkish trade structure and agreements
Turkeywas ranked 32nd inworldmerchandise exports and 20th
in world merchandise imports in 2011 (WTO, 2013). The most
important destination for Turkish exports was the EU (46% of total
Turkish exports), followed by Iraq, Russia, the United States and the
United Arab Emirates. The majority of Turkish imports also origi-
nated from the EU (38% of total Turkish imports). Other important
import markets for Turkey were Russia, China, the United States,
and Iran (European Commission, 2013a). Although the EU share of1 GAFTA was established in 1957 and signed in 1997. It currently has 17 members
including Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Wes
Bank and Gaza, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and
Yemen. 2 See http://.ec.europa.eu.,
tTurkey’s total trade has decreased since 1990, it has never fallen
below 40%, and the EU remains a major trade partner of Turkey.
Additionally, Turkey’s trade share with other Middle Eastern coun-
tries in the last two decades hovered around the 10% mark; how-
ever, this share has increased in the last 5 years, reaching 22% in
2012, due to FTAs that came into effect in 2007 (Turkstat, 2013).
In Tables 1 and 2 below, we provide an overview of the com-
modity speciﬁc trade shares as well as source and destination spe-
ciﬁc trade shares between Turkey and its trading partners. Though
we use data from 2007, the trade and protection structure of
Turkey have predominantly remained unchanged. What has chan-
ged is the volume of trade from 2007 to 2013. The greatest shares
of Turkey’s exports to the EU and GAFTA are attributed to the light
and heavy manufacturing sectors as well as services in the case of
Rest of theWorld (ROW) (compare Table 1). Accounting for 71.47%,
extraction ranks ﬁrst in Turkey’s imports from GAFTA. Heavy man-
ufacturing contributes the most to Turkey’s imports from the EU
(58.92%).
Turkey’s food and agricultural exports to the EU account for
6.03% of Turkey’s total export to the EU, whereas the share of Turk-
ish agro-food exports to GAFTA is equal to 11.13% of Turkey’s total
export to GAFTA. However, as shown in Table 2, the share of Tur-
key’s agro-food imports from GAFTA (2.80%) is also not as high
as the proportion of imports from the EU (30.42%). Moreover, the
amount of food and agricultural exports, that is shipped to the
EU, composes 44.21% of Turkey’s total agro-food exports to the
world, but this share is only equal to 17.45% for the Turkish
agro-food exports to the GAFTA member countries (GTAP database,
Version 8).
Table 3 presents the commodity-speciﬁc trade shares and
applied tariff rates in the food and agricultural sector between Tur-
key and its trading partners. The italicized rows exhibit the sectors,
in which exporters report where they most frequently face NTBs
(European Commission, 2013b; Teknikengel, 2013; Önen, 2008;
Özdemir, 2008). Vegetables and fruits (2.68%) and other food prod-
ucts (2.30%) compose the greatest share of Turkey’s total exports to
the EU within the agro-food sector, whereas other animal products
(0.33%), other food products (0.89%) and beverages and tobacco
(0.62%) comprise the largest groups of commodities imported by
Turkey from the EU. In addition to the numbers given in Table 3, it
is worthwhile to emphasize that Turkey already ships 52.97% of its
vegetable and fruit exports and43.55%of other food product exports
to the EU. Also, 80.30% of Turkey’s beverages and tobacco imports,
61.05% of other animal product imports and 56.46% of other food
product imports are originating from the EU. These shares exhibit
the importance of agro-food trade between Turkey and the EU.
The greatest agro-food share of Turkey’s total exports to the
GAFTA member countries is given for vegetables and fruits
(1.74%), vegetable oils and fats (1.13%), and other food products
(6.09%). Other animal products (0.15%), processed rice (0.44%)
and other food products (0.15%) are the most important agro-food
products in total imports from GAFTA to Turkey. Not shown in
Table 3, but nevertheless important, is that Turkey ships nearly half
of its other animal products and dairy exports to the GAFTA mem-
ber countries. Turkey receives 65.04% of its processed rice imports
and 45.26% of its sugar imports from GAFTA, whereas the shares of
other animal products and other food products imports from GAF-
TA in total Turkish imports within these sectors are negligible
(GTAP database, Version 8).
The Customs Union Agreement between the EU and Turkey pro-
vides for the free circulation of industrial goods but does not cover
the food and agricultural products listed in Annex I of the Amster-
dam Treaty.2 The Turkish agro-food sector is moderately protected;
Table 1
Commodity speciﬁc trade shares between Turkey and trading partners (%).
Turkey’s exports to Turkey’s imports from
The EU GAFTA ROW The EU GAFTA ROW
Food and agricultural products 6.03 11.13 9.31 3.04 1.43 5.99
Extraction 1.68 0.49 3.27 0.49 71.47 12.15
Light manufacturing 49.91 24.80 28.01 31.96 2.55 17.89
Heavy manufacturing 28.40 55.43 29.02 58.92 21.36 53.94
Services 13.99 8.15 30.39 5.58 3.20 10.03
Notes: please refer to Table A1 in Appendix A for the detailed regional and sector aggregation.
Source: GTAP Database, Version 8, Base Year 2007.
Table 2
Source and destination speciﬁc trade shares for commodities between Turkey and trading partners (%).
Turkey’s exports to Turkey’s imports from
The EU GAFTA ROW The EU GAFTA ROW
Food and agricultural products 44.21 17.45 38.34 30.42 2.80 66.78
Extraction 46.40 2.91 50.68 1.75 49.97 48.28
Light manufacturing 70.35 7.47 22.18 61.01 0.95 38.04
Heavy manufacturing 50.22 20.95 28.83 47.82 3.40 48.78
Services 42.64 5.31 52.05 32.11 3.61 64.28
Source: GTAP Database, Version 8, Base Year 2007.
3 See Anderson (2011) and Head and Mayer (2013) for a detailed review on gravity
odels.
4 In our analysis, the GAFTA member countries include only 9 countries (Armenia,
ahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Moroc-co, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) due to the
vailable regional disaggregation in the GTAP database.
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level and for individual trade partners (compare Table 3). Sectors
that have the greatest importance in Turkey’s exports to the EU,
namely vegetables and fruits and other food products, do not face
high import tariffs. However, as it is reported by Turkish exporters,
those are the sectors, in which the EU most frequently exhibits NTBs
(highlighted in italics in Table 3). In Turkey, NTBs are reported to be
high for the imports of other animal products and beverages and
tobacco from the EU. Within these sectors, Turkish tariff rates are
very high for beverages and tobacco imports (604.54%), whereas
imports of other animal products from the EU are not restricted by
tariffs. A similar picture is observed for the trade between Turkey
and GAFTA. Turkey’s most important exports to GAFTA (i.e., vegeta-
bles and fruits, vegetable oils and fats and other food products) are
regulated by tariffs of 6.97%, 14.60% and 7.15%, respectively. How-
ever, it is also reported that Turkish exporters face NTBs speciﬁcally
on these sectors. Imports of other animal products from GAFTA to
Turkey are also not constrained by tariffs, although high NTBs are
imposed on Turkey’s exports of animal products to the GAFTA mem-
ber countries (GTAP database, Version 8; European Commission,
2013b; Teknik Engel, 2013; Önen, 2008; Özdemir, 2008).
Turkey signed its ﬁrst FTA with the European Free Trade Area
member countries in 1991. This agreement was followed by the
Customs Union Agreement between the EU and Turkey in 1996.
Thereafter, several FTAs with Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Esto-
nia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Poland were signed. After the
expansion of the EU in 2004 and 2007, those FTAs were modiﬁed
according to Turkey’s Customs Union Agreement with the EU.
Turkey’s recently concluded FTAs show the country’s expanding
relationship with the Arab world in recent years. Currently, Turkey
has 8 FTAs with the Middle Eastern states. With the exception of its
FTA with Israel, all of these agreements were signed after 2002.
Econometric estimation with the gravity approach
Theoretical and empirical framework
The estimation of trade costs of NTBs in this paper is based on
the gravity model. The gravity model has become the standard
model for empirically measuring expected bilateral trade using
economy size and an additional set of control variables. Themodel’s popularity is a function of its theoretical justiﬁcation and
its simple and ﬂexible application.3 In our analysis, we use the bor-
der effect approach to identify NTBs in the trade between Turkey and
the EU and between Turkey and GAFTA member countries4 in 2007.
Originated by McCallum (1995) and theoretically advanced by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the border effect compares
intra-national trade with international trade. The border effect
reveals to what degree international trade falls below the trade
within a country due to barriers resulting from an international bor-
der, i.e., tariffs, NTBs and all other border-related factors that might
hinder trade. The border effect can also comprise of non-policy mea-
sures, such as transaction costs and consumer preferences for
domestic products, and regulative measures which should not be
eliminated. Restrictive regulative measures are a consistent subject
of public debate caused by divergent perceptions of risks and differ-
ent opinions on sensitive issues such as food safety and health
issues. While the justiﬁcations of restrictive measures are reasonable
in many cases, it might be doubtful in several others. The justiﬁca-
tion within the EU is administered within the process of achieving
a Single European Market, and is, in many cases, a matter for the
European Court of Justice. However, the elimination of these mea-
sures leads to higher welfare effects than the elimination of isolated
border barriers related to policy measures would (Olper and
Raimondi, 2008a). Although there might be an overestimation of
border trade costs, the advantage of this approach is that the border
effect takes into account all impediments, including those that are
unobservable or that are difﬁcult to measure directly. Particularly
in agriculture, there is a dearth of reliable, updated statistics on
the technical regulations and phytosanitary standards that signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence agro-food trade. To our knowledge, there are only
a few papers that employ this border effect approach to agro-food
trade in other countries; namely, Chang and Hayakawa (2010),
Olper and Raimondi (2008a,b) and Winchester (2009).
Using the latest developments with regard to the speciﬁcation




Disaggregated agro-food speciﬁc trade shares in total trade and related bilateral applied tariff rates between Turkey and trading partners (%).
Turkey’s exports to Turkey’s imports from
The EU GAFTA The EU GAFTA
Share of total Tariff rate Share of total Tariff rate Share of total Tariff rate Share of total Tariff rate
Food and agricultural products 6.03 3.15 11.13 8.76 3.04 15.86 1.43 27.25
Wheat 0.02 4.90 0.00 6.20 0.10 92.26 0.03 116.24
Cereal grains 0.01 2.36 0.25 14.28 0.11 39.05 0.00 46.70
Vegetables and fruits 2.68 3.20 1.74 6.97 0.06 1.22 0.13 6.39
Oil seeds 0.07 0.00 0.02 29.91 0.32 0.00 0.01 17.24
Plant-based ﬁbers 0.15 0.00 0.06 6.40 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.00
Crops 0.38 0.00 0.04 26.07 0.21 6.63 0.12 6.91
Cattle 0.01 0.31 0.00 0.32 0.02 1.84 0.00 4.43
Other animal products 0.07 0.16 0.41 9.57 0.33 0.00 0.15 0.00
Vegetable oils and fats 0.09 104.48 1.13 14.60 0.07 44.92 0.03 39.62
Dairy 0.04 25.94 0.55 2.47 0.06 102.41 0.02 127.31
Processed rice 0.00 23.84 0.00 19.94 0.03 13.60 0.44 20.73
Sugar 0.02 22.97 0.05 7.22 0.00 88.45 0.12 57.41
Other food products 2.30 2.74 6.09 7.15 0.89 66.02 0.15 12.10
Beverages and tobacco 0.17 0.00 0.76 6.57 0.62 604.54 0.02 643.06
Cattle meat 0.00 2.43 0.01 13.27 0.00 18.71 0.00 18.74
Other meat 0.01 2.16 0.02 11.02 0.02 50.41 0.00 50.49
Notes: Italicized rows exhibit the sectors, in which NTBs are most frequently reported by exporters.
Source: GTAP Database, Version 8, Base Year 2007.
5 In estimating border effects, we only use 16 of 20 food and agricultural sectors
used in the simulations by omitting the generally untraded sectors paddy rice, sugar
cane and beets, raw milk and wool.
6 To avoid effects of aggregation bias in the econometric estimates and the CGE
results we follow a disaggregated sector analysis. However, we only consider
disaggregation in agro-food sectors because the inclusion of disaggregated non-food
sectors goes beyond the scope of the paper. Therefore, the CGE analysis only considers
a uniform efﬁciency improvement in the non-food sectors.
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where xij is the value of the exports from country i to country j, yi
(yj) is exporter (importer) production (consumption), yw is the glo-
bal output, tij is the bilateral trade resistance, r is the elasticity of
substitution between all goods, and Pi and Pj are CES consumer
price indices for i and j, respectively. The price indices in Eq. (1) rep-
resent the multilateral resistance terms (MRTs) that cannot be
observed (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). These terms capture
the costs of bilateral trade between two regions, which are affected
by the average cost that each region incurs in trading with the rest
of its trading partners. These MRTs form the substitutability
between a country’s different trading partners and make it possible
to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Because each trading
country has different prices for each commodity, we control for
unobserved MRTs by specifying importer and exporter ﬁxed effects
(e.g., Chen, 2004; Feenstra, 2002; Olper and Raimondi, 2008a;
Philippidis et al., 2013; Winchester, 2009). Thus, we include expor-
ter and importer speciﬁc dummies. As such, the country dummies
control not only for multilateral resistance but also for country-
speciﬁc factors. Typically, the trade cost component tij is speciﬁed
using a function of transport costs and a border variable. Replacing
the cost function in Eq. (1) and taking the logarithm, we derive an
empirical log-linear speciﬁcation:
ln xij ¼ ai þ aj þ b1 þ b2 ln dij þ b3dij ð2Þ
where ai = lnyi  (1  r)lnPi is the ﬁxed effect of the exporting
country and aj = lnyj  (1  r)lnPj is the ﬁxed effect of the import-
ing country. Transport costs are approximated by distance (dij)
between country i and j and the factor dij takes a value of one if i
and j are different countries and a value of zero if i and j are the
same country; in this way, this border variable represents both
international and intra-national trade (Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003). The constant b1 is equal to (lnyw), b2 = (1  r)q
is the distant coefﬁcient and b3 = (1  r)lnbij is the border effect
coefﬁcient to be estimated. Accordingly, (bij  1) is the tariffequivalent of all trade barriers resulting from an international bor-
der. Following the standard procedure in the literature, we extend
our equation using an additional set of continuous and dummy con-
trol variables. The whole set of independent variables are deﬁned in
Table 4. We apply Eq. (2) with the full set of independent variables
to 16 agricultural disaggregated sectors5 and to one aggregated
agro-food sector by pooling over the corresponding agricultural
disaggregated sectors (see Table A1 in Appendix A).6 In the pooled
regression, we include sectoral dummies to account for sectoral het-
erogeneity and variables for production and consumption. Due to the
use of the ﬁxed effect approach, the importer-consumption and
exporter-production coefﬁcients explain only the sectoral dimension
of bilateral trade. The most important parameters to estimate are the
coefﬁcients of the border dummies. Taking the antilog of the esti-
mated border coefﬁcient, we obtain the border effect, which quanti-
ﬁes to what degree international trade falls below intra-national
trade. By controlling for the differences in tariffs, distance, and other
unspeciﬁed trade costs in the gravity equation, we assume that the
effects of the NTBs mainly determine the border effect.
Data and estimation technique
We source data on bilateral exports, production values, con-
sumption values, bilateral tariffs, and export subsidies from Ver-
sion 8 (base year 2007) of the GTAP database. To employ the
border effect approach, we must also consider intra-national trade.
Following Chen (2004), Wei (1996) and other authors, we calculate
a country’s exports to itself by subtracting each country’s aggre-
gate exports to all international destinations from its domestic pro-
duction in each sector. The GTAP database offers information about
129 regions and 57 sectors. We reduce the number of regions to 79
by omitting composite regions and countries whose trade share






Distance Distance between i and j
Landlocked Dummy variable; = 1 if country i and j are both landlocked
Contiguity Dummy variable; = 1 if country i and j share a border
Language Dummy variable; = 1 if country i and j have a common
language
RTA Dummy variable; = 1 if country i and j both are members of
the RTA
WTO Dummy variable; = 1 if country i and j both are members of
the WTO
Colony Dummy variable; = 1 if country i and j have colonial ties
Religion Dummy variable; = 1 if main religion is the same in country
i and j
LPI Logistic performance index




Index for political restraint
AVEtariff Ad-valorem tariff imposed by region j on imports from i
AVEesub Ad-valorem export subsidy paid to exporters in region i for
goods shipped to country j
EU Dummy variable; = 1 if the dependent variable measures
intra-EU trade
EUTUR Dummy variable; = 1 if the dependent variable measures
the exports to Turkey from the EU
TUREU Dummy variable; = 1 if the dependent variable measures
the exports to the EU from Turkey
GAFTA Dummy variable; = 1 if the dependent variable measures
intra-GAFTA trade
GAFTATUR Dummy variable; = 1 if the dependent variable measures
the exports to Turkey from GAFTA
TURGAFTA Dummy variable; = 1 if the dependent variable measures
the exports to GAFTA from Turkey
OTHER Dummy variable; = 1 if the dependent variable measures
any other international cross-border trade
Production Production of country i
Consumption Consumption of country j
1 Alternatively, Burger et al. (2009) suggest modiﬁed Poisson estimators that
pose fewer restrictions on variance and allow more heterogeneity. The negative
inomial (NB) speciﬁcation properly accounts for overdispersion stemming from
nobserved heterogeneity due to omitted variable bias by adjusting the distribution
sing a dispersion parameter. However, if the violation of equidispersion can be found
excess zeros, then the zip-inﬂated modeling techniques should be considered (the
p-inﬂated negative binomial or the zip-inﬂated Poisson model). These techniques
ddress censored variables by specifying two equations. The ﬁrst part is a logit
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tors. Our regression analysis includes 99,856 observations. Of those
99,856 observations, 98,592 (= 79  78  16) are bilateral cross-bor-
der trade observations, and 1264 (= 79  16) are intra-national
trade observations. The information on distance, landlocked status,
contiguity, common languages, currency and colonial relation-
ships, and on membership in trade agreements and WTO member-
ship comes from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).7 In our analysis, we use the
population-weighted average distances between major cities in our
countries of interest as the bilateral distances between countries.
This enables us to use intra-national distances as well. Information
on religion is gathered from the CIA Factbook8 and on political free-
dom is taken from Freedom House.9 The political freedom (political
restraint) index included in the gravity equation is generated from
the country-speciﬁc indices. The higher the index, the less politically
free the countries are. The data on logistic performance are obtained
from the World Bank.10 The logistic performance index considered in
the equation is the product of the country-speciﬁc logistic perfor-
mance indices. The higher this index is, the higher the countries’
logistic performance.
The presence of zero trade ﬂows represents a serious challenge




10 See http://www.worldbank.org.squares (OLS). In our dataset, 7.3% of the total export ﬂows are
equal to zero, and the greatest percentage of zero trade ﬂows are
in the sectors oil seeds (24.6%), wheat (20.8%) and plant-based
ﬁbers (16.6%). Because the logarithm of zero is not deﬁned, using
OLS in these instances would involve the truncation or rescaling
of the dependent variable. The deletion of zero trade ﬂows and
the subsequent loss of valuable information lead to biased results,
particularly when those observations are non-randomly distrib-
uted. The second strategy, that of adding a small positive number
to all trade values, is also theoretically and empirically inadequate.
As several studies show, even small numbers can critically distort
the results (Burger et al., 2009; Flowerdew and Aitkin, 1982;
Linders and de Groot, 2006). An alternative way to handle zero
trade values is to apply the two-stage Heckman selection proce-
dure (Heckman, 1979). The ﬁrst stage involves the use of a probit
model which is the selection equation to capture the probability
of trade. The second stage involves the use of an OLS regression
augmented by the inverse Mills ratio, which is obtained from the
ﬁrst stage. A Wald test of the estimated coefﬁcient of the inverse
Mills ratio determines whether sample correction is required.
The outcome equation is estimated using a dependent variable
censored to nonzero values. The Heckit estimator offers a valid
solution to the sample selection problem and thus has become
the standard approach to specifying gravity equations (e.g.,
Philippidis et al., 2013; Raimondi and Olper, 2011; Xiong and
Beghin, 2012). However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show
that using OLS to estimate the log-linear gravity model results in
biased and inconsistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity. The reason for this bias is Jensen’s inequality, which implies
that E(lny)– lnE(y) (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Thus, the
authors employ the more advantageous Poisson regression model
derived from the Poisson distribution. This regression model deals
with heteroskedasticity and addresses the skeweness and non-
negativity constraint with an implicit log transformative function
of the mean to adjust the critical issues. The model is estimated
by maximum likelihood. Using the Poisson maximum likelihood
estimator it is possible to account for zero observations making it
favorable in gravity modeling. However, the equidispersion prop-
erty of the Poisson distribution is very restrictive, requiring the
conditional variance of the dependent variable to be equal to its
conditional mean. Under weaker assumptions of correct speciﬁca-
tion of the conditional mean the Poisson pseudo-maximum likeli-
hood (PPML) estimator provides robust estimates (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005).11 In our econometric analysis, we proceed in three
steps. First, we examine the gravity equation results for the pooled
agro-food sector, comparing three different econometric speciﬁca-
tions with a focus on the PPML estimator.12 Second, we test the accu-
racy of the different estimators analyzing the out-of-sample
prediction performance. Finally, we use the superior speciﬁcation
to further estimate the disaggregated border effects.
Estimation resultsgression that estimates the probability of zero trade values. The second part is a
egative binomial or a Poisson regression. Because the NB and zero-inﬂated
stimators have been criticized in terms of the sensitivity of the variance of their
stimates (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and convergence problems, we did not
se these estimators in our study.
















T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61 51In Table 5, we provide the estimation outcomes pooled over all
observations. We use different econometric speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst
two columns report the OLS benchmark, and the last two columns
show the Heckman and Poisson model results. Column 1 presents
the OLS estimates using the logarithm of exports as a dependent
variable and skips observations with zero trade ﬂows (OLS1).
Because the Breusch–Pagan test for heteroskedasticity conﬁrms
the presence of heteroskedastic estimators, we use a robust vari-
ance–covariance matrix. The results are comparable to other stud-
ies using OLS on truncated data with relatively high border effects.
Column 2 shows the least squares results obtained using a rescaled
dependent variable to overcome the problem of zeros (OLS2). Esti-
mates differ slightly from the OLS1 regression and indicate a some-
what higher border effect. The third column reports the second-
stage results of the Heckman regression. Like Raimondi and
Olper (2011) and others, we exclude cultural dummies from the
outcome equation for identiﬁcation. In this way, we follow the the-
ory of trade models with heterogeneous ﬁrms by assuming that
those variables affect the ﬁxed costs but not the variable costs of
trade (Raimondi and Olper, 2011; Xiong and Beghin, 2012). The
highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of the inverse Mills ratio provides
sheds light on the sample selection problem. Using the Heckman
procedure to correct for selection bias increases the effects of all
variables except for currency and political restraint. The fourth col-
umn contains the Poisson model results considering all observa-
tions (PPML1). Compared to the OLS estimates, the Poisson
estimates of nearly all of the variables are lower in absolute terms.
The main differences are observed in the border effect coefﬁcients.
In 16 of 18 cases, the conﬁdence intervals of the border effect esti-
mates do not overlap. This result clearly indicates the serious bias,
and thus, the overestimation of effects that is generated when OLS
is used. Furthermore, the lower U-Theil statistic as a measure of
forecast accuracy (Theil, 1958) supports the Poisson model.
Because there is still a censoring at zero, the last column shows
the results of the Poisson estimator using only positive observa-
tions (PPML2). The estimates are similar in magnitude and there
is a consistent overlapping of conﬁdence intervals. Hence, we can
deduce that the zeros are not signiﬁcantly dominating the results
in the PPML estimation.13 To check the robustness, we investigate
the out-of-sample prediction performance of the different estimators
in a Monte Carlo simulation for 50 replications. We obtain the mean
squared error (MSE) as a measure for the precision of predictions14
for a 20% random subset. The PPML1 estimator outperforms the
other estimators because it presents the lowest MSE.15 Thus, we con-
clude the PPML1 estimator is best indicated for use in the subse-
quent analysis of the disaggregated sector regressions to obtain
bilateral border effects.
Most of the coefﬁcients in Table 5 have the expected signs and
are statistically signiﬁcant. Production and consumption have a
positive effect on trade ﬂows in all regressions. As expected, the
elasticity of trade with respect to distance is negative. According
to the PPML1 regression, agro-food exports decrease by 0.81% if
the distance between two countries increases by 1%. Furthermore,
the coefﬁcient of the number of landlocked countries indicates that
the impact of geography on trade is very high in agro-food trade.
Sharing a currency has a positive and signiﬁcant effect, except in
the truncated OLS and Heckman regressions. Consistent with our
expectations, we ﬁnd that contiguity and cultural adjacency also13 We also analyzed the inﬂuence of zeros in the disaggregated sector regressions. In
all 16 sectors the exclusion of zero trade ﬂows does not signiﬁcantly affect the PPML
estimates.
14 In order to compare the log-linear models with Poisson models we retransform
the predicted values. The model producing the smallest MSE is being the better one
15 Detailed results on the out-of-sample prediction performance are available from
the authors upon request.
16 Detailed gravity estimation results for disaggregated sectors are available from
the authors upon request..increase trade signiﬁcantly. The effect of religious afﬁnities is mar-
ginal and is only signiﬁcant in the truncated OLS regression. Being
in a mutual RTA increases trade signiﬁcantly. Also as expected, we
ﬁnd that the membership of both countries in the WTO enhances
trade. The coefﬁcients for logistic performance and political
restraint are within expectations and are highly signiﬁcant. Tariffs
have a signiﬁcant and negative effect only in the Poisson model
regressions. If tariffs increase by 1%, trade decreases by 0.4%. In
the OLS regressions and in the Heckman model, tariffs and export
subsidies have a signiﬁcant positive effect. In contrast, the effect of
export subsidies is not signiﬁcant in the Poisson regression. Such
contradictory and imprecise ﬁndings regarding the effects of policy
variables are not uncommon in the literature and are also found by
Philippidis and Sanjuán (2006, 2007), Philippidis et al. (2013) and
Winchester (2009). Except for those of consumption, RTA, political
restraint and logistic performance, the coefﬁcients are greater in
the OLS regressions than in the Poisson regression.
The coefﬁcients of the border dummies are negative and highly
signiﬁcant. This result can be attributed to the negative effect of
international borders. After controlling for distance and other trade
cost, the ratio of i’s exports to j to i’s exports to itself is given by the
exponential of the absolute value of the coefﬁcient of the i–j border
dummy (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Because the value of
the border coefﬁcient for the EU in the PPML1 regression is
1.73, intra-national agricultural trade is 5.64 (= exp(1.73)) times
greater than cross-border trade within the EU. This ﬁgure is similar
to the results obtained by Chen (2004) and Olper and Raimondi
(2008a). Intra-national agricultural trade is on average 4.9 times
greater than cross-border trade among the GAFTA member coun-
tries. These numbers show that the incidence of NTBs among EU
members is higher than the incidence of NTBs among GAFTA mem-
bers, possibly because of European consumers’ higher awareness of
food safety and health issues. Furthermore, according to the PPML1
regression, the EU’s exports to itself are 38.3 times greater than the
EU’s exports to Turkey. GAFTA’s exports to itself are 39.2 times
greater than GAFTA’s exports to Turkey. These ﬁgures show that
Turkey appears to implement similar NTBs for exports coming
from the EU and GAFTA. Turkey’s exports of agro-food products
to itself are 18.1 times greater than Turkey’s exports to the EU
and 26.7 times greater than Turkey’s exports to GAFTA. Thus, Tur-
key’s exports to GAFTA face higher NTBs than Turkey’s exports to
EU member countries.
In Table 6, we report the border effects for the disaggregated
food and agricultural sectors resulting from the PPML1 speciﬁca-
tion.16 There are ten cases in which the coefﬁcients of the border
dummies are not signiﬁcant and we thus assume a border effect of
one. As expected, the border effects among EU member countries
and GAFTA member countries are lower than the border effects
affecting trade between Turkey and those countries. In the sectors
for cattle, dairy, other food products, other meat and sugar, the bor-
der effects among EU member countries are signiﬁcantly lower than
those estimated for the trade between the EU and Turkey. By con-
trast, in the sectors beverages and tobacco, other animal products,
other food products, other meat and processed rice, the border
effects among GAFTA member countries are signiﬁcantly lower than
the border effect for GAFTA and Turkey. The greatest border effects
are found to inﬂuence trade between Turkey and GAFTA, particularly
when Turkey exports processed rice and cattle meat to GAFTA. Over-
all, the aforementioned sectors are characterized by very high border
effects. The vegetables and fruits sector is subject to relatively low
border effects, followed by the sectors of other food products, other
animal products and cereal grains.
Table 5











ln(Production)a 1.0975*** 1.0743*** 1.0769*** 0.7444*** 0.7454***
(0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0217) (0.0218)
ln(Consumption)b 0.1017*** 0.1058*** 0.1021*** 0.3196*** 0.3186***
(0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0074) (0.0233) (0.0234)
ln(Distance) 1.0055*** 0.9980*** 1.0315*** 0.8058*** 0.8029***
(0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0387) (0.0387)
Landlocked 0.6334*** 0.6555*** 0.6362*** 0.5759*** 0.5739***
(0.0629) (0.0733) (0.0863) (0.0441) (0.0441)
Contiguity 1.5758*** 1.6457*** 1.7389*** 0.4073*** 0.4101***
(0.0547) (0.0585) (0.0438) (0.0690) (0.0689)
Language 0.2684*** 0.2183*** 0.5679*** 0.5676***
(0.0361) (0.0390) (0.0634) (0.0633)
RTA 0.3832*** 0.4164*** 0.3938*** 0.5211*** 0.5181***
(0.0322) (0.0342) (0.0296) (0.0660) (0.0659)
WTO 0.7310*** 0.7400*** 0.7608*** 0.3058*** 0.3045***
(0.0802) (0.0927) (0.1034) (0.0678) (0.0678)
Colony 0.8203*** 0.8499*** 0.3306*** 0.3282***
(0.0585) (0.0616) (0.0962) (0.0962)
Religion 0.0465* 0.0416 0.0594 0.0589
(0.0229) (0.0249) (0.0663) (0.0662)
LPI 0.0965*** 0.0660** 0.1178*** 0.4572*** 0.4583***
(0.0213) (0.0228) (0.0222) (0.0841) (0.0841)
Currency 0.0600 0.0980 0.0203 0.4696*** 0.4688***
(0.0573) (0.0586) (0.0567) (0.0678) (0.0678)
Political restraint 1.4123*** 1.3620*** 1.3173*** 1.9695*** 1.9587***
(0.1416) (0.1507) (0.1295) (0.5716) (0.5712)
ln(1 + AVEtariff) 2.9233*** 3.1868*** 2.9390*** 0.3951* 0.4090*
(0.1120) (0.1211) (0.0629) (0.1910) (0.1925)
ln(1 + AVEesub) 3.8500*** 3.9109*** 3.9166*** 0.6133 0.6085
(0.2396) (0.2447) (0.2070) (0.3541) (0.3547)
EU 3.0648*** 3.2345*** 3.9144*** 1.7300*** 1.7350***
(0.1083) (0.1148) (0.0924) (0.1039) (0.1039)
EU? TUR 4.9996*** 5.1608*** 5.7638*** 3.6445*** 3.6494***
(0.1916) (0.2022) (0.1641) (0.2125) (0.2125)
TUR? EU 4.8756*** 5.0351*** 5.6452*** 2.8954*** 2.8961***
(0.1689) (0.1760) (0.1620) (0.2616) (0.2617)
GAFTA 2.9585*** 3.2023*** 3.5178*** 1.5881*** 1.5934***
(0.1500) (0.1581) (0.1194) (0.1803) (0.1802)
GAFTA? TUR 4.7011*** 4.9012*** 5.2797*** 3.6688*** 3.6715***
(0.2542) (0.2663) (0.2328) (0.5261) (0.5263)
TUR? GAFTA 4.7254*** 4.8531*** 5.3320*** 3.2842*** 3.2848***
(0.1788) (0.1848) (0.2180) (0.2696) (0.2698)
Other 4.1887*** 4.3516*** 4.9911*** 2.1621*** 2.1656***
(0.1133) (0.1201) (0.0979) (0.1353) (0.1353)
N 92,550 99,856 99,856 99,856 92,550
R2 0.7376 0.7524
Pseudo R2 0.9786 0.9783
Mills ratio 0.4961***
U-Theil 0.9954 0.0253
Notes: standard errors in parentheses.
a and b Denote exporter’s production and importer’s consumption, respectively. Country- and sector-ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Source: authors’ own calculations.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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The theoretical foundation of the gravitymodel enables us to uti-
lize the quantitative effects of border barriers to compute border
trade costs using the elasticity of substitution. The consideration
of the substitution effect between domestic and foreign goods
allows us to exclude consumer preferences from the border trade
costs. Additionally, in controlling for transport costs approximated
by distance and landlocked status as well as for other trade cost fac-
tors in the gravity equation the border trade costs are then supposed
to reveal NTBs’ effects (Winchester, 2009). To calculate the AVEs of
non-tariff trade barriers, we use the formula AVEij = exp[bij/
1  r]  1 (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), where AVEij is the
AVE of border barriers. AVEij represents the average level of import-ing country protection and the minor effects of additional factors
that are not captured by the trade barrier proxies in the gravity
equation. The coefﬁcient bij is applied to the border dummy dij,
and r is the elasticity of substitution for domestic and imported
goods.We employ the elasticity of substitution between goods from
the GTAP database according to our disaggregated sector selection.
In cases inwhich the border dummycoefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant,we
assume that there are no border barriers or that the effects of these
barriers are only marginal, which results in zero AVEs.
Table 7 reports the AVEs of the NTBs among EU and GAFTA
member countries as well as the AVEs of the NTBs in the trade
between the EU and Turkey and between Turkey and GAFTA. The
AVEs of the NTBs among the EU member countries range from
17% for other meat to 428% for beverages and tobacco. In the total
Table 6
Border effects in disaggregated agro-food sectors.
EU? EU EU? TUR TUR? EU GAFTA? GAFTA GAFTA? TUR TUR? GAFTA
Wheat 4.2 25.6 30.2 161.1 115.3 2032.0
Cereal grains 5.1 14.0 121.2 17.7 46.0 21.9
Vegetables and fruits 1.0 11.9 4.7 4.7 20.7 6.8
Oil seeds 18.6 17.0 55.9 1.0 22.4 248.9
Plant-based ﬁbers 20.9 434.8 26.2 91.4 474.5 21.5
Crops 27.0 19.8 60.8 6.1 12.2 388.5
Cattle 3.2 47.2 3.2 1.0 358.6 762.8
Other animal products 10.2 17.4 49.0 3.8 42.4 100.1
Vegetable oils and fats 1.0 22.4 28.3 1.0 537.8 36.8
Dairy 4.6 144.3 39.4 1.0 265.0 15.2
Processed rice 3.7 7.5 700.0 22.5 1.0 8920.4
Sugar 2.6 110.6 57.8 1.0 1.0 324.1
Other food products 6.0 42.3 21.3 4.6 106.5 15.7
Beverages and tobacco 8.7 25.6 17.0 16.9 1538.2 161.2
Cattle meat 3.3 449.6 118.9 39.3 510.9 1013.4
Other meat 3.5 282.9 260.2 6.0 300.8 310.2
Source: authors’ own calculations.
Table 7
Ad-valorem tariff equivalents of NTBs (%).
Among EU members Among GAFTA members On Turkey’s exports to On Turkey’s imports from
The EU GAFTA The EU GAFTA
Food and agricultural products 54.80 49.24 107.00 129.04 150.00 152.00
Wheat 19.89 90.28 53.91 162.26 50.78 82.38
Cereal grains 175.39 503.00 1905.54 588.56 421.41 994.83
Vegetables and fruits 0.00 77.82 77.06 103.43 150.16 207.38
Oil seeds 111.46 0.00 180.54 311.51 106.69 121.96
Plant-based ﬁbers 113.84 209.23 126.22 115.31 356.63 366.72
Crops 82.03 38.78 111.02 195.67 72.04 57.67
Cattle 47.29 0.00 47.29 813.70 261.37 610.48
Other animal products 325.70 132.19 1038.87 1678.98 496.63 939.94
Vegetable oils and fats 0.00 0.00 81.68 90.42 74.17 207.33
Dairy 27.39 0.00 79.20 54.05 120.16 142.46
Processed rice 36.84 109.85 375.78 772.10 61.58 0.00
Sugar 24.51 0.00 151.47 272.07 191.40 0.00
Other food products 81.52 66.27 177.40 150.39 248.50 374.08
Beverages and tobacco 427.51 778.80 784.43 4889.51 1109.84 28,185.18
Cattle meat 19.76 73.00 104.05 180.95 148.85 153.64
Other meat 17.32 25.70 104.01 108.66 106.21 107.84
Source: authors’ own calculations.
T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61 53food and agricultural sector, the AVE of the NTBs for intra-EU trade
is equal to 55%, which is nearly identical to the value of 56% that
Olper and Raimondi (2008a) found in using a value of 5 for the
elasticity of substitution. The AVEs of the NTBs among the GAFTA
member countries vary between 26% for other meat and 779%
for beverages and tobacco. In most sectors, the AVEs of the NTBs
are higher among GAFTA countries than among EU member coun-
tries. The AVE of the NTBs of total food and agricultural trade is
lower within GAFTA (49%) than within the EU. In seven sectors,
the EU exhibits higher AVEs of NTBs than GAFTA. This is not sur-
prising, since the EU is one of the regions with the most strict reg-
ulations and standards on food and agricultural products.
Especially sensitive sectors such as sugar, meat, and milk products
are highly protected by NTBs complicating the free trade ﬂow even
within the EU trade bloc. In contrast, the main obstacles for GAFTA
member countries’ intra-trade consist of customs and administra-
tive inefﬁciencies and infrastructural problems. In spite of ambi-
tious provisions in the agreement, there are a lot of NTBs in
place which still represent massive hindrance in intra-GAFTA trade
(Abedini and Peridy, 2008; IDIA, 2007; ITC, 2012). This might be
reﬂected in our estimates showing a much higher magnitude of
AVEs of NTBs among GAFTA members compared to intra-EU NTBs.In line with our results in terms of relatively high barriers in intra-
bloc trade, the International Trade Center also concludes that NTBs
cause many difﬁculties in trade and are mainly applied by partner
countries within regional trade agreements (ITC, 2014).
In most sectors, Turkey’s exports face higher NTBs in trade with
GAFTA. The AVEs are much higher in the sectors of beverages and
tobacco, cattle and other animal products. In contrast, Turkey’s
exports to GAFTA face much lower NTBs in the cereal grains sector.
Turkey implements lower NTBs on exports from the EU than it
does on products from GAFTA. The AVEs of the NTBs are much
lower in the sectors of beverages and tobacco, cereal grains, other
animal products and cattle. Only in three agro-food sectors (sugar,
processed rice, and crops) are the AVEs of the NTBs for EU exports
higher.
In general, the AVEs of the NTBs used in the trade between Tur-
key and the EU as well as in the trade between Turkey and GAFTA
are very high. In particular, the NTBs in the trade involving GAFTA
appear to be higher than the NTBs in the trade involving the EU.
Very high AVEs for NTBs in food and agriculture are also estimated
in other studies focused on the quantiﬁcation of NTBs (e.g., Chang
and Hayakawa, 2010; Philippidis and Sanjuán, 2006, 2007;
Winchester, 2009). The AVEs of the NTBs in the disaggregated food
54 T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61and agricultural sectors that are presented in this paper are in most
cases reasonably consistent with or lower than those given in the
literature (Philippidis and Sanjuán, 2006, 2007; Winchester,
2009). The only exception is the strikingly high AVE of the NTBs
in beverages and tobacco, which is not comparable to the value
of 242.7–730.4% that was presented by Philippidis and Sanjuán
(2006, 2007).
Following Winchester (2009), we use the existing border barri-
ers among EU member countries as a benchmark for the scenario
in which Turkey joins the EU. The calculated border trade costs
among EU member countries mirror the current status of actual
internal market barriers comprising justiﬁed, but also unjustiﬁed
trade barriers (also compare Section ‘Theoretical and empirical
framework’). This current status of actual internal market barriers
provides the most harmonized and least restrictive level of NTBs
among the EU member countries compared to foreign trade
(European Commission, 2013c; Weiler and Kocjan, 2005). In our
analysis we assume that Turkey’s integration into the EU would
generate a similarly low level of NTBs for the EU and Turkey. With
this approach, we furthermore assume that the current level of
NTBs including a justiﬁed share related to comprehensible food
safety, health concerns and cultural values, and a proportion of
unjustiﬁed restrictive measures will be maintained.17 Analogously,
we also use the existing border barriers among GAFTA members as a
benchmark for the scenario in which Turkey joins GAFTA, assuming
that the effects of NTBs among GAFTA member countries are low and
that this development would generate a similarly low level of NTBs
for GAFTA and Turkey.
We calculate the AVEs of the NTBs for EU exports to Turkey by
subtracting AVEEU from AVEEU/TUR if AVEEU is lower than AVEEU/TUR.
In the same way, we calculate the AVEs of the NTBs for Turkey’s
exports to the EU by subtracting AVEEU from AVETUR/EU if AVEEU is
lower than AVETUR/EU. In cases in which AVEEU is greater than
AVEEU/TUR and AVETUR/EU in absolute terms, we assume that the
accession of Turkey to the EU would not change the level of NTBs
among the EU countries and Turkey. We also calculate the AVEs of
the NTBs for GAFTA’s exports to Turkey and for Turkey’s exports to
GAFTA in the same manner. In cases in which AVEGAFTA is greater
than AVEGAFTA/TUR and AVETUR/GAFTA in absolute terms, we assume
that Turkey’s joining GAFTA would not change the level of NTBs
between the GAFTA countries and Turkey.Simulations with the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
framework
GTAP model and data
The CGE simulations in this paper utilize GTAP which is a com-
parative static multi-region general equilibrium model. The stan-
dard GTAP model provides a detailed representation of the
economy, including the linkages between the farming, agribusiness,
industrial, and service sectors of the economy. The use of the non-
homothetic constant difference of elasticity to handle private
household preferences, the explicit treatment of international trade
and transport margins and the inclusion of a global banking sector
are innovative features of the GTAP model. Trade is represented by
bilateral matrices based on the Armington assumption. Additional
features of the standard GTAP model are perfect competition in
all markets and the proﬁt- and utility-maximizing behavior of pro-
ducers and consumers. All policy interventions are represented by
price wedges. The framework of the standard GTAP model is well
documented in Hertel (1997) and is available on the Internet.1817 We are unable to identify the justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed share of the trade barriers
in our estimated NTBs.Francois (1999, 2001) developed an approach in which NTBs are
modeled as iceberg or dead-weight costs and used this method to
study the Doha Round of the WTO negotiations. This approach has
been extended by Hertel et al. (2001a,b), who also aimed to inte-
grate NTBs into GTAP modeling, treating NTBs as unobserved trade
costs that are not explicitly covered by the GTAP database. The
authors introduce an additional ‘‘effective’’ import price that is a
function of the observed import price and an exogenous unob-
served technical coefﬁcient. Hence, the removal of trade costs from
a particular exporter is reﬂected in an increase in technology. The
effective import price falls and thereby mirrors a reduction in real
resource costs (Hertel et al., 2001a, p. 13). This approach to model-
ing the change in NTBs as a reduction in trade costs draws on the
iceberg transport cost theory that was originally introduced by
Samuelson (1954). An increase in technology and the correspond-
ing efﬁciency enhancement furthermore implies that the effective
imported quantity is increased. Thus, imports are more competi-
tive and lead to the substitution of imports from other regions
(Hertel et al., 2001a, p. 13).
In addition, NTBs also generate protection effects that might be
captured via import tariffs. Andriamananjara et al. (2003, 2004) and
Fugazza and Maur (2008) offer a thorough study of the impact of
NTBs in regional and global CGEmodels comparing the iceberg cost
approach and the approach that involves capturing NTBs via import
tariffs. Effects of NTBs are measured by the price wedges between
domestic and world prices, when NTBs are modeled with the help
of import tariffs. This import-tariff approach to represent NTBs cre-
ates a rent that is associated with the NTBs and is captured by the
importer. Modeling NTBs with the help of the iceberg cost approach
is also referred to as the ‘‘sand in the wheels’’ of trade or the ‘‘efﬁ-
ciency approach’’ by the authors. In the iceberg cost approach, it
is thus assumed that NTBs are efﬁciency losses rather than rent-cre-
ating mechanisms, and as aforementioned, by using import-aug-
menting technology shocks, real resource cost raising effect of
NTBs are abolished. The results obtained from both papers show
that there are surprisingly substantial differences in the outcomes
of the experiments if NTBs are modeled with the help of import tar-
iffs or technological change variables, although the two approaches
tend to affect the terms of trade in a similar manner. The authors
emphasize that the use of the import tariff approach to model NTBs
and the corresponding artiﬁcial rent-creating and tariff revenue
mechanism requires a very careful analysis of the resulting welfare
effects (Fugazza and Maur, 2008). The authors also conclude that
the efﬁciency modeling of NTBs tends to weigh heavily in the over-
all large, positive welfare gains. Chang and Hayakawa (2010),
Philippidis and Carrington (2005), Philippidis and Sanjuán (2006,
2007) and Winchester (2009) obtained the same results using esti-
mated AVEs of NTBs in a CGE model applying the iceberg cost
approach. Based on these ﬁndings, we utilize the iceberg cost
approach for our simulations with the GTAP model. By reducing
the estimated AVEs of NTBs to the benchmark level, we try to obtain
more reliable results than would be possible with the complete
removal of the NTBs. However, the results obtained using this
approach should still be interpreted with caution.
Experiment design
In the following GTAP analysis, we employ the most recent ver-
sion of the GTAP database, Version 8. We combine the original 129
countries and regions and the original 57 sectors into a 24-sector,
14-region aggregated version. In so doing, we single out major
trading partners of the EU and Turkey as well as other countries
that are currently involved in FTAs with Turkey. In the sector8 See https://www.gtap.org.1
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the gravity model approach. Hence, we use all available food and
agricultural sectors and split the non-food sector into four sectors.
Countries, regions and sectors are highlighted in more detail in
Table A1 in Appendix A.
The base year in Version 8 of the GTAP database is 2007. In our
study, we develop a baseline projected from the benchmark year
2007–2020. Given that the base year in this global database is
2007, it seems that the political environment is fairly up to date.
The MFA quota has already been phased out (in 2005) and the
2004 and 2007 expansions of the EU have already occurred. China
is a member of the WTO fulﬁlling its scheduled obligations.19
To generate a comparison with the baseline, two alternative
enlargement experiments are conducted. We assume that by
2020, Turkey will be either an EU member or a GAFTA member
country. We use pre-experiments to take into account political
and economic changes in the environment that have taken place
since 2007. In addition to changes in the political environment,
economic developments, such as technical progress and the related
growth of the economy, are of great importance. By considering
these changes, we extend the GTAP framework to the year 2020.
We include exogenous projections of GDP and factor endowments
in the extended GTAP model. Technical progress is generated
endogenously by the model to facilitate these projections. The data
for the corresponding shocks are taken from the CEPII, the United
Nations, and the World Bank. In the GAFTA simulation in which
Turkey becomes a member, we simulate the FTAs with Turkey
using those of Albania, Georgia, and Chile. We exclude the FTAs
with Montenegro, Serbia and Jordan because these nations are part
of composite regions in Version 8 of the GTAP database and thus,
country-level data are not available for them. Algeria is also omit-
ted despite having become a member of GAFTA in 2009 because
Algeria is also part of a composite region in the GTAP database.
In a scenario in which Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the
country would need to withdraw from any FTAs with third-party
nations (European Commission, 2013d; Turkish Undersecretariat
of Foreign Trade, 2013). Hence, we disregard all of Turkey’s FTAs
in the EU expansion simulation.
Given the above information, in both simulations, we consider
the bilateral elimination of import tariffs and the full removal of
bilateral benchmarked NTBs from all sectors.20 However, the sce-
narios in which Turkey becomes a member of either the EU or the
GAFTA differs with regard to the change in the tariffs applied to
imports from third countries. Turkey’s import tariffs are unchanged
in the case of the GAFTA membership. On the contrary, Turkey’s
import tariffs are adapted to the EU customs union’s tariff level after
becoming an EU member. Thereby, we account only for short-term
effects of both trade agreements. Long-term effects of a deeper inte-
gration between the member countries are not taken into account.
This is particularly important for Turkey’s long-term EUmembership,
which might involve the effects of more policy changes such as the
beneﬁt of transfers within the ﬁrst pillar of the common EU budget,
the reform of environmental policies or the free movement of labor.
Simulation results
In this section, we discuss the results of the experiments that
explore Turkey’s inclusion into either the EU or GAFTA. In present-
ing the results, we focus on the welfare effects of the EU, GAFTA,
and Turkey, which are assessed based on the equivalent variation
(EV). Additionally, we discuss the change of the trade balance19 Nearly all required import tariff reductions were initiated by 2005, but the
implementation period lasted up until 2010.
20 Due to our focus on food and agriculture, we assume the AVEs of NTBs in the non-
food sectors to be 1%.showing the change in trade pattern by agricultural product which
is similarly reﬂected in the adjustment of domestic agricultural
production. For this reason, we do not discuss the impact of
domestic agricultural production here. The results are presented
in millions of US$ for the year 2020. The simulations are performed
using GEMPACK (Version 11.0) and RunGTAP (Harrison and
Pearson, 1996). A ﬁxed trade balance is adopted as a form of mac-
roeconomic closure in the enlargement simulations.Welfare effects
In the upper part of Table 8, we present the results of including
Turkey in the EU, whereas the lower part considers the results of
Turkey’s membership in GAFTA. In both cases, we present the total
EV in the ﬁrst columns, whereas subsequent columns decompose
the total EV according to the initiating shock. Thus, columns 2–6
show the effects of eliminating bilateral tariffs in the food and agri-
cultural sector as well as the manufacturing sector in the EU, Tur-
key, and GAFTA. In the second part of Table 8 (Columns 7–15), we
represent the effects of removing the NTBs for the food and agricul-
tural, manufacturing, services, and extraction sectors for either the
EU and Turkey or GAFTA and Turkey. In the experiments, the
removal of import tariffs is considered in all sectors. Because the
elimination of import tariffs in the services and extraction sectors
induces very low or even no gains, the simulation results of remov-
ing import tariffs from these sectors are not included in Table 8.
The ﬁrst column in the upper part of Table 8 shows that Turkey
would unambiguously gain from EU membership. Turkey’s total
welfare gains amount to nearly 5 billion US$, whereas the EU’s
welfare gains of 2.26 billion US$ are more limited but remain con-
siderable. These higher welfare gains for Turkey are in accordance
with Acar et al. (2007), Lejour and Mooij (2004) and Zahariadis
(2005). These results can primarily be traced back to the removal
of NTBs in both regions. The overall effect from bilateral tariff elim-
ination is equal to a 0.73 billion US$ gain for Turkey and 0.05 bil-
lion US$ loss for the EU and thus is much lower than the gains
due to the removal of NTBs (3.42 billion US$ for Turkey and
2.55 billion US$ for the EU). This result is also consistent with
Lejour et al. (2001), who show that the effects of NTBs are larger
than the effects of the customs union if the EU is expanded to
include Central and Eastern European countries. Due to the Cus-
toms Union Agreement between the EU and Turkey, considerable
welfare effects of bilateral tariff elimination are only observed in
the agro-food sector. The EU gains 0.37 billion US$ if Turkey elim-
inates the import tariffs in the protected food and agricultural sec-
tor (compare Section ‘Overview of the Turkish trade structure and
agreements’ and Table 3). In addition to the welfare changes
shown in Table 8, Turkey exhibits an additional gain caused by
adopting a lower EU level for tariffs for imports from third-party
countries after accession.
The removal of NTBs from the EU agro-food sector yields the
highest gains both for Turkey (1.41 billion US$) and for the EU
(1.87 billion US$). However, if the NTBs in the Turkish agro-food
sector are abolished, the EU gains are more limited (0.18 bil-
lion US$) than those of Turkey (1.14 billion US$). Table 7 (Sec-
tion ‘Calculation of tariff equivalents’) shows, that the AVEs of
NTBs are estimated to be very high in the agro-food trade between
Turkey and the EU. Accordingly, mutual welfare gains for Turkey
and the EU are expected due to the abolition of high trade barriers
between them.
Turkey’s EU membership also creates welfare impacts on other
economies. For instance, Asia experiences a welfare loss of 0.49
billion US$ and Latin America’s welfare level decreases by 0.16
billion US$. These welfare losses stem from trade diversion. After
Turkey’s accession to the EU, the overall exports of Asia to Turkey
and to the EU decrease. Particularly, EU’s agro-food imports from
Table 8
Welfare results of enlargement experiments (million US$ relative to the baseline).
Total EV Bilateral tariff removal Reduction of NTBs
EU Turkey Total EU Turkey Total
Food and Ag Mnfc Food and Ag Mnfc Food and Ag Mnfc Srvcs Extrct Food and Ag Mnfc Srvcs Extrct
Experiment 1: enlargement of the EU to include Turkey
Turkey 4907 712 2 49 68 733 1414 513 31 10 1143 234 74 8 3425
EU 2266 480 1 379 43 58 1873 99 30 14 182 318 31 3 2550
GAFTA 30 51 0 6 12 58 106 26 1 5 3 18 0 3 156
FSU 65 37 0 3 5 47 79 18 1 8 10 23 3 4 146
Asia 499 90 0 35 65 120 217 132 6 3 13 59 1 1 396
North Am. 80 14 0 12 11 38 48 21 3 1 33 0 6 0 110
Latin Am. 167 61 0 25 4 90 151 6 0 1 18 6 1 0 185
Oceania 14 11 0 4 2 17 20 2 0 1 3 4 1 0 30
SSA 56 39 0 6 2 48 46 3 0 2 6 14 1 0 72
ROW 30 10 0 12 8 30 14 9 1 2 12 18 1 0 58
ROW 86 26 0 5 13 44 65 19 1 4 11 25 2 0 127
Experiment 2: enlargement of GAFTA to include Turkey
GAFTA Turkey Total GAFTA Turkey Total
Turkey 2486 89 942 261 13 1259 250 107 7 2 715 29 6 107 1223
EU 241 6 149 99 33 92 14 19 2 0 26 17 1 24 2
GAFTA 899 34 190 344 73 193 323 62 9 0 134 24 2 42 595
Iran–Israel 17 3 21 15 1 12 8 3 0 0 4 1 0 1 5
FSU 33 10 76 115 3 54 25 9 1 1 42 5 0 85 74
Asia 405 20 280 187 32 129 67 33 2 1 54 12 0 26 84
North Am. 48 6 48 47 2 6 18 5 1 0 3 0 0 2 24
Latin Am. 20 7 31 31 1 8 26 4 0 0 7 2 0 3 23
Oceania 16 3 23 25 1 1 7 3 0 0 10 2 0 0 3
SSA 2 2 20 13 0 11 4 3 0 0 5 1 0 3 3
ROW 4 6 57 59 2 9 16 7 0 0 19 1 0 3 7
Note: our original mapping of ROW comprises Switzerland, Norway, Croatia, Rest of EFTA, Rest of Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe and Rest of the World (compare Table A1 in
Appendix A). For reasons of simpliﬁcation, we also aggregated Iran and Israel, Albania, Georgia and Chile to ROW to evaluate the results.
Source: authors’ own calculation.
56 T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61Asia are replaced by Turkish exports. Latin America also experi-
ences a reduction in its food and agricultural trade to the EU.
In the lower part of Table 8, we illustrate the results of our sec-
ond experiment, in which Turkey is treated as a GAFTA member. It
is apparent that the overall welfare effect of this change is lower
than in the simulation that evaluates Turkey’s accession to the
EU. Turkey’s total welfare gains amount to 2.48 billion US$,
whereas 0.89 billion US$ accrue to the GAFTA member countries.
Unlike in our ﬁrst experiment, we observe that Turkey’s overall
welfare gains from the removal of NTBs (1.22 billion US$) is nearly
the same as its gains stemming from the elimination of import tar-
iffs (1.25 billion US$). Conversely, for the GAFTA member coun-
tries, the effect of the removal of NTBs is greater
(0.59 billion US$) than the effect of the elimination of import tariffs
(0.19 billion US$). Duty free access to the manufacturing sector of
the GAFTA member countries results in the highest welfare gains
for Turkey at 0.94 billion US$. This gain for Turkey is resulting from
its high share of manufacturing exports to GAFTA, which is also
associated with high tariff rates (compare Section ‘Overview of
the Turkish trade structure and agreements’ and Table 3). The tar-
iffs imposed by Turkey on agro-food imports from GAFTA are
higher than the tariffs imposed for the manufacturing sectors.
Hence, for the GAFTA member countries, the improvement caused
by the elimination of import tariffs from the Turkish agro-food sec-
tor is greater (0.34 billion US$) than the gain resulting from the
removal of import tariffs from Turkish manufacturing sector
(0.07 billion US$).
Abolishing the NTBs in the Turkish agro-food sector leads to a
Turkish welfare gain of 0.71 billion US$, whereas this gain amounts
to 0.13 billion US$ for the GAFTA member countries. In contrast,
if the GAFTA member countries eliminate the NTBs in the same
sector, the welfare gain increases to 0.32 billion US$ for the GAFTA
member countries and decreases to 0.25 billion US$ for Turkey.Each region also experiences welfare increases if it removes its
own NTBs in these sectors through efﬁciency gains.
Turkey’s membership in GAFTA has also welfare impacts on
other economies resulting from trade diversion. Similar to the
EU-Turkey enlargement experiment, the largest decrease in wel-
fare level is in the Turkey-GAFTA-FTA also observed for Asia. Asia
experiences a welfare loss of 0.40 billion US$. Asia’s welfare loss
is caused by the decrease in its overall exports to GAFTA. However,
in this case the decrease in exports is primarily observed in the
manufacturing sector. Similar effects are also identiﬁed for the
EU. The EU’s welfare loss is predominantly caused by the decrease
in its heavy manufacturing exports to GAFTA as well. GAFTA’s
imports of heavy manufacturing from the EU are replaced by the
imports from Turkey.
In general, the effects of the removal of NTBs between GAFTA
and Turkey yield smaller welfare gains than those caused by the
removal of the NTBs between Turkey and the EU. The main reason
for this result is the higher share and greater value of the agro-food
trade between Turkey and the EU compared to the agro-food trade
between Turkey and GAFTA. The EU enlargement to include Turkey
increases the value of trade between Turkey and the EU by a value
that is 2.3 times greater than the increase in the trade value result-
ing from the Turkey-GAFTA experiment. The next part therefore
gives more insights into these changes in trade by focusing on
the trade balance.
Trade balance effects
In Table 9, we present the impact on the trade balance caused
by the two enlargement experiments disaggregated according
to the 16 food and agricultural products. The ﬁrst part of
Table 9 shows the changes in the trade balance due to Turkey’s
membership to the EU; whereas the second part of the table dem-
onstrates the changes in agro-food sector resulting from Turkey’s
T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61 57joining the GAFTA. As mentioned in Section ‘Welfare effects’, Tur-
key is exhibiting higher welfare gains due to the EU membership.
This result can be explained in more detail by the changes in trade
balance of agro-food products.
The ﬁrst part of Table 9 shows that Turkey’s accession to the EU
results in an increase of Turkey’s agro-food trade balance by
3.16 billion US$. However, the EU’s exports decrease relative to
its imports by 1.95 billion US$. Turkey’s relative sugar exports rise
extensively (2.44 billion US$) as a result of its accession to the EU.
The highest increase in the EU’s agro-food trade balance is
observed in dairy sector (1.24 billion US$), whereas Turkey’s dairy
imports decrease by 2.25 billion US$ more than its exports. All of
these effects can be traced back to the pre-experiment high tariff
rates and NTBs on the corresponding sectors (compare Sec-
tion ‘Overview of the Turkish trade structure and agreements’
and Table 3 as well as Section ‘Calculation of tariff equivalents’
and Table 7). The removal of high trade barriers hence results in
an increase of the trade volume.
Turkey’s effect on the trade balance is particularly shown in the
products that are highly traded between Turkey and the EU,
namely, vegetables and fruits and other food products (compare
Section ‘Overview of the Turkish trade structure and agreements’
and Table 3). The increase in Turkey’s trade of vegetable and fruits
(1.00 billion US$) and other food products (2.26 billion US$) is
expected due to the removal of the NTBs from these sectors, which
were estimated to be 77% and 177%, respectively (compare
Section ‘Calculation of tariff equivalents’ and Table 7). This result
is conﬁrmed by Turkish exporters, 72% of whom indicate that they
faced NTBs when exporting fresh vegetable and fruits to the EU in
2007 (Özdemir, 2008). The most frequent barriers are imposed for
food safety reasons and are related to health and environmental
labeling, pesticide use, genetically modiﬁed contents, quantity
restrictions, and maximum residual limits for commodities. The
aﬂatoxin level for hazelnuts, dried ﬁgs, pistachios, and commodi-
ties produced with these ingredients also creates barriers because
the Turkish exports in these categories do not meet the relevant EU
standards (Önen, 2008; Özdemir, 2008; Teknik Engel, 2013). Tur-
key ranked ﬁrst in terms of aﬂatoxin hazard on fruits and vegeta-
bles products category. In 2012, 152 of 297 notices from the
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed21 were for Turkish products
exported to the EU due to high aﬂatoxin levels on hazelnuts, dried
ﬁgs, and pistachios. In addition, Turkey was reported 60 times for
high level of pesticide residues, primarily for fresh pepper exports
(RASFF, 2013). Turkish beverage and tobacco exports also face high
barriers, mostly due to a lack of appropriate labeling, which gener-
ates consumer concerns (Teknik Engel, 2013). Hence, we observe a
slight increase in Turkey’s beverages and tobacco exports to the EU
due to the removal of the high NTBs on this sector (compare Sec-
tion ‘Calculation of tariff equivalents’ and Table 7). The NTBs that
the EU experiences in its exports to Turkey are generally related to
meat and other livestock products as they have been put in place
for public health reasons (European Commission, 2013b). Accord-
ingly, the AVEs of NTBs on the EU’s exports of cattle meat, other
meat and other animal products to Turkey are estimated to be very
high as 496%, 148% and 106%, respectively (compare Section ‘Calcula-
tion of tariff equivalents’ and Table 7). Hence, elimination of NTBs on
these sectors results in a relative increase of EU’s exports of meat
and livestock products which increases the EU’s trade balance in
other animal products, cattle meat and other meat by 0.037 bil-
lion US$, 0.34 billion US$ and 0.027 billion US$, respectively. These
ﬁndings are also in accordance with those of Oskam et al. (2004)21 The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed is primarily a tool to exchange
information between competent authorities on consignments of food and feed in
cases where a risk to human health has been identiﬁed and measures have been
taken.who state that after Turkey’s accession to the EU, Turkey remains to
be a net exporter of vegetables and fruits, but imports of beef from
the EU increase.
Turkey’s membership to the EU also affects the trade balance of
agro-food products in ROW. The agro-food trade balance of the
ROW increases by 1.35 billion US$. Due to Turkey’s adoption of a
lower EU level for tariffs of imports from third countries after EU
accession, relative food and agricultural imports from ROW to Tur-
key increase. These increases in agro-food trade balance are partic-
ularly observed in sugar and other food products sector
(0.67 billion US$ and 0.83 billion US$, respectively).
In the second part of Table 9, we present the changes in the
trade balance following the accession of Turkey to GAFTA. Turkey’s
membership to GAFTA results in a decrease of Turkey’s agro-food
trade balance by 2.69 billion US$. However, GAFTA’s exports
increase relative to its imports by 3.09 billion US$.
The largest decrease is given for the Turkish trade balance of
dairy products (3.12 billion). This is caused by the removal of
high trade barriers on dairy imports from GAFTA to Turkey (com-
pare Section ‘Overview of the Turkish trade structure and agree-
ments’ and Table 3 as well as Section ‘Calculation of tariff
equivalents’ and Table 7). Hence, after the removal of NTBs and
the elimination of import tariffs on the dairy sector, Turkey’s dairy
imports substantially increase. Turkey also imports relatively more
meat and livestock products due to the removal of trade distortions
in this sector (compare Section ‘Overview of the Turkish trade
structure and agreements’ and Table 3 as well as Section ‘Calcula-
tion of tariff equivalents’ and Table 7). Hence, following dairy prod-
ucts, GAFTA’s trade balance of other meat increases the second
highest by 0.26 billion US$.
Turkey’s agro-food trade balance rises by 0.26 billion US$ and
0.22 billion US$, respectively for the vegetable oils and fats and
other food products. These sectors include important export prod-
ucts from Turkey to GAFTA (compare Section ‘Overview of the
Turkish trade structure and agreements’ and Table 3). After joining
GAFTA, Turkey’s relative exports of beverages and tobacco exports
also rise (0.17 billion US$). Increasing relative exports of vegetable
oils and fats, other food products and beverages and tobacco from
Turkey to the GAFTA member countries are expected due to the
removal of high trade barriers on these sectors as shown in Table 7
in Section ‘Calculation of tariff equivalents’. In accordance, Turkish
exporters also report that mostly NTBs for Turkish exports to GAF-
TA are related to plant-based food, owing to quality requirements
regarding storage, labeling, transportation, sampling, and methods
of testing. In particular, exports of tobacco products face high bar-
riers resulting from labeling and consumer health protection con-
cerns. Also, exports of alcoholic beverages are uncommon.
Moreover, the NTBs for Turkey’s meat and livestock products, veg-
etable oil and animal fats are a response to quality issues and the
non-fulﬁllment of requirements for Halal accreditation (Teknik
Engel, 2013). Turkey’s accession to GAFTA also affects the trade
balance of agro-food products in ROW. ROW’s agro-food trade bal-
ance decreases by 1.42 billion US$ due to the relative decrease in
imports of Turkey and GAFTA from third-party countries. These
decreases in agro-food trade balance are particularly observed in
vegetable oils and fats and other food products (0.363 billion US$
and 0.37 billion US$, respectively).Qualiﬁcation of results
Empirical results always leave room for improvements and
further research. The gravity approach employed here only allows
the implicit estimation of trade costs of NTBs. We already
discussed in Section ‘Theoretical and empirical framework’ that
we control for many border-related factors in the trade cost func-
Table 9
Changes of the trade balance of the enlargement experiments for disaggregated agro-food sectors (million US$).
Experiment 1: enlargement
of the EU to include Turkey
Experiment 2: enlargement
of GAFTA to include Turkey
Turkey EU Turkey GAFTA
Food and agricultural products 3164 1950 2692 3098
Wheat 292 67 8 32
Cereal grains 98 63 17 12
Vegetables and fruits 1001 683 46 12
Oil seeds 58 27 19 4
Plant-based ﬁbers 63 257 27 109
Crops 98 99 1 108
Cattle 4 9 6 8
Other animal products 13 37 38 11
Vegetable oils and fats 761 254 262 35
Dairy 2251 1243 3127 2564
Processed rice 11 17 27 28
Sugar 2442 1500 88 86
Other food products 2267 1506 222 34
Beverages and tobacco 54 1 174 83
Cattle meat 221 346 9 8
Other meat 280 27 197 267
Source: authors’ own calculation.
58 T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61tion, but nevertheless the estimated AVEs do not include NTBs
alone. Thus, using our estimated AVEs in GTAP model simulations
might lead to the overestimation of our results. Additionally, the
estimated AVEs might also include NTBs that are initiated for
safety and health reasons. The elimination of those measures
might not be desirable and might lead to biased welfare effects.
With the help of benchmarking, we attempt to retain the NTBs
of this type, although full control is impossible. A future improve-
ment in the databases for NTBs might make it possible to esti-
mate the effects of NTBs directly. In addition, we also need to
emphasize that the EU and GAFTA benchmark settings are very
ambitious. The trade relations between EU member countries
and between GAFTA members have developed over a long period.
Our estimates therefore indicate the potential long-term welfare
effects of Turkey’s integration to the EU or GAFTA. Also these wel-
fare effects might be too high because we do not consider the
WTO negotiation or tax replacement scenarios as well as political
and social unrest in the Middle Eastern states. Further effects of
Turkey’s membership to the EU, such as ﬁnancial and budgetary
consequences on both parties as well as implications of potential
labor movements between Turkey and the EU member countries
can also be applied in future research.
In contrast, as also indicated by Winchester (2009), the results
do not cover several welfare improving aspects; mainly traced back
to the lack of dynamism of the CGE model. The standard GTAP
model is static and does not include dynamic behavior. Hence, pro-
ductivity improvements, foreign ownership of capital and changes
in foreign and domestic wealth are not explicitly considered. If
spillover effects were taken into account, we would expect Turkey
to experience higher gains in terms of technology and knowledge
transfer from the EU. As regards to Turkey’s membership to GAFTA,
we expect that these secondary effects of the FTA would be more
limited for Turkey. Higher productivity improvements are
expected to happen in GAFTA member countries, because knowl-
edge and technology would be transferred from Turkey to the Mid-
dle East.
Another aspect that might lead to an overestimation of results is
the so-called aggregation bias. Aggregation bias occurs in general
equilibrium models due to the inability to implement tariffs at
the six-digit level of the Harmonized System. The importance of
the level of data disaggregation and the differences in results
between models developed with aggregated and disaggregated
databases are already emphasized by several authors (e.g.,Charteris and Winchester, 2010; Grant et al., 2007; Narayanan
et al., 2010a,b). These differences in results can be predominantly
traced back to false competition (Narayanan et al., 2010a). False
competition results from a situation in which competition does
not initially exist between two exporting regions (e.g., in the EU
and GAFTA) in a subsector (e.g., bananas). However, the trade data
on this subsector may be available only in the form of an aggre-
gated sector (e.g., vegetables and fruits) that also includes other
competing sectors (e.g., tomatoes). Utilizing the aggregated sector
in models causes false substitution effects caused by wrongly
applied weights. False competition also applies to the situations
that one of the subsectors aggregated in a sector may not face
any NTBs whereas one of the other subsectors within the same
aggregation can be subject to NTBs. Hence, false competition
may result in the overestimation of trade effects when tariffs
and/or NTBs are reduced or abolished and thereby may cause bias
in the results.
Conclusion
This paper explores the economic implications of Turkey’s
membership in either the EU or GAFTA by considering both tariffs
and NTBs. Particular emphasis is given to the food and agricultural
sector. We use the GTAP database and the gravity approach to esti-
mate the AVEs of border barriers that reﬂect the impacts of NTBs in
16 agro-food sectors. In general, the AVEs of the NTBs are compa-
rable in magnitude with those reported in the results of recent
studies on border effects for other countries.
According to the reports of Turkish and European exporters, we
expected high NTBs on vegetables and fruits, other food products,
other animal products and beverages and tobacco sector in the
trade between Turkey and the EU. Those sectors are also strategi-
cally important for Turkey’s trade ﬂows with the EU and GAFTA
as indicated by their high trade shares and protection structure.
Turkish exporters report high barriers on other animal products,
vegetable oils and fats, beverages and tobacco in the trade between
Turkey and GAFTA. Our econometric estimates conﬁrm that high
AVEs of NTBs do indeed exist in these sectors. NTBs on Turkey’s
vegetables and fruits and other food products exported to the EU
are, for example, equal to 77.06% and 177%, respectively. These
barriers are much higher than the current barriers among the EU
members (0% and 81.52%, respectively). Analogously, we ﬁnd high
AVEs of NTBs for other animal products, vegetable and oil and bev-
T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61 59erages and tobacco on Turkey’s exports to GAFTA. Additionally, we
also identiﬁed several sectors with high AVEs of NTBs which were
initially not reported by exporters from either countries involved
in the respective FTA. Those are cereal grains and processed rice
in the case of the EU-Turkey enlargement and cereal grains, pro-
cessed rice, and sugar in the case of the accession of Turkey to
GAFTA.
We expect that sectors with particularly high AVEs of NTBs con-
tribute the most to the gains resulting from the two FTA agree-
ments compared in this paper. In a second step, we therefore use
the GTAP framework to implement the AVEs in the general equilib-
rium model. In our analysis, we utilize the most recent version ofTable A1
Regional and sector aggregation.
Regions Se
1 Turkey 1 Pa
2 European Union
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria
2 W
3 Greater Arab Free Trade Area
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa, Rest of Western Asia
3 Ce
4 Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel 4 Ve
5 Former Soviet Union
Belarus, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Rest of Former Soviet Union
5 O
6 Asia
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Cambodia,
Indonesia, People’s Democratic Republic of Lao, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, Rest of Southeast Asia
6 Su
7 North America
Canada, United States of America, Mexico, Rest of North America
7 Pl
8 Latin America
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, El Salvador, Caribbean, Rest of South America,
Rest of Central America
8 Cr
9 Oceania
Australia, New Zealand, Rest of Oceania
9 Ca
10 Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Rest of African
Customs Union, South Central Africa, Rest of Eastern Africa, Rest of
Western Africa, Central Africa
10 O
11 Rest of the World
Switzerland, Norway, Croatia, Rest of EFTA, Rest of Eastern Europe,
Rest of Europe, Rest of the World
11 Ra
12 Albania 12 W
13 Georgia 13 Su




















Source: GTAP Database, Version 8, Base Year 2007.the GTAP database, Version 8. Before using the AVEs, we extend
the GTAP framework to the year 2020 by updating the political
and economic environment. We also consider those of Turkey’s
FTAs that came into force after 2007 or that will be in force up until
2020. Thereafter, we run two enlargement experiments and com-
pare the possible effects of Turkey’s integration into the EU or
GAFTA.
The results of our experiments indicate that higher overall wel-
fare gains will accrue for Turkey through EU membership (4.90 bil-
lion US$) than through membership in GAFTA (2.48 billion US$).
These gains result mainly from the higher share and greater value
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60 T. Engelbert et al. / Food Policy 47 (2014) 46–61trade between Turkey and GAFTA. As other authors have sug-
gested, the new memberships will deliver higher gains for Turkey
than for their partner economies; 2.26 billion US$ for the EU and
0.89 billion US$ for the GAFTA member countries. The removal of
NTBs will predominantly result in greater economic effects rather
than the elimination of import tariffs. These higher effects are more
pronounced in the ﬁrst simulation, in which we enlarge the EU to
include Turkey. The abolition of trade costs of NTBs generates a
welfare gain of 3.42 billion US$ for Turkey, whereas the welfare
gain stemming from duty free access to the European market is
only 0.73 billion US$. Similarly, the EU’s and the GAFTA member
countries’ gains from NTB removal outweigh their gains due to
the elimination of import tariffs in both experiments. This ﬁnding
indicates the importance of NTBs in enlargement scenarios because
eliminating NTBs contributes more to welfare increases than does
tariff removal.
The changes in the trade balance show an increase of Turkey’s
trade balance for those products which are highly traded between
Turkey and the EU and are often protected by tariffs and high AVEs
of NTBs, namely, in vegetables and fruits and other food products
sectors. After the enlargement to include Turkey, the EU imports
relatively more vegetables and fruits, sugar and other food prod-
ucts, so that EU’s trade balance of these sectors decreases. In con-
trast, the EU’s trade balance of dairy products shows a substantial
increase. The accession of Turkey to GAFTA leads to a decrease of
Turkey’s trade balance for dairy and meat and livestock products,
while Turkey’s trade balance increases for vegetable oils and fats
and other food products, which are important export products of
Turkey to GAFTA.
Policy makers might ﬁnd our framework useful in their decision
making process regarding Turkish foreign policy. Our experimental
results verify the importance of the EU as a trade partner for Tur-
key and the narrow gains that will accrue from GAFTA member-
ship. These gains will most likely be even lower due to the
current political and military conﬂicts in the Middle Eastern states
as well as the serious structural problems in the Arab economies.
Turkey might obtain greater beneﬁts if it strengthens its relations
with the EU rather than with the GAFTA member countries.
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ANALYSE DES FREIHANDELSABKOMMENS ZWISCHEN DER EU UND INDIEN 
UNTER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG VON NICHT-TARIFÄREN HANDELSHEMMNISSEN IM 
AGRAR – UND ERNÄHRUNGSBEREICH 
Tanja Engelbert, Martina Brockmeier 1  
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Beitrag werden die Effekte eines Freihandelsabkommens zwischen der EU und 
Indien durch Senkung von Zöllen und nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnissen (NTBs) mit be-
sonderer Berücksichtigung des Agrar- und Ernährungssektors analysiert. Mit Hilfe eines 
theoriebasierten Gravitationsmodells werden die Effekte von grenzinduzierenden Barrieren im 
Handel zwischen der EU und Indien geschätzt. Die in Bezug auf wirtschaftliche Größen und 
beobachtbare Handelskosten korrigierten Grenzeffekte spiegeln die Effekte von NTBs wider. 
Sie werden in Zolläquivalente (AVEs) umgewandelt und in das Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) Modell integriert. Drei verschiedene Experimente mit variierenden Zollkürzungen 
und implementierten AVEs der NTBs werden berechnet. Die ökonometrischen Schätzergeb-
nisse zeigen die Bedeutung der NTBs im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelhandel zwischen der EU 
und Indien auf. Die GTAP-Simulationen veranschaulichen, dass Indiens Wohlfahrtsergebnis 
von der Höhe der Zollkürzungen und der Normierung der NTBs abhängt. Der Wohlfahrts-
effekt infolge NTB-Abbaus ist höher als der aus den Zollkürzungen resultierende Effekt. Der 
Abbau der NTBs im Agrar- und Ernährungssektor in Indien hat einen bedeutenden Anteil an 
den Wohlfahrtsgewinnen durch die NTB-Abschaffung. Dies zeigt die hohe Relevanz der 
NTBs im Handel von Agrargütern und Nahrungsmitteln zwischen der EU und Indien. 
Schlüsselbegriffe 
EU-Indien Freihandelsabkommen, nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse (NTBs), Gravitations-
modell, Grenzeffekt, Zolläquivalente (AVEs), Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
1 Einleitung 
Mit dem Scheitern der Verhandlungen im Rahmen der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) ist 
die Anzahl der nicht-WTO induzierten Handelsabkommen weltweit deutlich angestiegen. 
Insbesondere große Nationen sind bestrebt, die potenziellen Gewinne aus ökonomischer 
Integration mit Hilfe von Freihandelsabkommen (FTA) auszuschöpfen. Schwellenländer 
werden darüber hinaus immer mehr durch ökonomische Größe und wachsende Märkte ge-
kennzeichnet und stellen daher zunehmend attraktive Handelspartner für Industrieländer dar. 
Das Ergebnis ist eine wachsende Tendenz zu Nord-Süd-Allianzen. Die Europäische Union 
(EU) verhandelt zurzeit mit mehr als 70 Ländern über Präferenzabkommen (EU KOMMISSION, 
2012). Verhandlungen über ein Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der EU und Indien (EU-
Indien FTA) starteten in 2007 und sollen nach dem zwölften Gipfeltreffen in Neu-Dehli Ende 
2012 abgeschlossen werden. Das Interesse beider Parteien liegt hauptsächlich außerhalb des 
Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektors. Allerdings haben divergierende Interessen bezüglich 
Politiken im Agrar- und Ernährungsbereich zu den langjährigen Verhandlungen beigetragen. 
Es gibt nur wenige Studien, welche die Effekte eines EU-Indien FTA mit einem allgemeinen 
Gleichgewichtsmodell (CGE Modell) bewerten (z. B. DECREAUX und MITARITONNA, 2007; 
ACHTERBOSCH et al., 2008; FRANCOIS et al., 2008; POLASKI et al., 2008). Die Ergebnisse 
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dieser Studien zeigen, dass beide Parteien durch das Abkommen profitieren könnten, auch 
wenn dieser Gewinn nur auf asymmetrische Zollkürzungen und die Beibehaltung von hohen 
Handelsbarrieren auf dem indischen Markt zurückzuführen ist. Der Ernährungsbereich und 
die Agrarwirtschaft spielen eine wichtige Rolle in der indischen Ökonomie. Der Anteil der 
Bevölkerung, der in ländlichen Gebieten lebt, liegt über 70% (WELTBANK, 2011). Allerdings 
berücksichtigen die meisten empirischen Studien zur Bewertung des EU-Indien FTA nur hoch 
aggregierte Agrar- und Ernährungssektoren und bieten somit keine Möglichkeiten für 
detaillierte Einsichten und Interpretationen. Zusätzlich werden nicht-tarifäre Handelshemm-
nisse (NTBs) nicht in die Analysen einbezogen. Eine Ausnahme ist die Studie von FRANCOIS 
et al. (2008), in der NTBs im Dienstleistungssektor ökonometrisch geschätzt und in ein CGE 
Modell implementiert werden. Keine der oben genannten Studien berücksichtigt NTBs im 
Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelbereich, obwohl bekannt ist, dass NTBs gerade in diesen Sektoren 
sehr verbreitet sind. Haben NTBs im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor signifikante Aus-
wirkungen oder resultiert der hauptsächliche Effekt des Freihandelsabkommens aus der Zoll-
kürzung? Die vorliegende Studie leistet einen Beitrag zur existierenden Literatur, indem die 
Effekte eines EU-Indien FTA durch die Senkung von Zöllen und den Abbau von NTBs ana-
lysiert werden. Hierbei liegt der Schwerpunkt auf dem Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor.  
Die vorliegende Studie gliedert sich wie folgt. In Kapitel 2 wird ein Überblick über die Per-
spektiven eines EU-Indien FTA und dessen Potenziale aufgezeigt. Die empirische Analyse 
teilt sich in zwei Abschnitte. In Kapitel 3 wird ein umfassend spezifiziertes Gravitationmodell 
zur Schätzung der Grenzeffekte im Handel zwischen der EU und Indien aufgestellt und die 
resultierenden Handelseffekte der NTBs in Zolläquivalente (AVEs) umgewandelt. Im 
Kapitel 4 werden die AVEs in das Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Modell imple-
mentiert, um Ergebnisse des EU-Indien FTA für die Volkswirtschaft insgesamt zu erhalten. 
Dabei wird der theoretische Hintergrund der Implementierung, die Datenzusammenstellung, 
die Bildung der Szenarien und die Ergebnisse vorgestellt. Im Kapitel 5 folgt ein Fazit. 
2 Aspekte einer ökonomischen Integration zwischen der EU und Indien 
Im Juni 2007 haben die Europäische Kommission und die Regierung Indiens Verhandlungen 
zu einer umfassenden Freihandelszone begonnen. Die EU-Verhandlungen mit Indien sind Teil 
der 2006 eingeführten europäischen globalen Handelsstrategie, die insbesondere auf Länder 
mit großen und schnell wachsenden, protektionistischen Märkten ausgerichtet ist (EU-
KOMMISSION, 2006). Indien gehört zu den wichtigsten Handelspartnern der EU und ist auch 
ein wichtiger Akteur auf dem Weltmarkt geworden. Das jährliche BIP-Wachstum ist von 3% 
in den Jahren 1970-1980 auf 6% in den Jahren 1990-2000 gestiegen und liegt zurzeit bei mehr 
als 9% (WELTBANK, 2011). Diese beeindruckenden Wachstumsraten und ein Markt von mehr 
als 1,17 Mrd. Menschen lassen Indien zu einem interessanten Handelspartner für die EU 
werden. Allerdings beträgt das indische BIP nur 10% des BIP der EU und ist im Pro-Kopf-
Einkommen vergleichbar mit dem der ärmsten Länder der Welt. In Indien leben mehr als 40% 
der Bevölkerung von weniger als 1,25 US$ pro Tag. Indien ist damit das Land mit der größten 
absoluten Anzahl an Armen weltweit (WELTBANK, 2011). Folglich besteht ein starkes Un-
gleichgewicht zwischen den Partnern des FTA bezüglich Anforderungen in sensiblen 
Handelsbereichen. Beim Gipfeltreffen in Neu-Delhi im Februar 2012 wurden wichtige Fort-
schritte erzielt, so dass ein FTA voraussichtlich Ende 2012 abgeschlossen sein wird. Es wäre 
das weltweit größte Handelsabkommen mit 1,7 Mrd. Menschen (EU-KOMMISSION, 2012). 
Indiens Ökonomie und insbesondere die Agrarwirtschaft ist nur mäßig in die Weltwirtschaft 
integriert. Der Warenhandel hat einen geringen Anteil am BIP und ist von 20% in 2000/01 auf 
36% in 2008/09 gestiegen, was eine geringe, aber steigende Offenheit Indiens im Welthandel 
repräsentiert (WELTBANK, 2011). In 2007 war die EU Indiens wichtigster Handelspartner 
bezüglich Gesamtimporte, aber auch die Importe von Industrieerzeugnissen, Dienstleistungen 
und Primärprodukten aus der EU waren bedeutend. Seit 2002 bewegte sich Indien vom 15. 
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zum 8. Platz nach oben auf der Liste der wichtigsten Handelspartner der EU (EU-
KOMMISSION, 2012). Die wichtigsten von Indien in die EU exportierten Produkte sind Tex-
tilien und Bekleidung. Bezüglich des Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektors ist Indien der zehnt-
wichtigste Handelspartner der EU. Die Agrarexporte von der EU nach Indien sind im Ver-
gleich zu den Importen aus Indien sehr gering. Hinsichtlich der Agrarhandelsbilanz mit der 
EU beträgt der Überschuss der Exporte von Indien in die EU über den Importen aus der EU 
2265,7 Mio. US$ in 2007. Indien besitzt ein hohes Protektionsniveau, das von 13,4% im 
Industriesektor bis zu 70% im Agrarsektor reicht. Im Gegensatz dazu erhebt die EU relativ 
niedrige Zölle auf Importe aus Indien. Die höchsten Zölle sind im Agrar- und Nahrungs-
mittelsektor (8,3%) sowie im Textil- und Bekleidungssektor (7,9%) vorhanden (GTAP, 
2012). Allgemein weist die Zollstruktur in Indien eine höhere Protektion als in der EU auf. 
Eine weitgehende ökonomische Integration zwischen der EU und Indien würde jedoch nicht 
nur eine Zollsenkung, sondern auch eine Eliminierung der nicht-tarifären Protektion und die 
Harmonisierung technischer Standards und phytosanitärer Regulationen voraussetzen. Die EU 
ist bekannt für ihre hohen NTBs, die den Zugang von Exporten aus Entwicklungsländern ins-
besondere im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor erschwert. Allerdings erhebt Indien auch viele 
NTBs in Form von quantitativen Restriktionen, Importlizenzen, verbindlichen Tests und 
Inspektionen, technischen Regulationen, phytosanitären Maßnahmen als auch komplizierten 
Zollabfertigungen (EU-KOMMISSION, 2012). Beide Parteien führen die Gespräche auch hin-
sichtlich der NTBs. Bislang gibt es jedoch keine empirischen Ergebnisse wie die Eliminierung 
der nicht-tarifären Protektion im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor den Handel zwischen der 
EU und Indien beeinflussen würde. 
3 Analyse mit dem Gravitationsmodell 
3.1 Modellspezifikation 
Die ökonometrische Analyse zur Schätzung der Effekte von NTBs zwischen Indien und der 
EU in 2007 stützt sich auf das Gravitationsmodell und dem theoriebasierten Grenzeffekt-
Ansatz. Basierend auf ANDERSON (1979) wurde das klassische Gravitationsmodell durch eine 
Reihe von Handelsmodellen theoretisch fundiert. Dies und die Erweiterung der Spezifikation 
für verschiedene Fragestellungen in der Analyse außenwirtschaftlicher Beziehungen führten 
zum empirischen Erfolg des Gravitationsmodells. Ein Schwerpunkt bildet die Beobachtung 
von Grenzeffekten. Der Grenzeffekt vergleicht den innerstaatlichen mit dem internationalen 
Handel. Der Effekt zeigt, um wie viel der Handel innerhalb eines Landes den vergleichbaren 
grenzüberschreitenden Handel übersteigt (MCCALLUM, 1995). Der entscheidende Erklärungs-
ansatz für diesen Grenzeffekt sind die mit der Existenz von nationalen Grenzen verbundenen 
Barrieren, wie z. B. Zölle und NTBs. Der Vorteil dieser Methode besteht darin, dass der 
Grenzeffekt alle Hemmnisse zusammenfasst. Darunter fallen auch solche, die nur sehr 
schwierig direkt zu messen oder schwer zu beobachten sind. Insbesondere im Handel von 
Agrargütern und Nahrungsmitteln besteht ein Defizit an verlässlichen und aktuellen 
Statistiken zu technischen Regulationen und phytosanitären Standards. Es gibt nur wenige 
Studien, welche die theoriebasierte Grenzeffekt-Methode auf den Agrarhandel anwenden 
(OLPER und RAIMONDI, 2008; WINCHESTER, 2009; CHANG und HAYAKAWA, 2010). 
Das hier angewandte verallgemeinerte Gravitationsmodell von ANDERSON und VAN WINCOOP 
(2003) berücksichtigt Preise, die annahmegemäß zwischen den Ländern variieren. Diese 
Preisindizes reflektieren multilaterale Handelshindernisse, welche die relativen Handelskosten 
darstellen. Die Relevanz dieser relativen Kosten ist dadurch begründet, dass bilaterale Han-
delskosten von den Handelskosten, die jedes Land zu den übrigen Handelspartnern hat, beein-
flusst werden. Das Weglassen dieser relevanten Faktoren führt zur Missspezifikation des 
Modells und damit zu verzerrten Schätzergebnissen. Es gibt verschiedene Möglichkeiten 
diese nicht beobachtbaren multilateralen Handelshindernisse zu berücksichtigen. Der am 
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meisten angewendete Ansatz ist die Spezifikation mit fixen Effekten für Exporteure und Im-
porteure. Eine alternative theoriebasierte Möglichkeit ist die Berechnung dieser Variablen 
durch die Approximierungsmethode von BAIER und BERGSTRAND (2009).2 Unter Einbezieh-
ung der typischen Erklärungsfaktoren für das Gravitationsmodell, der länderspezifischen 
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Dabei ist xij der Exportwert von i nach j, Prodi ist die Produktion von Exporteur i und 
Consumj ist der Konsum des Importeuer j. αi (αj) sind die Exporter- (Importer-) Dummy-
variablen und εij ist der Fehlerterm. Zij ein Set an erklärenden Variablen, welche die Handels-
kosten approximieren. Dieses Set enthält die typischen Variablen einer Gravitationsgleichung 
wie die Geographie, soziokulturelle und -ökonomische Nähe als auch Politikvariablen wie 
Zölle und Exportsubventionen. Zusätzliche Dummyvariablen erfassen die Mitgliedschaft in 
gemeinsamen Handelsabkommen und in der WTO. Darüber hinaus werden Indizes berück-
sichtigt, welche die logistische Leistung und die politische Situation in den Ländern abbilden. 
Die interessantesten Variablen in diesem Set sind die Grenzdummyvariablen, welche die Han-
delsbarrieren an der Grenze erfassen. bIND/EU und bEFTA/EU nehmen den Wert Eins an, wenn die 
abhängige Variable die Exporte in die EU aus jeweils Indien und den EFTA Ländern misst. 
bEU/IND und bEU/EFTA nehmen den Wert Eins an, wenn Exporte aus der EU jeweils nach Indien 
und den EFTA Ländern erfasst werden. bOTHER ist gleich Eins wenn Exporte irgendeine 
Grenze überqueren, die in den vorigen Grenzdummyvariablen nicht erfasst wurde. 
Mit Hilfe des Antilogarithmus des geschätzten Grenzkoeffizienten kann der Grenzeffekt be-
rechnet werden. Es gibt das Verhältnis von i’s Exporten nach j zu i’s Exporten zu sich selbst 
an und gibt damit an um wie viel der innerstaatliche Handel den grenzüberschreitenden 
Handel übersteigt. Nach Korrektur bezüglich der Unterschiede in wirtschaftlicher Größe, geo-
graphischer Distanz, Zöllen und anderen beobachtbaren handelskosteninduzierenden 
Variablen in der Gravitationsgleichung, wird angenommen, dass der Grenzeffekt hauptsäch-
lich von den Effekten der NTBs bestimmt wird.3  
3.2 Daten und Schätzergebnisse 
Daten für bilaterale Export-, Produktions- und Konsumwerte, bilaterale Zölle und Export-
subventionen sind aus Version 8 der GTAP-Datenbasis bezogen. In Anlehnung an WEI (1996) 
und anderen Autoren, werden die Exporte eines Landes an sich selbst durch Subtrahieren der 
aggregierten Exporte jedes Landes (zu allen Handelspartnern) von deren Inlandsproduktion in 
jedem Sektor berechnet. Der Datensatz umfasst 99 Regionen und 57 Sektoren. Informationen 
über Distanz, Landumschlossenheit, Nähe, gemeinsame Währung, Sprache und koloniale Be-
ziehungen sowie Mitgliedschaft in gemeinsamen Handelsabkommen und WTO sind der 
Datenbasis des Centre D‘Etudes Prospectives et D’Informations Internationales (CEPII)4 ent-
nommen. Für die Analyse wird die bilaterale Distanz zwischen zwei Ländern als bevölker-
ungsgewichtete Durchschnittsdistanz zwischen den größten Städten verwendet. Dies ermög-
licht auch die Berücksichtigung von innerstaatlichen Distanzen. Daten über logistische Leist-
ung ist der Weltbank entnommen5. Aufgrund der fixen Effekte wird das Produkt der 
länderspezifischen „Logistic Performance Indices“ in die Gravitationsgleichung eingefügt. Je 
                                                 
2 Die Autoren approximieren Terme für relative Handelskosten durch eine First-Order Taylor Expansion. Diese 
Terme enthalten nur exogene Variablen und können in die lineare Gravitationsgleichung eingesetzt werden. 
3 Obwohl die theoriebasierte Gravitationsgleichung in (1) die Restriktion β2 = β3 = 1 impliziert, wird sie hier 
nicht eingeführt. 
4 Siehe http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
5 Siehe http://go.worldbank.org/7TEVSUEAR0 
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höher dieser Index, desto leistungsfähiger die Logistik. Freedom House ist die Quelle für die 
Informationen über politische Freiheit6. Auch hier wird der „Political Freedom Index“ als 
Produkt der länderspezifischen Indizes berücksichtigt. Je höher dieser Index, desto geringer 
die politische Freiheit. Informationen über Religion sind dem The World Factbook der CIA 
entnommen7. Der Datensatz enthält 82272 Exportwerte, die gleich Null sind. Aus diesem 
Grund wird das Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Modell (z.B. BURGER et al., 2009) gewählt8. Für 
die Poisson Schätzung wird die Gravitationsgleichung in (1) entsprechend einer Exponential-
funktion verändert. Die ZIP Regression wird für 16 Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektoren9 und 
für 4 aggregierte Nicht-Agrar-Sektoren10 durchgeführt. 
Entsprechend der Logit-Regression steigt in fast allen Sektoren erwartungsgemäß die Wahr-
scheinlichkeit für Exportwerte von Null mit der Distanz und sinkt mit gemeinsamer Grenze. 
Die signifikanten Koeffizienten und der positive Vuong Test sprechen für die ZIP Schätzung. 
Auch die Ergebnisse der Poisson Regressionen entsprechen den Erwartungen. Produktion und 
Konsum haben einen positiven Effekt auf den Handelsstrom in allen Sektoren und sind hoch-
signifikant. Die Handelselastizität hinsichtlich Distanz ist in allen aggregierten Sektoren signi-
fikant negativ und deutlich unter Eins. Kulturelle Nähe zwischen zwei Ländern und eine ge-
meinsame Währung beeinflussen den Handel positiv in fast allen Sektoren. Auch logistische 
Leistung hat einen signifikant positiven Effekt. Die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Handels-
abkommen und zur WTO erhöht den Handel signifikant. Nachteile in der geographischen 
Lage und Einschränkungen in der politischen Freiheit wirken sich negativ auf den Handel aus. 
Der Effekt von Zöllen ist in den meisten Sektoren hochsignifikant. Allerdings ist der Einfluss 
von Zöllen teilweise positiv. Auch der Koeffizient für Exportsubventionen ist entweder nicht 
signifikant oder hat das falsche Vorzeichen. Derartige Ergebnisse finden sich jedoch auch in 
der Literatur (vgl. PHILIPPIDIS und SANJUÁN, 2007; WINCHESTER, 2009). Die Koeffizienten 
der Grenz-Dummyvariablen sind erwartungsgemäß negativ und hochsignifikant in allen 
Regressionen. Dementsprechend liegt der eindeutige Nachweis für grenzinduzierte Barrieren 
vor. Im Handel von Agrargütern und Nahrungsmitteln insgesamt ist der Handel innerhalb der 
EU 46 mal größer als die Exporte von der EU nach Indien und nur 4 mal größer als die Ex-
porte in die EFTA. Diese Werte zeigen, dass die von den EU Ländern zu den EFTA Ländern 
exportierten Agrarprodukte und Nahrungsmittel geringeren Barrieren ausgesetzt sind als die 
Exporte nach Indien. Der Handel innerhalb Indiens ist 11 mal größer als Exporte in die EU 
und der EFTA intra-Handel ist 9 mal größer als die Exporte in die EU. Dies zeigt auch, dass 
die EU gegenüber Indien höhere Barrieren hat als gegenüber den EFTA Ländern. 
3.3 Berechnung der Zolläquivalente 
Die theoretische Spezifikation des Gravitationsmodells ermöglicht es mit Hilfe der 
Substitutionselastizität die Effekte der Barrieren, die durch internationale Grenzen verursacht 
werden, in Handelskosten zu überführen. Für die Kalkulation der AVEs der NTBs wird die 
folgende Gleichung verwendet AVEbij = exp[βij/1-σ] – 1, in der AVEbij das Zolläquivalent der 
Grenzbarrieren ist. AVEbEU/IND gibt beispielsweise die Schwierigkeiten der EU beim Export 
                                                 
6 Siehe http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
7 Siehe https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
8 Die ZIP Schätzung wird anderen Poisson Schätzern vorgezogen, um den Überschuss an Null Werten und die 
Überstreuung zu berücksichtigen. Dies geschieht in zwei Prozessen: der erste Prozess generiert die Null Daten 
(Logit-Regression) und der zweite Prozess generiert die Daten des Poisson Modells (Poisson-Regression). 
9 Auf Grund der Kollinearität zwischen Produktion und exporter-spezifischen fixen Effekten und zwischen 
Konsum und importer-spezifischen fixen Effekten werden in den sektoralen Regressionen die Variablen 
Produktion und Konsum nicht berücksichtigt. 
10 In den aggregierten Sektorregressionen werden Sektor-Dummyvariablen berücksichtigt, um sektor-spezifische 
Charakteristiken aufzufangen. Tatsächlich erfordert die gewählte Spezifikation die Berücksichtigung von 
exporter-sektor- und importer-sektor-spezifischen fixen Effekten. Dies hätte jedoch zur Einbeziehung von 11286 
(=2•99•57) Dummyvariablen geführt, was technisch nicht umsetzbar war. 
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ihrer Produkte nach Indien hinsichtlich des implizierten Preiseffekts an. Es umfasst das 
Durchschnittsniveau der Protektion des importierenden Landes und andere Grenzfaktoren, die 
nicht durch die berücksichtigten Variablen in der Gravitationsgleichung erfasst werden. βij ist 
der Koeffizient der Grenzdummyvariablen bij und σ ist die Substitutionselastizität zwischen 
den Produkten. Für die Berechnung der AVEs werden die Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen 
Gütern aus der GTAP-Datenbasis entsprechend der Sektoraggregation verwendet11.  
Tabelle 1: Zolläquivalente für NTBs (in Prozent) 
 
Quelle: Eigene Berechnungen. 
Tabelle 1 listet die AVEs von NTBs auf EU’s Exporte nach Indien und in die EFTA Länder 
und auf die Exporte von Indien und den EFTA Ländern in die EU. AVEs, die Exporte in den 
aggregierten Sektoren aus der EU nach Indien betreffen, reichen von 404% im Dienst-
leistungssektor bis 31% im Industriesektor. Im Agar- und Ernährungssektor und bei Textilien 
liegen die AVEs der NTBs bei 162% bzw. nur bei 34%. Bei sonstigen Primärsektoren liegt 
der AVE bei 0%. AVEs auf die Exporte der EU in die EFTA-Länder sind in den aggregierten 
Sektoren erwartungsgemäß niedriger. Insbesondere im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor ist 
der AVE um 120 Prozentpunkte geringer. Die 16 Sektoren für Agrargüter und Nahrungsmittel 
weisen AVEs auf, die von 48% bei Zucker bis 1158% bei Futtergetreide reichen. Auch hier 
liegen die AVEs auf EU’s Exporte in die EFTA Länder niedriger. Die einzige Ausnahme ist 
der Rindfleischsektor. Während Indien keine NTBs auferlegt, besteht in den EFTA Ländern 
ein AVE von NTBs auf EUs Rindfleischexporte von 53%. 
                                                 
11 Alternativ kann auch die geschätzte Substitutionselastizität aus der Gravitationsgleichung gewählt werden. 
Basierend auf der theoretischen Herleitung des Gravitationsmodells wird die Substitutionselastizität mit dem Ab-
solutwert des geschätzten Zollkoeffizienten plus Eins berechnet. Infolge nicht signifikanter Ergebnisse für einige 
Sektoren, wurde dieser Ansatz nicht gewählt. 
Auf Indien's Auf EFTA's
Sektor nach Indien  nach EFTA
Weizen 0 0 75 145
Futtergetreide 1158 0 660 20697
Obst & Gemüse 0 0 0 192
Ölsaaten 454 115 92 492
Pflanzliche Fasern 210 133 337 504
Sonstige Getreide 162 65 102 116
Reis 0 0 43 0
Rinder 209 160 0 168
Schweine & Geflügel 615 309 467 379
Rindfleisch 0 53 123 71
Schweine - & Geflügelfleisch 49 31 57 34
Pflanzliche Fette & Öle 65 0 0 0
Milchprodukte 63 0 0 29
Zucker 48 0 0 97
Sonstige Nahrungsmittel 198 27 85 91
Getränke und Tabak 814 409 1015 1446
Agrargüter und Nahrungsmittel 162 41 82 76
Sonstige Primärsektoren 0 0 24 0
Textilien & Bekleidung 34 9 19 31
Industrie 31 17 39 33
Dienstleistungen 404 363 391 446
Auf EU's Exporte 
Exporte in die EU
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Die AVEs von NTBs auf Indien’s Exporte in die EU sind in den aggregierten Sektoren von 
der Größenordnung vergleichbar. Sie sind im Bereich Agrargüter und Nahrungsmittel sowie 
Textilien und Bekleidung mit 82% bzw. 19% geringer. Für sonstige Primärgüter und 
Industriegüter sind sie mit 24% und 39% leicht höher. Die AVEs von NTBs auf EFTA’s Ex-
porte in die EU sind auch hier erwartungsgemäß niedriger. Eine Ausnahme bilden die 
Sektoren Textilien und Dienstleistungen. Bei den einzelnen Agrar- und Nahrungsmittel-
sektoren gibt es eine starke Variation. Besonders hohe AVEs von NTBs auf Indien’s Exporte 
in die EU sind bei Getränken und Tabak (1015%), Futtergetreide (660%) und bei Schweine 
und Geflügel (467%) zu finden. Reis sowie Schweine- und Geflügelfleisch weisen mit 43% 
bzw. 57% die geringsten AVEs auf. Überraschenderweise sind die AVEs von NTBs auf 
EFTA’s Exporte in die EU in den meisten Sektoren höher. Sehr viel höhere AVEs von NTBs 
werden in den Sektoren Futtergetreide, Getränke und Tabak, sowie Ölsaaten implementiert. 
Andererseits erhebt die EU auf EFTA’s Exporte von Schweinen und Geflügel, Rindfleisch 
sowie Schweine- und Geflügelfleisch sehr viel niedrigere AVEs von NTBs als gegenüber 
Indien. Zusammengefasst deuten die Ergebnisse auf teilweise sehr hohe AVEs von NTBs im 
Agrarbereich hin. Ein Vergleich mit anderen Studien (z. B. PHILIPPIDIS und SANJUÁN, 2007; 
WINCHESTER, 2009; CHANG und HAYAKAWA, 2010) zeigt, dass hohe AVEs bei Agrargütern 
und Nahrungsmitteln typisch sind. 
In Anlehnung an WINCHESTER (2009) werden die existierenden Grenzbarrieren zwischen der 
EU und den EFTA Ländern als Normierung verwendet. Hierbei wird angenommen, dass die 
Effekte von NTBs zwischen EU und Norwegen und Schweiz niedrig sind, und dass ein 
erfolgreicher Abschluss des EU-Indien FTA zu einem ähnlich niedrigen Niveau an NTBs 
führen wird. Die AVEs der NTBs, die EUs Exporte nach Indien betreffen, werden berechnet 
durch Subtraktion von AVEbEU/EFTA von AVEbEU/IND, wenn AVEbEU/EFTA geringer ist als 
AVEbEU/IND. In gleicher Weise werden AVEs von NTBs berechnet, die Indiens Exporte in die 
EU betreffen. Wenn AVEbEU/EFTA größer ist als AVEbEU/IND und AVEbEFTA/EU größer ist als 
AVEbIND/EU, wird angenommen, dass der Abschluss des FTA das Niveau der nicht-tarifären 
Protektion nicht ändert. Sind die Koeffizienten der Grenzdummyvariablen nicht signifikant, 
wird angenommen, dass kein Grenzeffekt vorliegt. 
4 Simulationen mit dem GTAP-Modell 
4.1 Modell und Daten 
Die Simulationen in der vorliegenden Studie verwenden das komparativ statische, globale all-
gemeine Gleichgewichtsmodell GTAP. Die Grundstruktur des Standardmodells ist ausführ-
lich in HERTEL (1997) dokumentiert und im Internet verfügbar.12  
FRANCOIS (1999) entwickelte einen Ansatz, in dem NTBs als Eisberg-Transportkosten oder 
als Nettowohlfahrtsverlust modelliert werden, um die Doha-Runde der WTO-Verhandlungen 
zu analysieren. Dieser Ansatz wurde durch HERTEL et al. (2001) erweitert. Die Autoren 
stellen die Verbindung zwischen NTBs und CGE Modellierung her, indem NTBs als unbe-
obachtete, nicht explizit von der GTAP-Datenbasis berücksichtigte Handelskosten behandelt 
werden. Hierfür wird ein zusätzlicher effektiver Importpreis eingeführt, der eine Funktion aus 
den beobachteten Importpreisen und einem exogenen unbeobachteten technischem 
Koeffizienten ist (HERTEL et al., 2001: 13) 
(2) *irs irs irspms pms ams   
*
irspms  prozentuale Änderung des effektiven Importpreises von i aus r nach s 
irspms  prozentuale Änderung des Inlandspreises von i aus r nach s 
irsams  Importe i aus r nach s, erweitert durch technische Änderung 
                                                 
12 Siehe www.gtap.org. 
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Die Senkung der Handelskosten eines bestimmten Exporteurs wird in einer Erhöhung des 
amsirs unter der Annahme reflektiert, dass amsirs im Anfangsgleichgewicht gleich Eins ist. 
Entsprechend dieses Ansatzes fällt der effektive Inlandspreis des von r nach s exportierten 
Guts i, der hierdurch die Abnahme der realen Ressourcenkosten reflektiert. Diese Methode 
zur Modellierung des Abbaus der NTBs in Form von sinkenden Handelskosten geht auf die 
Theorie der Eisberg-Transportkosten zurück, die ursprünglich durch SAMUELSON (1954) ein-
geführt wurde.  
Durch Effizienzsteigerung und eine entsprechende Erhöhung des amsirs wird die effektive Im-
portmenge von Gut i aus der Region r nach Region s erhöht. Dies führt zu den folgenden Im-
portnachfrage- und Importpreisgleichungen (HERTEL et al., 2001: 13): 
(3)  iirs irs is irs irs irsqxs ams qim pms ams pim     
(4) ݌݅݉௜௦ ൌ ∑ ߠ௜௥௦ ∙ ሺ݌݉ݏ௜௥௦ െ ܽ݉ݏ௜௥௦ሻ௥   
irsqxs  prozentuale Änderung der bilateralen Exporte von i aus r nach s 
isqim  prozentuale Änderung der Durchschnittsimporte von i nach s ݌݅݉௜௥௦ prozentuale Änderung des Importpreises von i aus r nach s 
ispim  prozentuale Änderung des durchschnittlichen Importpreises von i nach s 
i  Substitutionselastizität zwischen den Importen von i 
irs  Anteil der Importe aus r an den Gesamtimporten von s zum Marktpreis 
Entsprechend der Gleichungen (3) und (4) impliziert eine Erhöhung des amsirs, dass die Im-
porte von i aus der Region r nach s kompetitiver werden und Importe aus anderen Regionen 
substituieren. Zusätzlich zu den kostenerhöhenden Effekten, generieren NTBs einen 
Protektionseffekt, der durch Importzölle aufgefangen werden könnte. Sowohl 
ANDRIAMANANJARA et al. (2003) als auch FUGAZZA und MAUR (2008) bieten ausführliche 
Studien zum Vergleich dieser beiden Ansätze in regionalen bzw. globalen CGE Modellen an. 
Die Autoren betonen, dass die Anwendung des Importzoll-Ansatzes zur Modellierung von 
NTBs und der hierbei entstehenden Renten eine vorsichtige Interpretation der resultierenden 
Wohlfahrtseffekte erfordert. Mit der effizienzmäßigen Modellierung der NTBs werden ins-
gesamt sehr hohe positive Wohlfahrtsgewinne quantifiziert, so dass sie nur bei geringeren 
Effizienzsteigerungen zu realistischen Ergebnissen führt.  
In der vorliegenden Studie wird der Ansatz der Eisberg-Transportkosten angewendet. Die 
quantitative GTAP Analyse basiert auf Version 8 der GTAP-Datenbasis. Die 129 Länder und 
Regionen und 57 Sektoren werden zu einer 20x23 Datenbasis aggregiert. Hierbei werden 
Länder von potentiellen FTA und andere signifikante Handelspartner der EU und Indiens 
herausgehoben. Diese Sektoraggregation entspricht den Sektoren, die vorher in der An-
wendung des Gravitationsmodells definiert wurden. 
4.2 Szenarien und Ergebnisse 
In diesem Abschnitt werden die Resultate der verschiedenen Optionen eines EU-Indien FTA 
diskutiert. Die Berechnungen basieren auf GEMPACK (HARRISON und PEARSON, 1996). Eine 
fixierte Handelsbilanz wird als makroökonomische Schließung in allen Szenarien verwendet.  
Das Basisjahr 2007 der GTAP-Datenbasis impliziert ein aktuelleres politisches Umfeld. So ist 
das Multi-Fiber-Agreement bereits ausgelaufen (2005), die EU Erweiterung von 2004 und 
2007 berücksichtigt und China ist seit 2007 ein Mitglied der WTO, das die vorgesehenen 
Verpflichtungen erfüllt. Allerdings erfordert die Analyse eines EU-Indien FTA die 
Implementierung laufender und kürzlich abgeschlossener FTA, welche die EU und Indien be-
treffen. Deshalb werden einige Prä-Experimente durchgeführt, die die ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), die Südostasien FTA (SAFTA), das Indien-Sri Lanka-FTA, das EU-Korea-
FTA und das EU-Südafrika-FTA (TDCA) berücksichtigt. 
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Neben Änderungen des politischen Umfelds sind makroökonomische Entwicklungen von Be-
deutung für eine Volkswirtschaft. Daher werden Projektionen des globalen und regionalen 
BIP und der Faktorausstattung in das erweiterte GTAP Modell implementiert. Technischer 
Fortschritt wird durch das Modell endogen generiert und so die projizierten Wachstumsraten 
erreicht. Durch die Implementierung der zusätzlichen FTA und der Aktualisierung des 
makroökonomischen Umfelds wird eine Projektion bis zum Jahr 2015 durchgeführt. Hierbei 
wird angenommen, dass innerhalb dieser Zeitspanne das EU-Indien FTA vollständig ab-
geschlossen sein wird. Demgegenüber werden die WTO Verhandlungen aus den Simulationen 
ausgeschlossen.13 Zusammenfassend ergeben sich drei Experimente für das EU-Indien FTA, 
die in Tabelle 2 aufgezeigt werden. 
Tabelle 2: Politikszenarien zur Implementierung des EU-Indien FTA 
 Zollkürzungen NTBs 
 EU Indien Abbaurate Normierung 
EXP1 97% 97% 100% EFTA - Normierung 
EXP2 97% 97% 100% keine Normierung 
EXP3 97% 30% 100% EFTA - Normierung 
 
Tabelle 3 zeigt die Wohlfahrtsergebnisse der drei Experimente in Millionen US$ der GTAP-
Datenbasis mit Hilfe der äquivalenten Variation (ÄV). Die erste Spalte zeigt die ÄV ins-
gesamt, während die folgenden Spalten die Ergebnisse entsprechend der jeweiligen Schocks 
differenzieren. Folglich zeigen Spalte 2 bis 7 die Effekte der bilateralen Zollkürzungen im 
Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor sowie im Industriesektor in der EU und Indien. Der zweite 
Teil der Tabelle 3 (Spalten 8 bis 15) repräsentieren die Effekte, die auf die Eliminierung der 
NTBs in der EU oder in Indien in unterschiedlichen Sektoren zurückzuführen sind. 
Aus der ersten Spalte in Tabelle 3 ist es ersichtlich, dass die EU und Indien aus dem EU-
Indien FTA profitieren. Die gesamten Wohlfahrtsgewinne der EU liegen zwischen 12 und 67 
Mrd. US$. Im Vergleich dazu ist das Wohlfahrtsergebnis für Indien etwas niedriger im ersten 
Experiment und deutlich höher in den zwei anderen Experimenten. Es liegt im zweiten 
Experiment mit einer Zollkürzung von 97% und ohne Normierung der NTBs bei 85 Mrd. 
US$. Mit der asymmetrischen Zollkürzung im EXP3 ergibt sich ein Wohlfahrtsgewinn von 20 
Mrd. US$, der im Vergleich zu EXP1 um 5 Mrd. US$ höher liegt (15 Mrd. US$). Die Zoll-
kürzung in Indiens Industriesektor in der symmetrischen FTA führt zu einem Wohlfahrtsver-
lust von 6,1 bzw. 6,8 Mrd. US$, der nur teilweise durch den Wohlfahrtsgewinn aus der Zoll-
kürzung im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor der indischen Ökonomie kompensiert wird. In 
EXP3 ergibt sich dagegen nur ein Wohlfahrtsverlust von 0,2 Mrd. US$ durch die Zollkürzung 
in Indiens Industriesektor, der vollständig durch den Wohlfahrtsgewinn aus der Zollkürzung 
im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor kompensiert wird. Grundsätzlich führt die Zollsenkung 
im indischen Industriesektor zu einem negativen Terms of Trade Effekt, der im EXP3 auf 
Grund der asymmetrischen Zollkürzung niedriger ausfällt. Die negativen Effekte werden 
jedoch von den positiven Allokationseffekten aufgehoben. Die meisten dieser Resultate sind 
bereits in der Literatur diskutiert. Interessanter sind die Ergebnisse im zweiten Teil der 
Tabelle 3, die sich auf die Eliminierung der NTBs beziehen. Auf den ersten Blick ist ersicht-
lich, dass das allgemeine Niveau dieser Wohlfahrtskomponente höher ist als die Effekte, die 
sich infolge der Zollkürzung ergeben. Dabei ist der Anteil der Eliminierung von NTBs an den 
Gesamtwohlfahrtseffekten für Indien in den ersten beiden Experimenten höher als für die EU. 
                                                 
13 Hierfür gibt es zwei Gründe. Erstens ist aufgrund des mangelnden Fortschritts in den aktuellen WTO Ver-
handlungen eine fundierte Vermutung über den Zeitpunkt der Abschließung sehr schwierig. Zweitens wird die 
aktuelle GTAP-Datenbasis noch nicht mit der entsprechenden TASTE (Tariff Analytical and Simulation Tool for 
Economist) Funktion ergänzt, so dass die entsprechenden WTO Zollkürzungen auf der disaggregierten Ebene 
(HS6) berechnet werden können.  
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Dieser Anteil ist hauptsächlich auf die Eliminierung von NTBs im Industriesektor zurückzu-
führen. An zweiter Stelle folgt der Agrar- und Ernährungssektor. EXP2 bildet eine Ausnahme, 
da hier die Effekte der NTB-Eliminierung im Dienstleistungssektor auf Grund der fehlenden 
Normierung an Bedeutung gewonnen haben. Indien profitiert am meisten aus der eigenen 
NTB Eliminierung, wobei auch hier NTBs im Agrar- und Ernährungssektor eine wichtige 
Rolle spielen. Für die EU ist das Gegenteil zu beobachten. Die meisten Gewinne aus der 
Eliminierung von NTBs erzielt die EU wenn Indien die NTBs im Industriesektor abschafft. 
Da der Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor für den Handel zwischen Indien und der EU bislang 
nur von geringerer Bedeutung ist, sind die mäßigen Effekte im Agrar- und Ernährungsbereich 
plausibel. 
Tabelle 3: Veränderung der Wohlfahrt (Äquivalente Variation, Mio.US$) 
 
Quelle: Eigene Berechnungen. 
5 Schlussfolgerung 
Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die potenziellen Effekte eines EU-Indien FTA unter Be-
rücksichtigung von Zöllen und NTBs. Der Fokus liegt auf dem Agrar- und Ernährungs-
bereich. Für die Analyse wurde die GTAP-Datenbasis und Poisson Regressionen von 
Gravitationsgleichungen zur Schätzung der AVEs der NTBs angewendet. Die Ergebnisse der 





















EU 22202 112 -999 -886 826 9760 10586 305 2661 0 2967 349 7603 1589 9541
Indien 15088 368 2722 3090 1333 -6129 -4795 104 6047 0 6150 2823 5751 2072 10646
China 1417 30 -251 -220 -325 1242 918 9 -26 0 -17 -210 1480 -532 738
Japan 538 14 -6 8 -103 390 286 5 30 0 35 -71 441 -160 210
USA 855 3 6 10 -159 256 97 -6 196 0 190 -207 1045 -278 560
RestAsien -1688 -11 -191 -202 -441 -747 -1189 -6 -96 0 -101 -126 -224 154 -195
LDC -228 -4 -63 -67 45 -103 -58 1 -191 0 -189 36 -201 251 86
rWTOIC -1209 9 -65 -56 -63 -302 -365 7 -400 0 -393 -14 -669 288 -395
rWTODC -2645 -66 -577 -643 504 83 587 -5 -2314 0 -2320 435 -2600 1896 -269
Welt 34331 455 577 1032 1617 4450 6067 414 5907 0 6321 3015 12627 5279 20921
EU 67041 116 -1727 -1611 1172 13438 14611 1507 11161 14468 27136 533 19093 7284 26910
Indien 85211 466 3871 4337 1373 -6776 -5403 856 41195 11356 53407 4037 17962 10833 32833
China -561 33 -374 -341 -373 1446 1073 79 -3198 981 -2138 -301 3415 -2269 844
Japan -91 15 -14 1 -118 438 320 32 -911 243 -636 -98 1009 -686 224
USA -427 7 18 25 -192 325 133 25 -1710 324 -1361 -291 2344 -1277 775
RestAsien -3364 -7 -245 -252 -548 -915 -1462 24 -903 -362 -1241 -200 -707 499 -409
LDC -757 -2 -66 -69 26 -184 -158 -4 -348 -536 -888 30 -586 914 358
rWTOIC -2364 13 -75 -62 -96 -513 -609 33 -467 -608 -1042 -38 -1708 1095 -651
rWTODC -8450 -62 -674 -736 411 -819 -408 -139 -3670 -3983 -7792 494 -7018 7010 486
Welt 136237 578 715 1292 1657 6441 8097 2413 41150 21882 65445 4165 33801 23404 61370
EU 12471 120 -1001 -881 73 2389 2462 296 2449 0 2746 157 6281 1714 8151
Indien 20462 358 2718 3076 471 -163 308 101 5978 0 6079 2799 6275 1910 10983
China 811 31 -239 -208 -39 470 431 9 19 0 29 -149 1249 -540 559
Japan 351 14 -5 8 -13 148 136 5 35 0 40 -50 379 -163 166
USA 827 4 10 14 -36 194 158 -6 210 0 205 -154 890 -286 450
RestAsien -699 -6 -169 -176 -42 -207 -249 -4 -67 0 -71 -103 -241 141 -204
LDC -231 -3 -58 -62 5 -74 -69 2 -185 0 -183 18 -188 253 83
rWTOIC -927 11 -56 -45 -8 -168 -176 7 -380 0 -373 -18 -596 280 -333
rWTODC -3437 -57 -533 -590 70 -477 -407 -4 -2230 0 -2234 274 -2365 1885 -206
Welt 29627 470 667 1137 482 2113 2595 407 5831 0 6239 2774 11683 5194 19651
Experiment 1: FTA und NTBs
Experiment 2: FTA und NTBs, keine Normierung
Experiment 3: asymmetrische FTA und NTBs
Totale 
ÄV
Bilateral Zollkürzung Abbau der NTBs
EU Indien EU Indien
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im Agrarhandel zwischen der EU und Indien, das sich auf das hohe Niveau an NTBs zurück-
führen lässt. Indiens Exporte in die EU werden durch sehr hohe NTBs in den Sektoren Ge-
tränke und Tabak, Schweine und Geflügel behindert, während EU-Exporte nach Indien mit 
hohen NTBs in den Sektoren Futtergetreide, Schweine und Geflügel, sowie Getränke und 
Tabak, konfrontiert werden. Die geschätzten AVEs der NTBs werden unter der Annahme 
normiert, dass die Verhandlungen über ein EU-Indien FTA die NTBs im Agrarhandel auf 
ähnliche Niveaus reduzieren, die zwischen der EU und den EFTA Ländern vorherrschen. 
Allerdings sind die grenzinduzierten Handelskosten zwischen der EU und den EFTA Ländern 
teilweise immer noch sehr hoch und übersteigen die, die zwischen der EU und Indien vor-
herrschen. Im zweiten Schritt werden die AVEs in das CGE Modell GTAP implementiert und 
drei Experimente durchgeführt. Die Gesamtwohlfahrtseffekte aus diesen Experimenten ver-
deutlichen, dass EU und Indien aus dem EU-Indien FTA profitieren. Indiens Wohlfahrts-
ergebnis hängt hauptsächlich von der Höhe der Zollkürzung und von der Normierung der 
NTBs ab. Das Wohlfahrtsergebnis für Indien ist höher als in der EU, wenn eine asym-
metrische Zollkürzung durchgeführt wird oder die NTBs nicht normiert werden. Die Effekte 
der Zollkürzungen sind insgesamt von geringerer Bedeutung als die Abschaffung von NTBs. 
Im Vergleich zu den bisherigen quantitativen Analysen eines Freihandelsabkommens 
zwischen der EU und Indien mit einem CGE Modell ist das Gesamtwohlfahrtsergebnis in 
dieser Studie für beide Handelsparteien höher, was eindeutig auf die Abschaffung von NTBs 
zurückzuführen ist. Dabei gewinnt Indien mehr durch die Eliminierung von NTBs als die EU. 
Der Abbau von NTBs im Agrar- und Nahrungsmittelsektor in Indien macht nach dem 
Industriesektor den zweithöchsten Anteil an den Gesamtwohlfahrtsgewinnen aus der 
Eliminierung von NTBs aus. Dies verdeutlicht die hohe Relevanz von NTBs im zukünftigen 
Handel von Agrargütern und Nahrungsmitteln für die indische Volkswirtschaft. 
Die obige Analyse bedarf einer Qualifikation. Erstens, die Effekte von NTBs sind nicht direkt 
geschätzt worden. Neben den NTBs gibt es weitere Erklärungsfaktoren für den Grenzeffekt, 
so dass die Schätzungen hier eine Obergrenze bilden. Die Erweiterung der Spezifikation 
könnte dazu beitragen, die Effekte von NTBs stärker zu isolieren und nicht signifikante 
Grenzeffekte auszuschließen. Zweitens, die EU-EFTA normierten AVEs und insbesondere 
die nicht-normierten AVEs sind ambitioniert. Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Norwegen, 
Schweiz und den EU Mitgliedsländern entwickelten sich über eine lange Zeit. Demnach 
stellen die Schätzungen in dieser Studie langfristige Wohlfahrtseffekte des EU-Indien FTA 
dar. Schließlich muss bedacht werden, dass die Wohlfahrtseffekte geringer ausfallen würden, 
wenn die WTO Verhandlungen berücksichtigt worden wären. Allerdings, wie auch in 
WINCHESTER (2009) dargestellt, decken die Wohlfahrtseffekte einige wohlfahrtsverbessernde 
Aspekte nicht ab. Hierzu gehören die Realisation von Größeneffekten, dynamische Fort-
schritte durch Kapitalgewinn und Produktivitätsverbesserungen durch Technologietransfer. 
Diese Aspekte bieten interessante Möglichkeiten für weitere Forschungsarbeit. 
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We examine the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) be-
tween the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) considering detailed
nontariﬀ barriers (NTBs) in food and agriculture. We use the gravity model to
estimate ad-valorem tariﬀ equivalents (AVEs) of NTBs, which are based on inte-
gration levels negotiated by the TTIP partners in the past. We implement these
AVEs into the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model to obtain economy-
wide eﬀects. We validate our results drawing on experience gained from past
analyses of free trade areas. Simulation results indicate considerable gains for the
EU and US that are predominantly driven by the reduction of NTBs, whereas
third countries gain from spillover eﬀects and are only moderately aﬀected.
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11 Introduction
Regionalism and the related ever-growing number of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have
become striking features of international trade in recent years. One of the most promi-
nent FTAs is the currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), whose poten-
tial partners cover approximately half of the world's trade. The conclusion of the TTIP
would thus lead to one of the biggest FTAs worldwide and might change the global
trading system. There are many reasons why the EU and the US have gone forward
with the negotiation of the TTIP. The most decisive factor in re-opening the trade talks
in February 2013 was the obvious lack of progress in the Doha Round of the WTO ne-
gotiations since 2001, although the Bali Agreement of December 2013 has inspired new
enthusiasm for the possible completion of the Doha Round. Other important reasons
include the declining international competitiveness of many developed countries and
the most recent global economic crisis. As a result, many developed countries estab-
lished strong structural reforms, intensiﬁed the search for new partners in the world
market and reinforced activities to stimulate existing trade relations. By opening up
their markets to the respective TTIP partner for commodities, services and invest-
ments, the two giants of world trade are intent on enabling economic growth, creating
jobs to boost their economies and keeping up with other global players, particularly
the fast-growing emerging countries.
Whether the EU and the US might be successful in this endeavor is currently being
controversially discussed, particularly in Europe but also in the US. This continuous
debate has been triggered by the intention of the two partners to this FTA to not
only reduce or abolish already-lowered tariﬀs but also to harmonize nontariﬀ barriers
(NTBs). Here, consumer and other nongovernmental organizations fear that the TTIP
will lower safety and environmental standards. NTBs in the food and agricultural sec-
tor are regarded as playing an especially important role in the TTIP because European
and American consumers seem to have very diﬀerent and sometimes seemingly opposed
attitudes toward food and how it should be produced. Two of the most obvious exam-
ples are the adverse attitude of European consumers to the use of genetically modiﬁed
feed in livestock production and the reluctance of American consumers to consume
cheese produced from raw milk. An agreement on the NTBs between the EU and
2the US might provide a starting point for a global set of standards, in which case
the related spillover eﬀects in third countries might contribute to reducing a possible
trade-diverting eﬀect of the TTIP.
Until now, there have been only a few publications providing quantitative analyses to
support arguments for or against the TTIP. The results of these analyses indicate that
the EU and the US would gain from a successful conclusion of the TTIP negotiations
and that the major gain would result from the harmonization of EU and US NTBs and
mutual recognition of production and testing procedures (e.g., CEPR, 2013; Felbermayr
et al., 2013). To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study covering NTBs in
the food and agricultural sector at a disaggregated level (Bureau et al., 2014); thus,
extensive comparative analyses of the particularly important harmonization of the EU
and US trade rules and regulations in the food and agricultural sector are not yet
available. In this article, we make the following contributions. First, in contrast to the
majority of the recent literature on this topic, we contribute to the understanding of the
impact of reliable NTB reductions in detailed food and agricultural sectors. Second, in
establishing possible liberalization scenarios for food and agriculture, we take advantage
of new measures of the depth of various FTAs (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig, 2014) by
working with a gravity-based econometric framework to link the depth of past FTAs
to levels of liberalization in the food and agricultural sectors. This approach serves
as the basis for a computable general equilibrium (CGE)-based prospective analysis of
the TTIP. Finally, keeping concerns about CGE-based trade estimates in mind (Kehoe,
2005), we also compare our estimates to the outcomes from NAFTA.
2 Simulation Model-Based Assessments of Free
Trade Areas
The question of whether FTAs are welfare gaining has been the subject of several arti-
cles after Viner (1950) published his inﬂuential analysis on trade creation and diversion.
Since then, many authors have demonstrated that economic theory does not provide
an unambiguous answer to this question. Among them are Lloyd and MacLaren (2004,
p. 452ﬀ.), who shed light on this question by providing an extended theoretical general
equilibrium analysis. However, they also conclude that an ambiguity remains in the
3prediction of general equilibrium theory and suggest that CGE models are a natural
vehicle to explore the economic eﬀects of FTAs. Indeed, FTAs have for the most part
been analyzed with the help of CGE models in the past. A survey analyzing the results
of the substantial literature on this topic can be found in Lloyd and MacLaren (2004,
p. 452ﬀ.).1
Although CGE models have often been applied in the past to analyze this topic, very
few articles have addressed the performance of this method. Hertel et al. (2003) con-
sider this question by evaluating the likely outcome of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. The authors concentrate on the underlying parameters of the CGE models
and note that CGE models are justiﬁably criticized for their lack of econometric foun-
dation. Even if their estimated point elasticities are available, they might be based
on deviating sector disaggregation or time periods that do not match. A systemati-
cally raising or lowering of elasticities in a sensitivity analysis therefore often fails to
properly address the problem. Hertel et al. (2003) particularly note that the elasticity
of substitution or so-called Armington elasticity is the key parameter to substitute
among imports from diﬀerent countries, thereby governing trade diversion and thus
also welfare results. The authors are able to demonstrate that welfare results are far
more sensitive to the Armington parameter than to all of the other parameters of the
CGE model combined. Accordingly, they suggest building econometrically estimated
conﬁdence intervals around this particular parameter to enhance the quality of the
CGE model results in an FTA analysis.
An additional important article in this context, written by (Lloyd and MacLaren,
2004), is based on a comparison of the available analyses of the FTA between the US
and Australia. The authors also emphasize the importance of the Armington elas-
ticity in analyzing FTAs and thereby support the suggestion of Hertel et al. (2003)
to build conﬁdence intervals for this key parameter. However, Lloyd and MacLaren
(2004) extend this view by demonstrating that there might be a bias in trade diversion
and the terms of trade eﬀect due to the shortcomings of the Armington Assumption
(Armington, 1969) together with the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) func-
tion. Accordingly, they propose concentrating on national income and welfare eﬀects
in FTA analyses and advocate separating terms of trade eﬀects from other eﬀects in
1Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010) provide a comprehensive menu of available methods for
evaluating the impact of FTAs apart from the CGE models.
4the welfare impact on third countries. Additionally, they state that up to the point
of writing their article, estimates of tariﬀ equivalents of NTBs had for the most part
not been considered in FTA analyses. This includes rules of origin, which may serve
to undermine liberalization commitments. Although rules of origin can be complex to
model, the authors single them out because they assume their implementation in FTAs
might lead to substantial additional administrative costs relative to welfare gains.
Kehoe (2005) provides an even more thorough evaluation of the performance of CGE
modeling in FTA analyses. He systematically assesses three of the most prominent
CGE models utilized to quantify the eﬀect of the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA). The analysis is built on relative measures to capture the development of
trade ﬂows after the implementation of NAFTA. Of particular importance is the in-
crease in sectoral or total exports relative to the change in GDP. Using related statistical
measures (e.g., the weighted correlation of data and the variance in the decomposition
of change) to isolate the deviation between models' results and the actual statistics
from 1999, the author is able to draw several signiﬁcant conclusions for analyses of
FTAs. Kehoe (2005) demonstrates that CGE models drastically underestimated the
impact of NAFTA and failed to predict the absolute size of the increase in overall
trade. In particular, the CGE models were not able to capture many of the sector
details when employed to analyze NAFTA. Here, the results indicate that the highest
relative increase in trade occurs in those sectors that have the smallest initial trade
value, whereas previously larger sectors become less important. The CGE models,
however, predicted exactly the opposite, which Kehoe (2005) mainly traces back to the
CES function set up, low values of the elasticity of substitution and missing growth in
productivity (see also Treﬂer, 2004, p. 887). In contrast, the CGE models delivered
good results when predicting the increase in overall trade relative to GDP or quantifying
the change in relative prices and quantities. It must be emphasized that Kehoe (2005)
does not consider the eﬀects of NTBs on the outcome of his evaluation.2
Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010, p. 55) add to the discussion of the per-
formance of CGE models in FTA analyses by arguing that productivity spillover is
particularly important for the results of third countries in FTA analyses. However,
2At the time of writing, researchers were still mainly concerned with improving the tariﬀ protection
data in CGE models. The quantiﬁcation of data on NTBs and their implementation in CGE models
seemed to be an out-of-reach issue at that time.
5they argue that the inclusion of endogenized productivity spillovers in CGE models is
a very complicated operation, and none of the articles addressing it has succeeded so
far. Similar to Lloyd and MacLaren (2004), they also emphasize that it is particularly
diﬃcult to model certain NTBs such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, techni-
cal barriers or customs issues if they are included in an FTA. More recent analyses of
FTAs largely include these trade costs of NTBs (e.g., Andriamananjara et al., 2004;
Philippidis and Carrington, 2005; Fugazza and Maur, 2008; Engelbert, Bektasoglu, and
Brockmeier, 2014). Here, the authors stress that the elasticity of substitution is not
only important to determine changes in trade ﬂows and welfare changes but also to
quantify the magnitude of the NTBs.
What do we learn from these articles evaluating CGE-based analyses of FTAs? The
public debate as well as the scope of the negotiations clearly indicates that it is essential
to include NTBs in analyses of the TTIP. Therefore, we believe that it is of utmost im-
portance to base the following analysis of the TTIP on an elasticity of substitution that
we econometrically estimate using an exact match of the sector disaggregation of the
CGE model and an appropriate time period. Additionally, we use our estimates of the
elasticity of substitution and the related conﬁdence interval to generate a distribution
of the model's results when presenting absolute amounts or sectoral details. Taking
the ﬁndings of Kehoe (2005) into account, we otherwise constrain our presentations of
the simulation results to relative or percentage changes compared with initial values of
macroeconomic variables such as GDP. Validating our analysis, we also evaluate the
simulation results against the ﬁndings of Kehoe (2005) regarding the actual data after
NAFTA came into force. In so doing, we believe that, of all of the concluded FTAs,
NAFTA is most comparable to the TTIP, and the impact on the partner economies is
therefore likely to be similar.
3 Estimations with the Gravity Model
Empirical analyses (CEPR, 2013; Felbermayr et al., 2013; Bureau et al., 2014) of the
TTIP suggest that lowering trade costs through behind-the-border regulations and
NTBs accounts for the majority of gains for the EU and US. Both are characterized by
advanced regulatory systems that they consider essential to upholding their high stan-
dards for consumer, environmental, health and labor protections. Following ECORYS
6(2009), our analysis does not judge whether a speciﬁc NTB is right or wrong or whether
one system is better than the other. Instead, our article identiﬁes NTBs through di-
vergences in the regulatory systems that cause additional costs or limited access for
foreign ﬁrms. This approach is also in accordance with the interests of the negotiating
partners, who intend to keep their high standards but also to avoid unnecessary time
and administrative costs by recognizing similarities in approval procedures, adjusting
the wording of provisions to make it easier to comply with each other's existing rules,
and making serious attempts to cooperate closely in designing new bilateral trading
rules (European Commission, 2014a; USTR, 2014a).
There are several methods to combine the large variety of nontariﬀ trade measures in
one uniform metric. Many approaches are econometric, quantity-based methods and
use trade data as the basis. One of the most inﬂuential studies on NTBs was performed
by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009). The authors use the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade Analysis and Information System
(TRAINS) database on NTBs and nonlinear regressions to estimate the importer-
speciﬁc trade costs of NTBs at the HS-6 data level. The data are provided by the World
Bank. Table 1 presents their estimated aggregated Ad Valorem Equivalents (AVEs) on
NTBs for the EU and US for two non-food sectors and 16 food and agricultural sectors.
In terms of non-food sectors, the US imposes nontariﬀ restrictions in manufacturing and
extraction that are equivalent to 18.37% and 137.44% tariﬀs, respectively. In contrast,
the EU imposes much lower AVEs on NTBs in non-food sectors. The average AVEs
on NTBs in agro-food sectors are 45% in the EU and 55% in the US. Both impose
the highest AVEs on NTBs in the rice sector. These high AVEs can be explained
by administrative burdens and ineﬃciencies in quantity and price measures, whereas
technical regulations play only a minor role. In general, AVEs on NTBs in products
of animal origin such as dairy and meat are higher than in plant-based products due
to sanitary measures and other food safety regulations. Finally, Kee, Nicita, and
Olarreaga (2009) ﬁnd that the EU has a more homogenous structure in NTBs than the
US.
The ﬁndings of Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) in Table 1 present the estimated
average level of nontariﬀ protection currently existing in the EU and US. We assume
that this level is the upper-bound level of NTBs for trade liberalization within an
FTA. Given the experience of past negotiations on FTAs and the proposed course of
7action, it is likely that the EU and the US will not completely remove or harmonize
existing bilateral NTBs within the TTIP. In our analysis, we therefore aim to quantify
the level of NTB reduction that is oriented toward the historical actions of the two
partners in the TTIP within an ex post study. In so doing, we use the gravity model
and an indirect approach to estimate the trade costs of NTBs that can be considered
reasonably likely to be reduced in a potential FTA between the EU and US. We apply
an FTA variable that captures the trade eﬀect of all of the policy instruments that are
intended to reduce restrictive nontariﬀ trade measures or to harmonize regulations and
standards within FTAs on average (Chen and Novy, 2012).
Table 1: Estimated Aggregated Ad Valorem Equivalents (AVEs) on NTBs





Cereal grains 53.33 114.23
Vegetables and fruits 38.67 35.81
Oil seeds 14.23 111.16
Plant based ﬁbers 0.74 -
Crops 40.35 17.60
Cattle 58.38 61.03
Animal products 35.97 14.35




Other food products 58.60 45.88
Beverages and tobacco 21.39 1.57
Cattle meat 47.99 51.77
Other meat 55.17 30.74
Source: Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009).
As a new feature, we introduce an FTA variable in our analysis that diﬀerentiates
the depth and scope of agreed topics in the negotiations according to seven levels.
Consequently, we can select the level of ambition in terms of reduction of nontariﬀ
trade measures and harmonization of regulations and standards in our experimental
design. In the gravity modeling, we adopt the recent econometric developments. In
8particular, we account for endogenous FTAs and their eﬀects on bilateral trade ﬂows.
Thereby, we follow the recent studies by Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2007, 2009) and
Egger et al. (2008, 2011). We adapt the two-stage procedure proposed by Greene
(1994, 1997) by ﬁrst using a probit regression to estimate the probability for each level
of integration and to generate the inverse Mills ratios. In the second step, we use the
predicted selectivity measures from the ﬁrst stage in our gravity equation as regressors
to correct for the potential endogeneity of FTAs (Winkelmann, 2008, p. 155). In doing
so, we consider selection bias for depth in trade agreements (Egger and Francois, 2014).
3.1 Econometric Framework and Data
The gravity model has been used frequently to empirically analyze patterns of trade
and the eﬀects of trade agreements and barriers.3 For our analysis, we implement
the gravity-like equation developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004), which
accounts for the general equilibrium eﬀects of trade barriers. Their basic model explains
bilateral trade by exporter production and importer consumption relative to global
output. Trade is reduced by bilateral trade barriers and also by average trade barriers.
The latter are known as multilateral resistance terms. Empirically, these average trade
barriers can be fully controlled by importer- and exporter-speciﬁc dummy variables.
Because bilateral trade frictions are not observable, they are deﬁned as a function of
observed trade costs factors. Generally, a set of geographical, political and cultural
adjacency variables are included in the cost function. In addition to the FTA depth
variable, we include two interaction terms between the FTA depth variable and the
EU and US importer dummy variables to identify asymmetric peculiarities of EU and
US trade agreements. The second-stage empirical speciﬁcation reads as follows:
Xij = exp
(
αi + αj + Z
′
ijβ







3See Anderson (2011) and Head and Mayer (2014) for a thorough review of the theoretical and
empirical developments of the gravity model.
9where Xij is the value of trade from country i to country j, αi is the ﬁxed eﬀect of the
exporting country and αj is the ﬁxed eﬀect of the importing country, accounting pro-
perly for general equilibrium eﬀects. The vector Zij = (1, Distanceij, Contiguityij, . . .)
′
contains a constant and all of the variables promoting or hindering trade except the
FTA depth variable and the corresponding interactions with regional dummy variables.
Furthermore, β = (β0, β1, β2, . . .)
′ is a vector of the coeﬃcients applying to the variables
in Zij. The categorical variable FTADij ranges from zero to seven. It takes the value
of zero if the two trade partners do not join the same FTA. A value that is greater
than zero indicates an eﬀective FTA between the two countries, whereby higher values
indicate a deeper scope of the FTA. The variables FTADi,EU and FTADi,US represent
the interaction terms between the FTA depth variable and the regional importer dum-
mies. Thereby, the EU exhibits all integration levels within FTAs with the exception
of the lowest level 1, and the US has only deeper FTAs (4, 6 and 7). The coeﬃcient δ1
identiﬁes the average eﬀect of a typical FTA, whereas δ2 and δ3 indicate EU and US
behavioral deviations from the average FTA eﬀect. Finally, mij is equal to the poten-
tial measure for endogeneity from the ﬁrst-stage regression and γ is the corresponding
coeﬃcient.4
According to the theoretical derivation, we interpret the average FTA eﬀect as δ1 =
(σ−1)ln(1+AVEFTAD). Here, σ is equal to the elasticity of substitution, and AVEFTAD
represents the trade cost equivalent of a typical FTA. We apply equation (1) to 16 in-
dividual food and agricultural sectors and ten manufacturing sectors (see Table A.1 in
the Appendix).5 The most important parameters for our analysis are the coeﬃcients
on the FTA depth variable and the interaction terms. In the second-stage estimation
procedure, we apply the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator pro-
posed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) to address the problems of zero trade
ﬂows6 and heteroskedasticity in the trade data.
4Following Egger et al. (2011), we model the selection of FTA depth by a set of diﬀerent characteris-
tics. We consider geographical, cultural, historical and political aﬃnity as well as the diﬀerence in
economic size and the degree of networking between countries. The dependent variable is deﬁned as
a binary variable that takes the value of one if two countries belong to a common FTA in the corres-
ponding integration level. We cover the most important FTAs, which are noted by the World Trade
Organization. Detailed ﬁrst-stage estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
5In estimating NTBs, we only use 16 of the 19 food and agricultural sectors from the simulations by
combining the generally untraded sectors of paddy rice with processed rice, sugar cane and beets
with sugar, and raw milk with dairy.
6Zero trade ﬂows amount to 69.84% in agro-food and 41.79% in the non-food sectors.
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We source data on bilateral imports at the GTAP level from the United Nations Com-
modity Trade Statistics database and the MFN applied tariﬀ rates from the UNCTAD
TRAINS database for 2010.7 Due to unavailability of data, we reduce the number of
regions to 114 regions. We also reduce the number of sectors to 16 food and agri-
cultural sectors and ten manufacturing sectors.8 Thereafter, our regression analysis
includes 12769 observations for each sector.9 The FTA depth variable is constructed
using information from Dür, Baccini, and Elsig (2014). Data on contiguity, common
language and colonial relationships are gathered by the Centre D'Etudes Prospectives
et D'Informations Internationales (CEPII). Distances are the actual shipping distances
taken from (Francois et al., 2013).10 Political science variables on democratic and
autocratic patterns of authority and regimes are taken from the Polity IV Project
database.11 GDP data are taken from the World Bank. We also include a measure of
lagged trade network embeddedness taken from Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2014).
This measure is based on the number of common export partners shared by a given
country pair and is motivated by evidence on the importance of network structures in
economic relationships (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; de Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011;
Zouh, 2014).
3.2 Estimation Results
In Table 2, we display the PPML results for the primary agriculture and processed
foods regressions. The Mills ratios are all negative, with two exceptions in the processed
food regression. This result implies that unobservable factors favoring the creation of
FTAs and their average scope are accompanied by unobservables that have a negative
eﬀect on trade (Egger et al., 2011, p. 125). However, the exogeneity for selectivity is
rejected only for integration levels 1 and 6 in the primary agriculture regression and for
integration level 6 in the processed food regression. Importantly, the joint signiﬁcance
7We use the tariﬀ margin to consider the trade policy eﬀect.
8Five non-food sectors are pooled over the individual manufacturing sectors. See Table A.1 in the
Appendix for the detailed sector composition.
9Due to data unavailability, our data set includes 114 importing countries and 113 exporting countries.
Missing data for other variables leads to unbalanced data sets.
10Missing values are replaced by distance information from CEPII.
11We replace missing data for the political science variable with mean values.
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test for endogenous FTA depth selection reveals endogeneity, so we reject the hypothesis
of exogeneity with p-values for the χ2 statistic with a signiﬁcance level lower than
0.05. Most of the coeﬃcients have the expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant,
conﬁrming the results of the gravity literature. The elasticity of trade with respect
to distance is negative and is only signiﬁcant in the primary agriculture regression.
Hence, if the distance between two countries increases by 1%, bilateral trade in primary
agriculture decreases by 0.65%. The eﬀects of contiguity and cultural adjacencies are
positive and signiﬁcantly inﬂuence agro-food trade. In contrast, political divergence
does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Our expectations are that FTAs promote trade. Primary agricultural trade is expected
to increase by 13% and trade in processed foods by 15% for countries trading within
an FTA at the integration level of one. To obtain the regional speciﬁc deviations from
the average eﬀect, we take the cumulative eﬀect by combining the typical FTA and
the importer-speciﬁc FTA given the joint signiﬁcance of the FTA depth variable and
importer-speciﬁc dummy variables. Interestingly, the EU and the US deviate positively
in primary agricultural trade and negatively in the processed food trade compared with
the average FTA eﬀect. If the EU is the importer in the FTA, primary agricultural
trade is expected to increase by 16%; if the US is the importer, by 25%. Trade in
processed food is expected to increase by 12% for the EU and by 5% for the US.
Table 3 reports point and interval estimates of disaggregated agro-food AVEs of NTBs
for a modest FTA scenario using the elasticity of substitution σ from the sectoral esti-
mations12 and the FTA depth level of four.13 In addition to point estimates, we assess
the respective interval estimates. We calculate the interval estimates by considering
the 95% conﬁdence interval of the tariﬀ elasticity and the point estimate of the FTA
quantity eﬀect. With respect to the existing diversity of the EU and the US in their
attitudes within FTAs, we take into account the cumulative eﬀect by combining the
typical FTA eﬀect and the importer-speciﬁc FTA eﬀect, given the joint signiﬁcance of
the two parameters. In case the estimates are only individually signiﬁcant, we take ei-
ther the typical FTA quantity eﬀect and conclude that EU and US agreements are not
12The substitution elasticity is equal to the absolute tariﬀ coeﬃcient plus one. In nine of 26 sectors,
the estimate of the tariﬀ elasticity is not signiﬁcant. In these cases, we use the estimates from the
pooled sector regressions.
13Non-food results on the AVEs of NTBs are not reported but are available from the authors upon
request.
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diﬀerent compared with a typical FTA, or we take the importer-speciﬁc FTA quantity
eﬀects and conclude that EU and US agreements have an eﬀect that is not observed
in a typical FTA.14
Table 2: Second-Stage Estimation Results for Primary Agricultural and
Processed Foods Trade
Primary Agriculture Processed Foods
Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
ln(Tariﬀ) −2.197∗∗ (0.959) −0.545 (0.613)
ln(Distance) −0.647∗∗∗ (0.0727) −0.598∗∗∗ (0.0506)
Contiguity 0.618∗∗∗ (0.130) 0.693∗∗∗ (0.105)
Language 0.210∗ (0.123) 0.377∗∗∗ (0.111)
Colonizer 0.548∗∗∗ (0.205) 0.497∗ (0.298)
Colony 0.246 (0.184) 0.365∗∗∗ (0.109)
Policy −0.277 (0.546) 0.556 (0.453)
FTAD 0.118∗∗∗ (0.0438) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.0295)
FTADi,EU 0.0288 (0.0376) −0.0307 (0.0275)
FTADi,US 0.109
∗∗ (0.0451) −0.0943∗∗ (0.0479)
mˆ1 −0.267∗∗ (0.122) −0.250 (0.252)
mˆ2 −0.125 (0.0940) 0.0123 (0.0820)
mˆ3 −0.0555 (0.0894) −0.0359 (0.0857)
mˆ4 −0.0623 (0.0835) −0.00154 (0.0775)
mˆ5 −0.335 (0.280) 0.140 (0.191)
mˆ6 −0.445∗∗ (0.175) −0.270∗∗ (0.121)




p-value of χ2 0.00954 0.0444
Note: Importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported. Asterisks (*), (**) and (***) denote signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. χ2-stat and p-value of χ2 refer to a test of joint signiﬁcance of Mills ratios to
assess endogeneity.
Source: Authors' calculations.
14In cases in which both the cumulative and the individual eﬀects are not signiﬁcant, we consider the
average eﬀect from the pooled agro-food sector regression.
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Table 3: Point and Interval Estimates for AVEs of NTBs in Disaggregated
Agro-Food Sectors and the Average Non-Agro-Food Sector
US to EU EU to US
LB MV UB LB MV UB
Non-agro-food 1.3 1.9 3.4 1.6 2.3 4.2
Wheat 71.4 95.5 142.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cereal grains nec. 6.7 8.4 11.3 113.0 156.2 246.8
Crops nec. 22.4 28.6 39.5 33.9 43.8 61.7
Oil seeds 31.3 40.3 56.5 114.1 157.9 249.8
Vegetable & fruit 17.8 22.6 30.9 57.9 76.5 111.9
Other animal products 22.4 28.6 39.5 33.9 43.8 61.7
Sugar 4.0 6.4 15.9 8.3 13.4 34.9
Vegetable oil & fat 22.4 28.6 39.5 33.9 43.8 61.7
Processed rice 7.1 11.2 26.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Beef 49.0 64.2 92.7 299.1 459.4 873.7
Dairy products 90.5 122.9 188.6 23.2 29.6 40.9
Other meat nec. 48.1 63.1 90.8 30.3 39 54.6
Other food products 3.3 4.4 6.8 0.2 0.3 0.4
Beverages & tobacco 6.6 9.9 19.8 12.7 19.3 39.9
Note: LB = Lower Bound; MV = Mean Value; UB = Upper Bound.
Source: Authors' calculations.
In terms of non-food sectors, the EU is expected to reduce NTBs against US exports
equivalent to a 1.86% tariﬀ on average. US willingness to reduce NTBs is estimated
to be slightly higher, at 2.28% on average. In contrast, reducible trade costs caused
by NTBs in the agro-food sectors are much higher. The EU is expected to greatly re-
duce NTBs in animal-based products such as other meat (64%), beef (63%) and dairy
(123%). However, in the wheat sector (96%), the EU is assumed to issue regulatory
convergence. In addition, the US is anticipated to reduce NTBs mainly in beef (459%),
but NTB reduction is also considerable in oil seeds and cereal. According to our em-
pirical results, the US does not consider regulatory convergence in two sectors (wheat
and processed rice). In contrast, we estimate EU regulatory convergence in all sectors,
but concessions in sugar, other food products and cereal grains are not important. The
US is not expected to negotiate regulatory divergence in its FTAs in other food pro-
ducts. We estimate the most regulatory compliance in the beef and other meat sectors
and anticipate the least compliance in other food products, processed rice and sugar.
The EU and the US are estimated to have diﬀerent compliance attitudes in terms of
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scope. The greatest diﬀerences are in the beef, cereal grains and oil seeds sectors. The
marginal concessions and sector exclusions ﬁt with the diﬀerentiated special treatment
in agricultural agreements across countries. Speciﬁcally, such exclusions comply with
the previous behavior of the EU and US in FTA negotiations, where particularly sen-
sitive sectors such as sugar, rice and dairy are left out or treated specially, mainly as
a result of historical reasons and political sensitivity (European Commission, 2014b;
USTR, 2014b).15
4 Extension of the GTAP Model
The simulations in this article build on the GTAP framework. The standard version
of the GTAP model is a comparative, static, multi-region general equilibrium model
that provides a detailed representation of the economy, including the linkages between
the farming, agribusiness, industrial and service sectors of the economy. Outstanding
characteristics of this standard GTAP model are the non-homothetic constant diffe-
rence of elasticity preferences of the private household and the explicit inclusion of
international trade and transport margins and a global banking sector. Trade ﬂows
draw on bilateral matrices and are based on the Armington assumption (Armington,
1969). Price wedges represent all policy interventions. Additional features of the
standard GTAP model are perfect competition in all markets and the proﬁt- and utility-
maximizing behavior of producers and consumers. The standard GTAP model and
database is well documented by Hertel (1997) and is available on the Internet.
The standard GTAP framework does not take NTBs into account. To incorporate our
estimated NTBs in the analysis of the TTIP, we extend the GTAP model and augment
the GTAP database. There are several ways that NTBs can be covered in the equation
system of a CGE model. All of these approaches are based on the assumption that
NTBs limit trade, thereby creating an artiﬁcial scarcity and a related higher import
price. The resulting wedges between the world market and domestic prices are the
key inputs used in the empirical analysis of NTBs. They can be incorporated into the
CGE model as tariﬀ equivalents beyond the actual tariﬀs, as export tax equivalents or
15Examples of EU and US FTAs excluding individual agro-food sectors from full liberalization are
the EU-Mexico FTA, the EU-Korea FTA, the US-Australia FTA and the US-Canada trade arrange-
ments.
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as eﬃciency losses with the help of the so-called sand in the wheel or iceberg cost
approach (Andriamananjara, Ferrantino, and Tsigas, 2003, p. 3).
Following CEPR (2013, p. 16), we diﬀerentiate between two types of NTBs in our ana-
lysis, namely, costs and rents and associate them with either one of the approaches
to incorporate NTBs in the CGE models noted above. Costs of NTBs are induced by
regulations that increase the resources used to conduct the business. An example is
a regulation that requires expansive reconﬁgurations of products for export. To cover
these resource-wasting costs of NTBs, we employ an approach originally developed
by Francois (1999, 2001) and extended by Hertel, Walmsley, and Itakura (2001) that
treats NTB-related costs as unobserved trade costs not explicitly covered by the GTAP
database.
In contrast, NTBs generate rents when market access is restricted, prices are increased
due to induced market power and additional mark-ups (higher prices) accrue to ﬁrms
(CEPR, 2013, p. 16). To integrate these rents of NTBs into the GTAP model, we follow
the approach of Urban, Jensen, and Brockmeier (2014, p. 15ﬀ.), which was initially
elaborated for domestic support, and adapt it to the import rents in the GTAP model.
In so doing, we supplement the GTAP model structure with a tariﬀ equivalent that
allows for an additional rent above the tariﬀ revenues. This procedure enables us to
diﬀerentiate between tariﬀ-related and rent-creating policy instruments.
Costs and rents of NTBs cause diﬀerent economic impacts in terms of changing mar-
ket concentration and economic power. Both types of NTBs and their corresponding
integration into the CGE models aﬀect the terms of trade in a similar way but exhibit
diﬀerent welfare eﬀects. NTB-related costs involve the wasting of resources and hence
eﬃciency and welfare losses but do not exhibit trade diversion eﬀects. In contrast,
NTB-related rents imply a redistribution of welfare between consumers and producers
in addition to the eﬃciency losses and give rise to trade-diverting eﬀects (Andriamanan-
jara, Ferrantino, and Tsigas, 2003, p. 4; Schiﬀ and Winters, 2003, p. 57; Fugazza and
Maur, 2008, p. 485; CEPR, 2013, p. 16).
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5 Simulations of the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership
In recent years, international trade negotiations as well as agricultural trade reforms
have lowered tariﬀ levels but also smoothed out tariﬀ peaks between the EU and the
US. In 2009, EU imports of food and agricultural products from the US faced an
average tariﬀ of 4.9%, whereas the average EU import tariﬀ for US industrial sector
exports amounted to a very low 1.18%. The average US tariﬀs for EU agro-food and
manufacturing exports are also very moderate, at only 3.22% and 1.55%, respectively
(TRAINS, 2014).
The situation slightly changes when tariﬀs in the food and agricultural sector are
considered at a detailed product level. Table 4 presents the bilateral tariﬀs between
the EU and the US for food and agricultural products at the most disaggregated sector
level of the GTAP database (version 9, 2014). In general, the EU tariﬀs are higher
than the US tariﬀs for all food and agricultural markets. The EU's highest tariﬀs are
on US exports of beef (65%), dairy (47%), processed rice (21%) and pork and poultry
(other meat nec., 38%). However, US tariﬀs are highest on EU exports of sugar (13%),
dairy (12%), other food products (4%) and processed rice (4%).
Table 4: Bilateral Tariﬀs of the Agricultural and Food Sectors, 2011, %
EU US
Wheat 11.8 1.4
Cereal grains nec. 1.4 0.1
Crops nec. 6.4 3.2
Oil seeds 0.0 0.0
Vegetable & fruit 2.9 2.1
Other animal products 2.0 0.5
Vegetable oil & fat 2.8 1.4
Processed rice 21.0 4.3
Beef 65.3 1.4
Dairy products 47.3 11.6
Other meat nec. 14.0 0.8
Other food products 13.3 4.4
Beverages & tobacco 5.9 0.8
Source: GTAP database, version 9, 2014.
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The AVE estimates presented in Table 2 are used to integrate the costs and rents of
NTBs into the GTAP database. Currently, only ECORYS (2009) provides information
on rents and costs in the food and agricultural sectors of the EU and the US. They
identify a cost share for the food and agricultural sector that amounts to 69% and
64% for the EU and the US, respectively. The remaining 31% (EU) and 36% (US) are
attributed to rents of NTBs. For the non-food sectors, we also draw on the analysis
provided by ECORYS (2009) and allocate an average share of 56.3% (EU) and 59.8%
(US) to the costs of NTBs, while the remaining gap is distributed to the respective
rents of NTBs.
In line with Fox et al. (2003), OECD (2009) and CEPR (2013), we implement the
rents of NTBs in the GTAP database using the Altertax procedure (see Malcom, 1998).
Because rents mainly accrue to importer interest in the food and agricultural sector,
we assume that all rents of NTBs are established on the import side. Applying the
information from ECORYS (2009) presented above to the AVE estimates given in
Table 3, we derive the breakdown of bilateral rents and costs of NTBs for the food
and agricultural sectors presented in Table 5. Using the mean value and the upper
and lower bounds of our econometric estimates, we thereby establish a base for our
conﬁdence interval in the following simulations.
In accordance with (CEPR, 2013, p. 28), we take direct and indirect spillover eﬀects
for third countries into account. A direct spillover eﬀect enables third countries to take
advantage of improved market access to the EU and the US. Here, we assume that
the direct spillover eﬀect is equal to 0% to 10% of the estimated NTBs between the
EU and the US, depending on the intensity of trade relations with the third country.
An indirect spillover eﬀect captures the improved access of the EU and the US to the
markets of third countries, which is assumed to be equal to 1% of the direct spillover










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1 Pre-Simulations and Scenarios
Simulations in this article are based on the GTAP framework. We use version 9 of the
GTAP database with a base year of 2011. This database is aggregated into 31 sectors
and 20 regions. Thereby, we single out major trading partners and other countries
currently involved in FTAs with the EU and the US. Given the focus of the analysis,
we keep the most detailed information from the GTAP database for the food and agri-
cultural sector. For the nonagricultural part of the economy, we diﬀerentiate between
several manufacturing and service sectors16 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The re-
sulting sector disaggregation also matches the predeﬁned sectors in the gravity model
approach.
Using the bilateral rents and costs based on the mean value and the upper and lower
bounds of our econometric estimates (see Table 5) as well as the related econometric
estimates of the elasticity of substitution, we build the starting point of our conﬁdence
interval by projecting three diﬀerent baselines from the benchmark year 2011 to the
year 2020. In each baseline, we consider identical changes to the political and economic
environment. To update the political situation, we simulate EU enlargement to include
Croatia (2013). The economy-wide levels of macroeconomic variables are updated
according to developments based on factor endowment and population in each country
and region to the year 2020 for each baseline. Thereby, the GTAP model endogenously
generates the value of the technical change parameter necessary to reach the projected
growth rates of the prevailing economies. The three diﬀerent baselines are compared
with a scenario in which we completely abolish tariﬀs and reduce all of the costs
and rents of NTBs between the EU and the US. The scenario is also conducted with
values for the elasticity of substitution, which are calculated with the help of the mean
value and the upper and lower bounds of our estimates (see table 3). Additionally,
we assume that changes in the political and economic environment will be completely
implemented within the given time period. Such changes include the previously noted
change in tariﬀs and NTBs of the EU and the US and also the resulting spillover eﬀects
in third countries.
16In the simulations of the TTIP, we also consider reductions of NTBs in services sectors. Information
on the AVEs of NTBs for services is taken from CEPR (2013).
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5.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we discuss the results of the policy simulations. In presenting the
results, we focus on the trade and welfare eﬀects. The results are presented in millions
of US$. The simulations are performed using GEMPACK (version 11.0) and RunGTAP
(Harrison and Pearson, 1996). A ﬁxed trade balance is adopted as the macroeconomic
closure in the policy simulations.
5.2.1 Trade
The EU and the US are linked through intensive trade relations with each other but also
with other trade partners. The partners in the TTIP account for over half of worldwide
GDP and nearly one-third of world trade. Tables 6 and 7 display the trading partners
of the EU and the US in the base year 2011, after our projections in the year 2020
and after the TTIP is implemented, respectively. We use exports to illustrate the
trade relations but also observe the import side to ascertain that there is no deviating
situation. Both tables diﬀerentiate according to the share of the trading partner in
total exports and in food and agricultural exports. Trading partners importing less
than 1% of the total exports of the EU and the US are aggregated in the Rest of the
World (ROW).
The numbers in Table 6 indicate that the EU trades for the most part with itself.
Intra-EU trade covers approximately 60% of total EU exports and approximately 75%
of total EU agro-food trade in the base year. The US is the most important trading
partner for total exports outside the EU. EU agro-food exports go mainly to high-
income countries (HIC) and North Africa, whereas the US is the third most important
partner. Up to the year 2020, the intra-EU trade becomes slightly less important. The
TTIP increases the importance of the US, whereas other trading partners of the EU,
particularly HIC and North America, become to some extent less important. However,
for most of the third countries, we hardly observe any change of importance.
The US total exports as well as agro-food exports are more evenly distributed among
the trading partners. Although much of the total US exports goes to the EU as well, the
NAFTA partner as well as HIC, Japan and China are also important trading partners.
For the US agro-food exports, the NAFTA partners, HIC, Japan and China are even
21
Table 6: Trading Partners of the EU, %
Total EU exports EU food and agricultural exports
2011 2020 2020+TTIP 2011 2020 2020+TTIP
EU 60.7 58.9 56.1 75.8 70.8 69.0
USA 7.9 8.6 12.8 2.2 2.4 4.4
HIC 6.6 6.7 6.4 4.1 4.7 4.6
China 3.5 3.4 3.2 1.0 2.1 2.1
North Africa 2.3 2.6 2.5 3.3 4.1 4.0
Japan 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0
Rest of Asia 1.5 1.7 1.6 0.8 1.1 1.1
East Europe 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3
Turkey 1.5 1.6 1.5 0.8 0.9 0.9
India 1.2 1.4 1.3 0.1 0.3 0.3
ROW 12.2 12.6 12.0 9.3 11.3 11.2
Note: High Income Countries (HIC); Rest of the World (ROW); please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the GTAP framework and own econometric estimates.
Table 7: Trading Partners of the US, %
Total trade Food and agricultural trade
2011 2020 2020+TTIP 2011 2020 2020+TTIP
EU 23.8 21.9 31.7 7.4 5.4 13.3
Canada 14.5 14.9 12.9 11.5 10.0 9.2
Mexico 9.8 10.2 8.9 12.4 11.6 10.7
HIC 9.0 8.5 7.5 5.8 5.4 5.0
Japan 6.3 5.9 5.1 12.2 9.7 8.9
China 7.8 8.8 7.7 15.4 20.3 18.6
Korea 3.7 3.7 3.2 5.2 5.0 4.6
Rest of Asia 3.6 4.0 3.5 6.1 7.2 6.6
Central America 2.1 2.2 2.0 3.7 3.6 3.3
North Africa 2.2 2.4 2.1 5.1 5.1 4.6
Brazil 2.2 2.1 1.9 0.5 0.5 0.4
India 1.7 2.1 1.8 0.5 1.2 1.1
ROW 13.3 13.3 11.7 14.1 15.0 13.7
Note: High Income Countries (HIC); Rest of the World (ROW); please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the GTAP framework and own econometric estimates.
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more important. EU demand for US exports is slightly decreasing by 2020, but because
of the TTIP, the EU is regaining importance and particularly the NAFTA partners lose
market shares. A similar situation is given for agro-food trade, but here, China is still
the most important partner after the TTIP is in place.
Tables 6 and 7 suggest that third countries are not substantially aﬀected by the TTIP,
but the tables do not provide information on all countries or on bilateral trade. In
Tables 8 and 9, we therefore supply a matrix covering the bilateral percentage of exports
relative to the prevailing countries' GDP, which, as discussed above, have proven to be
close to the actual data after the implementation of NAFTA. We adapt the variable
calculated by Kehoe (2005, p. 353) according to equation (2) so that n is summed over
total trade in Table 8 or over food and agricultural trade in Table 9.














To ease the interpretation of the results in Tables 8 and 9, we indicate in bold the
trading partners with which the trade of the EU or the US is greater than 1% of total
trade or of food and agricultural trade, and we highlight cells with negative values in
grey.
As expected, we observe the highest increase of exports relative to GDP between the
partners of the TTIP. This increase in trade is more pronounced in the food and
agricultural sector and more noticeable for EU exports to the US, for which the initial
share of the total exports and food and agricultural exports of the EU to the US is
smaller than the corresponding trade ﬂow from the US to the EU. Additionally, EU
exports relative to GDP to third countries mainly increase, whereas third country
total exports relative to GDP to the EU mainly decrease. The opposite development
can be observed for the US. In other words, the EU enhances its supply to the US
but also to other countries, whereas the US is only able to enlarge its supply to the
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EU by decreasing its exports to third countries. A similar pattern, although not as
pronounced, is shown for food and agricultural exports in Table 9.
A decrease of exports relative to GDP occurs more often when only the food and
agricultural sector is considered. Obviously, the spillover eﬀect increases non-agro-
food trade with and between third countries, and this eﬀect outweighs the mainly
negative development in the agro-food sector. The decreasing eﬀect in the food and
agricultural sectors of most third countries is accompanied by a greater increase in
trade between the TTIP partners and can be traced back to the higher NTBs in the
food and agricultural sector (see Table 3).
In general, the trade eﬀect for third countries is rather moderate. None of the positive
or negative percentage changes in exports relative to GDP in third countries is greater
than 2% for total exports or greater than 7% for food and agricultural exports. Those
countries whose initial trade with the EU and/or the US is initially of a lower magnitude
particularly experience only minor eﬀects. Additionally, trade between third countries

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bangladesh, Mozambique and the rest of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are
only able to increase total exports relative to GDP to the US, whereas we mainly
observe a decrease for other trade with the TTIP partners. However, due to the
spillover eﬀects, the LDCs are able to increase their trade with other third countries,
although we only assume that they have the resources to indirectly adapt to the EU-US
standard and are thus not able to gain from their own spillover eﬀects.
In Tables 10 and 11, we provide a sectoral breakdown of the bilateral trade in the agro-
food sector between the EU and the US. We report the share of the individual sectors
in total food and agricultural trade in the base year of 2011, after our projections in the
year 2020 and after the TTIP is implemented, respectively. For each trading partner,
we present the development of the most important sectors, whereas sectors with shares
of less than 1% are aggregated in a sector called Other agro-food sectors.
Table 10: Share of Agro-Food Sectors in EU Total Agricultural and Food
Exports to the US, %
2011 2020 2020+TTIP
Other food products 54.81 54.20 35.97
Dairy products 13.01 12.25 17.72
Vegetable oil & fat 9.77 9.24 9.5
Crops nec. 8.17 9.97 10.97
Other meat nec. 5.31 4.89 5.06
Vegetable & fruit 3.58 4.14 6.96
Beef 0.49 0.46 6.87
Cereal grains nec. 0.26 0.28 0.95
Wheat 0.24 0.29 0.17
Oil seeds 0.11 0.13 0.46
Sugar 0.19 0.18 2.19
Other agro-food sectors 4.06 3.97 3.08
Note: Please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for more detail; cells highlighted in grey represent sectors with
increasing importance compared with 2020.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the GTAP framework and own econometric estimates.
In the year 2011, EU exports to the US are dominated by other food products (55%).
Less important, though still covering approximately 13%, 10% and 8% of total agro-
food trade, are dairy products, vegetable oil and fats, and crops nec., respectively.
This situation does not change considerably in our projections to the year 2020. The
structure of US agro-food exports to the EU is more evenly distributed. In 2011, a
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high share of the US exports to the EU is also given for other food products (28%),
but exports of vegetables and fruits (22%) as well as oil seeds (13%) are comparably
important. Crops, wheat and cereal grains take up a share of 7% to 8%. Analogously
to the EU, we do not observe a major change in the US export structure to the EU in
the year 2020.
Table 11: Share of Agro-Food Sectors in Total US Agricultural and Food
Exports to the EU, %
2011 2020 2020+TTIP
Other food products 27.72 34.62 30.05
Vegetable & fruit 21.70 20.86 12.48
Oil seeds 13.13 13.59 9.36
Crops nec. 8.48 6.65 4.93
Wheat 7.65 3.88 6.81
Cereal grains nec. 6.98 4.83 2.20
Other meat nec. 2.64 2.43 3.54
Vegetable oil & fat 2.19 3.66 2.40
Dairy products 1.33 1.16 6.55
Beef 0.93 2.04 8.66
Processed rice 0.32 0.74 6.87
Other agro-food sectors 6.91 5.54 6.16
Note: Please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for more detail; cells highlighted in grey represent sectors with
increasing importance compared with 2020.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the GTAP framework and own econometric estimates.
According to the ﬁndings of Kehoe (2005), we evaluate our analysis by comparing the
results in the year 2020 with the data after the TTIP has been implemented. In so
doing, we highlight the sectors in Tables 10 and 11 in grey that are gaining in im-
portance compared with the pre-TTIP situation in 2020. Table 10 indicates that the
most important EU export sector to the US, comprising other food products, becomes
noticeably less important after the implementation of the TTIP, whereas we observe
an increase in the EU export shares for the majority of the other sectors. For the US,
we report a decrease in importance for the four initially most important sectors. In
contrast, the other, initially not notable sectors mainly gain in importance. We there-
fore believe that our simulation results signiﬁcantly resemble the development shown
in the actual data after the implementation of NAFTA, and we are more conﬁdent in
presenting these more detailed results at the sector level for selected products.
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5.2.2 Welfare
In Table 12, we depict the welfare changes, given as Equivalent Variation (EV). Fol-
lowing Hertel et al. (2003), we present the mean value of the EV as well as the upper
and lower bounds in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 12 to provide insight into the
distribution of the welfare results. We also decompose the mean value of the EV in
Table 12. Accordingly, columns 3 to 6 present the decomposition related to policy
instruments. To ease the interpretation, we again highlight negative values in grey in
Table 12.
The world gains approximately 100 billion US$ due to the implementation of the TTIP.
A majority of this welfare gain accrues to the TTIP partner, and the increase is slightly
higher for the EU.Welfare gains can mainly be attributed to the harmonization of NTBs
(columns 5 and 6 in Table 12). However, we assume the share of the welfare eﬀect due
to the costs of NTBs in total welfare to be lower because our applied econometric
approach enables us to only capture the integration level that the TTIP partners have
negotiated in the past. We would observe a much higher share for the costs of NTBs
here if we were implementing the overall possible harmonization level. The abolishment
of tariﬀs between the partners of the TTIP only plays a minor role. Accordingly, we
also observe the highest gains in the EU and the US.
The NAFTA and Mercosur countries as well as most of the countries in Central America
exhibit slight decreases in their welfare resulting from the trade-diverting eﬀect of the
TTIP. Column 4 shows that this eﬀect largely stems from the elimination of tariﬀs
between the EU and the US, and the harmonization of the NTBs and the spillover
eﬀect has a positive eﬀect on the welfare of these countries. A similar eﬀect is shown
for the main trading partners of the EU. Here, the HIC countries, Eastern Europe,
North Africa, Japan and China exhibit a similar pattern. We observe only marginal
welfare eﬀects for Bangladesh and Mozambique, but the rest of the LDCs face a welfare
loss of approximately 0.2 billion US$. Using the decomposition of the result, we are
able to identify the harmonization of NTBs as the main reason for this welfare loss in
the LDCs (column 6 in Table 12). Assuming that LDC countries are only indirectly
able to adapt to the EU-US set of rules and standards after the TTIP is in place,
they are not able to compensate for the loss due to trade diversion by the welfare gain
resulting from the spillover eﬀect.
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In general, the welfare eﬀect for third countries is also rather moderate. None of
the positive or negative changes is greater than 0.1 billion US$. In accordance with
Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010), we must emphasize that the spillover eﬀect
is of particular importance for the results of third countries in the TTIP analysis.
Table 12: Change in Welfare (EV, billion US$)
Total EV Decomposition of EV
(Conﬁdence interval) (MV) according to
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LB MV UB Tariﬀs Rents Costs
World 89.26 96.57 118.04 3.64 10.43 82.5
EU 46.78 53.61 72.54 1.61 11.57 40.44
US 44.46 44.66 49.05 5.27 −0.28 39.68
Canada 0.31 0.44 0.64 −0.22 −0.08 0.75
Japan −0.28 −0.14 0.31 −0.33 −0.2 0.38
Korea −0.27 −0.12 0.22 −0.20 −0.15 0.23
HIC 0.61 0.75 1.07 −0.17 −0.22 1.15
China −1.11 −0.72 −0.43 −1.07 0.22 0.13
India −0.30 −0.13 0.21 −0.24 0.02 0.08
Brazil −0.03 −0.04 −0.05 −0.10 0.02 0.03
Mexico −0.06 −0.07 −0.22 −0.18 −0.27 0.38
Turkey 0.02 0.09 0.3 −0.12 0.01 0.20
Central America −0.11 −0.10 −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03
East Europe 0.03 0.05 0.16 −0.01 −0.04 0.10
North Africa 0.16 0.09 −0.3 −0.06 −0.05 0.20
Rest of Asia −0.45 −0.47 −0.53 −0.18 −0.10 −0.19
Rest of Mercosur −0.10 −0.12 −0.13 −0.03 −0.01 −0.07
Bangladesh 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.03 −0.01
Mozambique 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rest of LDC −0.12 −0.22 −0.66 −0.04 0.02 −0.20
ROW −0.28 −0.98 −4.00 −0.23 −0.02 −0.73
Note: LB = Lower Bound; MV = Mean Value; UB = Upper Bound; Please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for
more detail; cells highlighted in grey represent negative values.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the GTAP framework and own econometric estimates.
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6 Conclusion
Our analysis of the implications of the TTIP for food and agriculture is based on
econometrically estimated NTB rents and costs and an extended GTAP framework.
We consider NTB rents and costs economy-wide but particularly for disaggregated food
and agricultural sectors, taking into account the integration levels negotiated by the
TTIP partners in the past. We implement these AVEs into the GTAP model to obtain
economy-wide eﬀects. We validate our results by drawing on experiences gained from
past analyses of FTAs.
Gravity results indicate diﬀerentiated treatment in the reduction of NTBs in the agro-
food sectors. Whereas some sectors are estimated to be excluded from the TTIP, other
sectors experience great regulatory convergence. The EU and the US are expected to
signiﬁcantly reduce NTBs in animal-based products such as beef and other meat. In
contrast, concessions in sugar, other food products and cereal grains are estimated to
not be important. This outcome ﬁts with the previous behavior of the EU and US
in FTA negotiations, leaving out or providing special treatment to speciﬁc sensitive
sectors as a result of historical reasons and political sensitivities.
Subsequent policy simulation results indicate a strong increase in trade between the
EU and the US. Low trade-diverting eﬀects are predominantly observed for the main
trading partners of the EU and the US, namely, the NAFTA and Mercosur countries
as well as North Africa, China and Japan. A decrease in exports relative to GDP
occurs more often when only the food and agricultural sector is considered. Obviously,
spillover eﬀects increase non-agro-food trade with and between third countries, and
this eﬀect outweighs the primarily negative development in the agro-food sector. The
decreasing eﬀect in the food and agricultural sectors of the majority of third countries
is accompanied by a greater increase in trade between the TTIP partners and can be
traced back to the higher NTBs in the food and agricultural sector (see Table 3). In
accordance with Kehoe (2005), sectors with initially low trade volumes thereby exhibit
the largest relative increase in trade, whereas previously larger sectors become less
important in the EU and the US.
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Finally, simulation results indicate considerable gains for the EU and the US that are
mainly driven by the reduction in NTBs, whereas third countries gain from the spillover
eﬀects and are only moderately aﬀected. In general, NTBs are much more important
than tariﬀs for trade eﬀects but also for welfare eﬀects. However, we assume the share
of the welfare eﬀect due to the costs of NTBs in total welfare to be lower because our
applied econometric approach enables us to only capture the integration level that the
TTIP partners have negotiated in the past. Welfare eﬀects for high- and middle-income
third countries are primarily positive, whereas LDCs exhibit negative welfare eﬀects,
predominantly because we assume that LDCs are less likely to be able to adapt to the
EU-US set of rules.
32
Appendix
Table A1: Regional and Sectoral Aggregation
Regions Sectors
1 European Union
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, United King-
dom, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia
1 Paddy rice
2 United States of America 2 Wheat
3 Canada 3 Cereal grains nec.
4 Japan 4 Vegetables, fruits, nuts
5 Korea 5 Oil seeds
6 High Income Countries
Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Rest
of EFTA
6 Sugar cane, sugar beet
7 China 7 Plant-based ﬁbers
8 India 8 Crops nec.
9 Brazil 9 Cattle
10 Mexico 10 Other animal products nec.
11 Turkey 11 Raw milk
12 Central America
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Rest of
Central America, Dominican Republic,




Albania, Belarus, Ukraine, Rest of Eastern
Europe, Rest of Europe
13 Sugar
14 North Africa
Israel, Rest of Western Asia, Egypt, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa
14 Processed rice
Continued on next page
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Table A1  continued from previous page
Regions Sectors
15 Association of Southeast Asian Nations






17 Bangladesh 17 Other meat nec.
18 Mozambique 18 Vegetable oils and fats
19 Least Developed Countries
Rest of East Asia, Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Re-
public, Rest of Southeast Asia, Nepal,
Rest of South Asia, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Guinea, Senegal, Togo, Rest of Wes-
tern Africa, Central Africa, South Cen-
tral Africa, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Rest of Eas-
tern Africa
19 Other food products
20 Rest of the World
Rest of Oceania, Mongolia, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Rest of North America, Bo-
livia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Venezuela, Rest of South America, Rus-
sian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Rest of Former Soviet Union, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bahrain, Islamic Re-
public of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emi-
rates, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia, Zim-
babwe, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa,
Rest of South African Customs Union,
Rest of the World
20 Beverages and tobacco
21 Other primary sectors
Wool, Forestry, Fishing, Minerals nec.
22 Other primary energy
Coal, Oil, Gas
23 Chemicals
Continued on next page
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26 Other transport equipment
27 Other machinery
28 Metals and metal products
Ferrous metals, Metals nec., Metal pro-
ducts
29 Wood and paper products
Wood products, Paper products, Publi-
shing
30 Other manufactures
Textiles, Wearing apparel, Leather pro-
ducts, Mineral products nec., Manufac-










Electricity, Gas manufacture, Distribution,
Water, Trade, Transport nec., Public ad-
ministration, Defense, Health, Education,
Dwellings
Source: GTAP database, version 9, 2014
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We explore how diﬀerent data aggregation levels aﬀect the gravity estimates of
non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) in the agro-food sector, and we examine their related
impacts on policy simulations of an expansion to the European Union (EU) that
would include Turkey. We calculate two sets of ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of
NTBs using the gravity approach to disaggregated and aggregated Central Prod-
uct Classiﬁcation data for 15 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) agro-food
sectors. We ﬁnd that the AVEs of NTBs vary substantially across products and
that using aggregated data primarily leads to an overestimation of the eﬀects
of NTBs. In a second step, we incorporate the AVEs of NTBs into the GTAP
model to evaluate Turkey's EU membership and conclude that aggregation bias
has considerable eﬀects on both the estimation of NTBs and on the general equi-
librium simulation results. Utilizing aggregated data leads to an overestimation
of the trade costs of NTBs and, hence, to an overestimation of trade and welfare
eﬀects.
JEL classiﬁcation: D58; F15; Q17
Keywords: aggregation bias; gravity estimates; non-tariﬀ barriers;
computable general equilibrium modeling; Global Trade
Analysis Project
11 Introduction
Multilateral negotiations on trade liberalization and the increasing number of economic
integration agreements have led to a low level of tariﬀs worldwide. Consequently,
the number and importance of non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) to trade has risen, and the
plethora of diﬀerent NTBs makes their regulation at the multilateral level almost im-
possible. Another potential framework to negotiate the reduction of NTBs might be
bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs). Thus, a reduction in NTBs needs to
be taken into account, particularly in the analysis of RTAs. Recent literature shows
that NTB reduction has a greater impact on welfare results than reduced tariﬀs in most
RTAs (e.g., Engelbert et al., 2014; Lejour et al., 2001). RTAs are negotiated at a very
detailed product level, whereas most empirical studies only consider the aggregated
sector level. Against this background, this article analyzes the eﬀects of diﬀerent ag-
gregation levels on econometric estimates of the trade costs of NTBs and their related
impact on the policy simulations of Turkey's potential membership to the European
Union (EU). In our analysis, we consider the importance of the food and agricultural
trade between Turkey and the EU and the high NTBs imposed on this sector.
Aggregation bias is well-recognized and apparent in the gravity estimates used to quan-
tify NTBs (e.g., Agostino et al., 2007; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Anderson,
2009; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2012; French, 2012; Haveman and Thrusby, 1999; Have-
man et al., 2003; Hillberry, 2002; Hillberry and Hummels, 2003). Authors argue that
inferences about trade costs from the literature are limited and misleading due to highly
aggregated data and the diﬀerent eﬀects of trade policies across products. These au-
thors agree that the impacts of trade barriers can only be separated and compared at
a sectoral level if disaggregated data are used. However, to the best of our knowledge,
none of the existing studies oﬀer gravity estimates at a very detailed agro-food product
level, nor do existing studies oﬀer a combination of econometric estimates of NTBs at
diﬀerent aggregation levels and their use in a CGE model.
We calculate two sets of ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTBs using the gravity
approach to disaggregated and aggregated Central Product Classiﬁcation (CPC) data
for 15 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) agro-food sectors. We compare the
disaggregated CPC pooled gravity results with the aggregated gravity results to reveal
the impact of the level of data aggregation on the magnitude of trade costs caused
2by NTBs. Subsequently, we incorporate the AVEs of NTBs estimated at diﬀerent
aggregation levels into the GTAP model to simulate the EU's expansion to include
Turkey. We run two experiments, which diﬀer in terms of the NTBs resulting from
the diﬀerent gravity aggregation estimates, to show the impact of aggregation bias on
the simulation results. Hence, our article contributes to the literature by revealing the
impact of data aggregation on the estimation of NTBs and its related eﬀect on policy
simulation results.
Our analysis is divided into two parts. In the ﬁrst part, we use the gravity approach to
estimate the AVEs of NTBs using disaggregated and aggregated data. In the second
part, we incorporate these AVEs, which are calculated at diﬀerent aggregation levels,
into the GTAP framework to expose the aggregation bias that is transferred from the
gravity estimates to the CGE analysis. We focus on the extent of aggregation bias and
the diﬀerences between the results of experiments that are either run using the AVEs
of NTBs from the disaggregated gravity estimates or those from the aggregated gravity
estimates.
2 Gravity Modeling
The measurement of the eﬀects of NTBs at diﬀerent levels of aggregation is based on an
ex post study using the gravity approach. The gravity model has become a strong em-
pirical tool for analyzing patterns of trade ﬂows, regional agreements, and the eﬀects of
trade frictions. Due to its broad theoretical justiﬁcation and strong explanatory power,
it is also recognized as a useful tool for identifying and quantifying the trade costs of
NTBs.1 For our analysis, we adopt the gravity-like equation of Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003, 2004). Their speciﬁcation is based on the Armington model and takes
into account the general equilibrium eﬀects of trade barriers. In its basic formulation,
imports depend on the output of the exporting country and the consumption of the
importing country relative to world output. Bilateral trade is lowered by bilateral and
multilateral trade barriers as governed by the elasticity of substitution. Multilateral
trade barriers, also known as multilateral resistance terms, represent the average trade
barriers (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The multilateral resistance terms are
1See Anderson (2011) and Head and Mayer (2014) for a thorough review on the theoretical and
empirical developments of the gravity model.
3econometrically captured by country-speciﬁc dummies or by country-time-ﬁxed eﬀects
in a panel data framework (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004).2 Bi-
lateral trade barriers are unobservable, but they can be approximated by a trade cost
function using observable trade cost proxies.
2.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy and Data
To identify the eﬀects of NTBs, we use an implicit measure that we integrate into our
trade cost function. RTA variables serve as instruments to isolate the measures that
aim to eliminate unnecessary and restrictive non-tariﬀ measures, to reduce regulatory
divergence and to harmonize standards or regulations within a region on average (Chen
and Novy, 2012). In the analysis of Turkey's potential accession to the EU, we apply a
variable to the EU trade bloc to quantify the positive eﬀects of regulatory convergence
and the reduction in NTBs that occur in the integration process.3 We compare existing
trade levels under the European economic integration to a hypothesized, counterfactual
trade level in the absence of the EU. We draw inferences about the trade costs of NTBs
using the theoretical model structure based on the missing trade in the absence of the
EU. Applying this approach allows us to calculate a consistently aggregated measure
that identiﬁes all NTB-induced trade costs at the sector or product level, which can
be realistically eliminated within the EU integration process.
We use a panel data framework to obtain the most reliable estimate of the average ex-
pected eﬀect of the European integration process (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Magee,
2008; Raimondi et al., 2012), but there are diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the panel gravity
equation (compare Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Egger and Pfaﬀermayr, 2003; Micco
et al., 2003; Stack, 2009; Sun and Reed, 2010). For our analysis, we choose the panel
structure with time-ﬁxed and bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects. Accordingly, we use a panel data
estimation strategy in which all time-invariant country-pair factors, such as distance,
sharing a common border or common language, a colonial relationship, and other ties
that are constant over time, are captured by the country-pair individual heterogeneity
term. The intercept is also absorbed, so it has to be removed from the equation.
2Alternatively, multilateral trade barriers can be approximated using Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
method.
3By using this identiﬁcation strategy, we assume a wide-ranging notion of NTBs. We are not able to
identify individual measures and so can only quantify the overall eﬀects of the NTBs on trade.
4Hence, only time-variant characteristics enter the ﬁxed-eﬀects model. As controls, we
include several variables to capture changes in economic and political characteristics
as well as trade policies. We use the Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects model to estimate the gravity
equation (Palmgren, 1981; Hausman et al., 1984). This estimation is accomplished
through a multiplicative form incorporating trade ﬂows in levels, and we thereby ad-
dress the problem of zero bilateral trade ﬂows. The evaluation of the parameters is
based on the conditional quasi-maximum likelihood (Anderson, 1970).4 We infer from
robust standard errors to properly account for heteroskedasticity which is typical of
trade data (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The conditional ﬁxed-eﬀects Poisson
regression technique is pursued to estimate the following empirical speciﬁcation that
diﬀers according to the degree of data aggregation:
Xkij,t = exp
(
αij + αt + β1sGDPij,t + β2dGDPpcij,t + β3dPopDensityij,t
+ β4dPolicyij,t + β5lnTariﬀ
k




Here, the similarity in the terms for economic size (sGDPij,t) for each country pair is
derived from the two countries' share of GDP5, and the diﬀerence in terms of relative
factor endowments (dGDPpcij,t) for each country pair is derived from the absolute
diﬀerence in the GDP per capita6 (Helpman, 1987; Stack, 2009). In the same way,
diﬀerences in population density (dPopDensityij,t) and political structure (dPolicyij,t)
are obtained. The variable lnTariﬀkij,t is equal to one plus the ad valorem tariﬀ equi-
valent of country i on the exports of country j in year t and sector k. The variable
4An alternative and equivalent method that would yield identical estimates would be to use a conven-
tional Poisson regression by maximum likelihood including dummy variables for all country pairs and
years to directly estimate the ﬁxed eﬀects. For convenience, we choose the conditional maximization
of the likelihood.

















where GDPpc is the GDP per capita.
5EUij,t is equal to one if countries i and j are both members of the EU and zero
otherwise. The dummy variable RTAij,t is set to unity if both countries belong to
the same RTA and to zero otherwise. The EU and RTA dummies account for the
regional non-tariﬀ preferences. The corresponding regression parameters are denoted
by β1 to β7, and the ﬁxed eﬀects control for time-invariant bilateral factors (αij) and
time-speciﬁc macroeconomic shocks aﬀecting global trade ﬂows (αt). Finally, kij,t is an
error term.
To estimate Equation (1) and to compute the tariﬀ cost equivalent of NTBs, we source
annual data on bilateral trade ﬂows for 157 CPC products7 at the most disaggre-
gated level from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (UN COMTRADE)
database.8 Bilateral tariﬀs come from the UNCTAD TRAINS database using the
World Integrated Trade Solution application software. Information on GDP and GDP
per capita, population and land area is taken from the World Bank. The source of the
political variable is the Polity IV project (CSP, 2014). Finally, the binary RTA variable
is taken from de Sousa (2014). Our panel set covers the period from 1988 to 2011. The
most important parameters of our analysis are the ones for tariﬀs and EU membership,
and we expect tariﬀs to have a negative eﬀect on trade and EU membership to have
a trade-enhancing eﬀect. In the regressions at the aggregated data level, we assume
an upward bias over tariﬀs and EU membership that probably distorts the size of the
estimates of tariﬀ elasticity and economic integration compared to disaggregated data-
level regressions. In the CPC product-level regressions, we anticipate high variation in
the eﬀects of tariﬀs and economic integration across products.
2.2 Empirical Results
We apply the two-way ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson model to the trade data of 157 CPC products
for 15 GTAP agro-food sectors at the aggregated and pooled levels. In addition, we
obtain estimates at each CPC product level to compare product line estimates to sector
estimates and thus reveal the aggregation diﬀerences in the estimates. Table 1 shows
7Table 2 shows the number of CPC sectors mapped to each food and agricultural GTAP
sector. The complete and detailed listing of CPC sectors by GTAP sector is available at
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/contribute/concordinfo.asp.
8Trade ﬂows that are recorded as missing, and countries that do not report any trade statistics are
omitted from the dataset.
6the parameter estimates for the vegetables, fruits and nuts sector.9 We only present
and discuss the results of this sector in detail because it is important to the trade
between the EU and Turkey and exhibits substantially relevant NTBs. Vegetables,
fruits and nuts are highly aﬀected by sanitary and phytosanitary measures and other
food safety standards to which consumers are sensitive. Column 1 shows the estimates
for the vegetables, fruits and nuts sector at the aggregated level, and column 2 shows
the estimates from the disaggregated CPC pooled gravity regression. The subsequent
columns display the gravity results for the corresponding individual disaggregated CPC
products. Thereby, columns 3 to 6 represent vegetables, and columns 7 to 12 represent
fruits.
Most control variables have the expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. As
expected, diﬀerences between countries in terms of factor endowments, population
density and policies, as identiﬁed by the variables dGDPpcij,t, dPopDensityij,t and
dPolicyij,t, respectively, tend to decrease bilateral trade. Instead, the estimates of
similarity in economic size, as captured by the variable sGDPij,t, are mixed in terms
of having the correct sign. When the parameter shows the correct sign, it is not
signiﬁcant. In contrast, the eﬀects of tariﬀs are consistent with our expectations and
are highly signiﬁcant. If the tariﬀ increases by 1%, the trade of vegetables, fruits and
nuts decreases by 3.1% in the aggregated version and by 2.3% in the disaggregated
version. Considering the results from the product-level gravity approach, the tariﬀ
elasticity varies greatly from 0.8% to 4.8%.10
Economic integration agreements have a positive eﬀect on trade. Trade between two
countries that join the same RTA is expected to increase by 114.9% with the aggregated
data and by 71.4% with the disaggregated data. In terms of the product-level results,
trade is expected to increase somewhere between 23.4% (dried leguminous vegetables)
and 103.2% (other vegetables, fresh or chilled).11
9Detailed regression results for the other sectors are available from the authors on request.
10The interpretation of the parameters using log-transformed variables in the exponential function is
identical to the interpretation using log-log equations; they are interpreted as elasticities.
11The interpretation of the parameter associated with the economic integration dummy variables is
standard for semi-logarithmic equations. For example, if we assume the coeﬃcient estimated for









× 100 = 114.9% relative to the amount













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8As expected, deeper trade integration increases trade even more, and EU membership
is expected to increase the trade of vegetables, fruits and nuts by 403.8% if considering
the aggregated data and by 192.1% if considering the disaggregated data. In the
product-level estimations, the positive trade eﬀects of EU membership are greater for
some products (e.g., dates, ﬁgs, bananas, coconuts, Brazil and cashew nuts, pineapples,
and avocados (1,685%)) and lower for others (e.g., potatoes (80.6%)). In two sectors
(shelled, dried leguminous vegetables and edible roots and tubers with high starch or
inulin content), EU membership does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade.
In terms of aggregation bias, the eﬀect of EU membership is signiﬁcantly lower using
disaggregated data compared to the result using aggregated data. This notion is not
applicable to all regressions and trade policy variables because there is an overlap
between the conﬁdence intervals of the disaggregated gravity and aggregated gravity
results. Nonetheless, we can conclude that for some sectors (vegetables, fruits, and
nuts, crops; dairy; other food products; beverages and tobacco) there is a signiﬁcant
overestimation of trade policy eﬀects using aggregated data. This result is in accordance
with those of other authors using aggregated data in gravity modeling (e.g., French,
2012; Hillberry, 2002).
Following the structure of the theoretical gravity model, the parameters of the economic
integration variables are interpreted as βˆ6 = (σ − 1) lnbEU and βˆ7 = (σ − 1) lnbRTA ,
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods12 and bEU − 1 and bRTA− 1 are
the tariﬀ cost equivalents of the EU NTBs and a typical RTA.13 Accordingly, the last
row of Table 1 displays the tariﬀ cost equivalents of NTBs. In terms of the aggregated
gravity result, EU membership leads to a reduction in NTBs or regulatory divergence in
vegetables, fruits and nuts equivalent to a 68.7% tariﬀ for both countries. Considering
the CPC-pooled regression results, the trade-enhancing eﬀect for the vegetables, fruits
and nuts sector that results from Turkey's membership in the EU amounts to only
12The substitution elasticity is equal to the absolute tariﬀ coeﬃcient resulting from sectoral or product
estimations plus 1. When the tariﬀ elasticity estimate is not signiﬁcant, we take the GTAP elasticity
of substitution for the sector-level calculations or the average tariﬀ elasticity from the remaining
signiﬁcant estimates in the GTAP sector group for the product-level calculations.
13Whenever the EU dummy coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant, we consider the typical RTA quantity eﬀect
to calculate the trade costs of NTBs. In that way, we assume that the eﬀect of EU membership does
not diﬀer from a typical RTA eﬀect. However, there are also some cases in which both economic
integration variables are not signiﬁcant or have the incorrect sign. In these cases, we assume that
Turkey's EU membership will not have any eﬀects on the reduction of NTBs in the respective sectors.
960.06%. This reﬂects the overestimation eﬀect of using highly aggregated data to
estimate the eﬀects of NTBs.
The results of the CPC product-level gravity approach reveals that the most regula-
tory convergence occurs in the dates, ﬁgs, bananas, coconuts, Brazil and cashew nuts,
pineapples, and avocados sector (117.7%). The least regulatory compliance occurs in
the edible roots and tubers with high starch or inulin content sector (11.2%). The
results on AVEs of NTBs are very sensitive to the elasticity of substitution (e.g., Obst-
feld and Rogoﬀ, 2001; Raimondi and Olper, 2011). In general, the lower the elasticity
of substitution, the greater the AVEs of NTBs will be. Thus, even low levels of non-
tariﬀ protection can have large trade-hindering eﬀects if the substitution elasticity is
suﬃciently low. This issue also applies to our estimates of tariﬀ elasticity and explains
the high AVEs of NTBs for some disaggregated CPC-level products.
To compare the CPC product-level results to the sector-level results, we aggregate the
results of the product-level gravity approach on AVEs to the sector level and weight
them by their relative importance using trade quantities as weights.14 Speciﬁcally, we
utilize the weights according to the bilateral trade structure of the EU and Turkey for
each sector. This approach leads to asymmetric AVEs of NTBs for the EU and Turkey.
Table 2 exhibits aggregated, disaggregated and re-aggregated AVEs of NTBs that the
EU and Turkey are expected to decrease during the process of Turkey's integration into
the EU. In addition, we present the number of CPC sectors mapped to each GTAP-
level sector and the variation coeﬃcient of AVEs of NTBs from the CPC product-level
gravity regressions. In the wheat and processed rice sectors, there is only one corre-
sponding CPC sector leading to equal AVEs of NTBs for all gravity versions. Con-
sequently, there is also no variation at the CPC level across products. In line with
other studies (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004), there is high variation across
products. We observe high variation coeﬃcients in the sectors of other meat, other
animal products and plant-based ﬁbers with variation coeﬃcients of 188%, 130% and
122%, respectively. The lowest variation is found in the oil seeds (22%), sugar (50%),
14Applying trade weights to the aggregation method is atheoretic and might considerably bias the
measurement of trade restrictiveness due to NTBs. Anderson and Neary (1996, 2003) propose
theoretic aggregation by using the idea of uniform tariﬀ equivalents. However, this theory-based
aggregation method requires large and mostly unavailable quantities of data, so we rely on the
standard procedure. We are aware that most restrictive NTBs enter into the overall average with
relatively low weights and vice versa (Laird and Yeats, 1988).
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and vegetable oils and fats (64%) sectors. Turning to the results of the aggregated
gravity approach to estimate the AVEs of NTBs, the trade of plant-based ﬁbers is
expected to face relatively low non-tariﬀ compliance. The very high trade costs caused
by NTBs are expected to decrease in beverages and tobacco, wheat, and cereal grains.
The order is similar when considering the pooled CPC-disaggregated gravity regression
results on AVEs of NTBs, although the magnitude is much lower. The EU and Turkey
are assumed to only marginally reduce trade costs in the crop and sugar sectors. In-
stead, the two parties are expected to achieve the most regulatory compliance in the
wheat, beverages and tobacco, other food products and cereal grains sectors. With
one exception, namely, other food products, all gravity results on the AVEs of NTBs
using aggregated data are higher than those obtained using disaggregated data. This
result again conﬁrms our previous assumption that estimates from aggregated data
regressions will overestimate the eﬀect of EU membership.
Table 2: Aggregated, Disaggregated and Re-aggregated AVEs of NTBs
(%)
Sector CPC Variation Aggregated Disaggregated Re-aggregated
sectors coeﬃcient AVEs AVEs AVEs
(No.) (%) EU/TUR EU/TUR TUR−→EU EU−→TUR
Wheat 1 - 315.17 315.17 315.17 315.17
Cereal grain 4 76.75 291.89 140.94 98.08 86.15
Vegetables, fruits and nuts 10 77.01 68.73 60.06 47.07 47.75
Oil seeds 5 22.32 40.86 26.64 17.75 19.42
Plant-based ﬁbers 3 122.45 8.52 0.00 0.00 0.03
Crops 14 113.51 101.77 13.86 43.34 32.75
Other animal products 10 130.14 122.28 78.38 13.45 1.41
Cattle meat 9 91.41 88.62 35.02 127.25 48.01
Other meat 9 188.00 116.95 104.62 21.39 19.52
Vegetables oils and fats 11 64.08 52.66 29.95 30.62 29.35
Dairy 11 113.91 84.14 56.98 102.70 137.30
Processed rice 1 - 50.14 50.14 50.14 50.14
Sugar 4 49.58 42.52 28.96 125.00 135.73
Other food products 52 95.19 49.26 148.99 41.49 37.52
Beverages and tobacco 13 113.15 541.97 156.00 60.56 183.96
Source: Authors' calculation.
According to the trade-weighted results, the EU and Turkey show the greatest deviation
in terms of reduced NTBs in the beverages and tobacco, dairy and sugar sectors, in
which Turkey is expected to reduce NTBs more strongly than the EU. Additionally, in
the cattle meat, other animal products, cereal grains and crops sectors, there are large
deviations. Here, the EU is willing to reduce NTBs to a higher degree than Turkey.
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Not shown in Table 2 but important nonetheless, is the average AVE of NTBs across
all 15 sectors, which decreases greatly from the aggregated version (131.7%) to the
disaggregated version (83.1%) and even more in the re-aggregated version (72.9% for
the EU and 76.3% for Turkey). Hence, the overestimation eﬀect ranges between 60
and 80 percentage points. Considering the sectoral diﬀerences between the aggregated
and disaggregated gravity estimation results, there is a bias of between 11 and 635
percentage points. In the same way, the variation in the average AVEs of NTBs across
sectors decreases substantially.
3 Simulations with the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) Framework
We analyze the eﬀects of the aggregation bias of the gravity estimates on the policy
simulation results with the help of the GTAP model, which is a comparative, static,
multi-region general equilibrium model. The standard GTAP model provides a detailed
representation of the economy, including the linkages between the farming, agribusi-
ness, industrial and service sectors. The use of the non-homothetic, constant diﬀerence
of elasticity to handle private household preferences, the explicit treatment of inter-
national trade and transport margins and the inclusion of the global banking sector
are innovative features of the GTAP model. Trade is represented by bilateral matri-
ces based on the Armington assumption. Additional features of the standard GTAP
model are in perfect competition in all markets and the proﬁt- and utility-maximizing
behavior of producers and consumers. All policy interventions are represented by price
wedges. The framework of the standard GTAP model is well-documented in Hertel
(1997) and is available on the Internet.15
3.1 Incorporation of NTBs into the GTAP Model
NTBs are not considered in the standard GTAP model. However, they can be modeled
using several methods, namely, as export taxes or import tariﬀs or as eﬃciency losses
depending on the policies with which they are related. In the cases in which trade
15See https://www.gtap.org.
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barriers generate rents, they can be implemented into the CGE model as import tariﬀs
or export taxes. When NTBs only cause eﬃciency losses and thus increase the cost of
production, an eﬃciency approach can be used (compare Francois, 1999, 2001). Several
authors employ a combination of both NTB-modeling approaches to account for the
diﬀerent eﬀects of trade barriers (Andriamananjara et al., 2003, 2004; CEPR, 2013;
Fox et al., 2003; Fugazza and Maur, 2008; Walkenhorst and Yasui, 2005). With the
eﬃciency approach, the removal of trade costs is reﬂected as an increase in technology
by introducing an additional eﬀective import price that is a function of the observed
import price and an exogenous unobserved technical coeﬃcient (Francois, 1999, 2001;
Hertel et al., 2001, p. 13). The eﬃciency approach to modeling NTBs is also referred
to as the sand in the wheels of trade or the iceberg cost approach. Alternatively,
rent-creating NTBs are incorporated into the GTAP model using the import-tariﬀ or
export-tax approach. Hence, a change in import tariﬀs or export taxes is simulated
to account for the protection eﬀect of NTBs. The Altertax program in the GTAP
model enables users to implement NTBs as additional duties to the initial GTAP duties.
Therefore, the partial or complete removal of import tariﬀs and/or export taxes reﬂects
the eﬀects of trade costs (Andriamananjara et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2003; Walkenhorst
and Yasui, 2005).
3.2 Experimental Design
In this article, we employ version 8 of the GTAP database. We combine the original
134 countries and regions and the original 57 sectors into a 23-sector, 10-region ag-
gregation. We keep food and agricultural sectors separate and group non-food sectors
into extraction, manufacturing and services. In the regional mapping, we single out
the main country groups. Our sector and region aggregations are highlighted in Table
A1 in the Appendix.
The base year in version 8 of the GTAP database is 2007. We move the GTAP frame-
work to 2020 because we assume that Turkey's membership in the EU will be concluded
by then. Croatia's membership in the EU is established after 2007. With the help of a
pre-experiment, we model the enlargement of the EU to include Croatia, and we include
exogenous projections of GDP, population, technical progress and growth in factor en-
dowments to incorporate economic developments until 2020. We source the data for the
13
corresponding shocks from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Inter-
nationales, the UN and the World Bank. We disregard Turkey's free trade agreements
(FTAs) after 2007 since Turkey would have to withdraw from any FTAs with third-
party nations on its membership in the EU (European Commission, 2014a; Turkish
Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, 2014).
We then run two experiments using the AVEs of NTBs, which are calculated at diﬀerent
aggregation levels, namely, by using the AVEs of NTBs from the aggregated gravity
approach (EXP1) and those from the disaggregated gravity approach (EXP2).16 We
consider the bilateral import tariﬀs and export subsidies between Turkey and the EU
and Turkey's adaptation of the EU Customs Union's tariﬀ level after becoming an EU
member. In modeling the NTBs, we take the predominance of technical NTBs in the
food and agricultural sectors into account by assuming that 75% of NTBs to the agro-
food trade are technical NTBs. Hence, we model them using the eﬃciency approach.17
The remaining 25% are assumed to be rent-creating NTBs, so they are implemented
in the GTAP model by employing the import tariﬀ modeling technique.18 We also
assume 1% of trade facilitation in non-food sectors due to our focus on the agro-food
sector (Engelbert et al., 2014; Francois, 2007).
3.3 Simulation Results: Welfare and Trade Eﬀects
This section discusses the results of two experiments, EXP1 and EXP2, and we focus
on the welfare and trade balance eﬀects. We use the NTBs estimated with the gravity
approach based either on aggregated data or disaggregated data to reveal the eﬀect of
diﬀerent data aggregation levels on the policy simulation results. We present our re-
16We do not consider the re-aggregated AVEs of NTBs in our policy CGE experiment because of the
additional aggregation bias we incorporate through the atheoretic trade weighting.
17An inspection of NTBs to trade between Turkey and the EU show that especially in the food and
agriculture sector, the most frequent trade barriers are technical. They are imposed for food safety
reasons, such as labeling, maximum residual limits, pesticide use, and genetically modiﬁed content.
The remaining frequent NTBs are rent-creating and include quantitative restrictions as well as non-
automatic and import licenses (European Commission, 2014b; RASFF, 2013; Önen, 2008; Özdemir,
2008; Teknik Engel, 2014). The predominance of technical NTBs, especially in the agro-food sector,
is also common in the literature (Andriamananjara et al., 2003; Fugazza and Maur, 2008).
18We only use eﬃciency and import tariﬀ modeling of NTBs. We disregard export tax modeling since
NTBs that are related to export prices, such as quantitative export restrictions, are not common
in trade between Turkey and the EU except for the export restrictions on copper scrap (European
Commission, 2014c).
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sults in millions of 2007 US$. GEMPACK (version 11.0) and RunGTAP (Harrison and
Pearson, 1996) are used to perform the simulations. We adopt a ﬁxed trade balance
as macroeconomic closure in the enlargement simulations. In Table 3, we present the
welfare results of Turkey's potential membership in the EU. The simulation results in
the ﬁrst part of the table are based on the experiment using the aggregated data in the
gravity estimation, whereas the second part of Table 3 displays the simulation results
using the disaggregated data in the gravity estimation. The welfare results are also
diﬀerentiated according to the gains that result from the reduction of NTBs or the re-
moval of tariﬀs. We consider our ﬁrst experiment, EXP1, as our reference situation. In
the third part of the table, we therefore present the absolute and percentage deviations
of EXP2 from EXP1. The percentage deviations are denoted in parentheses.
Table 3: Welfare Results of the Enlargement Experiments (million US$)
Turkey EU MENA Asia NorthAm LatinAm Oceania SSA ROW
EXP1 (NTBs from aggregated gravity estimates)
Total 6548 5867 629 -329 -468 -247 8 306 502
Tariﬀs 893 622 705 -422 179 358 36 187 749
NTBs 5655 5245 -262 247 -255 -356 -46 -27 -349
EXP2 (NTBs from disaggregated gravity estimates)
Total 5200 5485 452 -117 -221 -44 28 210 442
Tariﬀs 898 484 630 -33 255 200 53 157 755
NTBs 4302 5001 -359 249 -86 -292 -53 -63 -404
EXP1 - EXP2
Total 1348 382 177 -212 -247 -203 -20 96 60
(21) (7) (28) (64) (53) (82) (-250) (31) (12)
Tariﬀs -5 138 75 -389 -76 158 -17 30 -6
(-1) (22) (11) (92) (-42) (44) (-47) (16) (-1)
NTBs 1353 244 97 -2 -169 -64 7 36 55
(24) (5) (-37) (-1) (66) (-18) (-13) (-133) (-16)
Note: The numbers in brackets are the percentage deviations of EXP1 from EXP2. For instance, the percentage
change in Turkey's total welfare level between EXP1 and EXP2 is equal to 21%.
Source: Authors' calculations.
As expected, Turkey's inclusion in the EU results in unambiguous gains for both Turkey
and the EU in both experiments. Turkey's total welfare gain amounts to 6.55 billion
US$ in the ﬁrst experiment whereas 5.87 billion US$ accrue to the EU. In EXP2, in
which NTBs from the disaggregated gravity estimates are used, the welfare gains for
Turkey and the EU are more limited but remain considerable (5.20 billion US$ and 5.49
billion US$, respectively). In EXP1, 0.89 billion US$ of welfare gain accrue to Turkey
due to the bilateral removal of import tariﬀs between Turkey and the EU, and Turkey's
adaptation of the EU Customs Union's tariﬀ level after becoming an EU member. The
remaining 5.66 billion US$ stem from the reduction in NTBs. The greater welfare eﬀects
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through the elimination of NTBs, as opposed to the abolition of tariﬀs, also applies to
the EU (5.25 billion US$ vs. 0.62 billion US$). Similar welfare eﬀects are observed in
EXP2, in which the gains stemming from NTB reduction outweigh the gains resulting
from bilateral tariﬀ removal. Hence, the welfare eﬀect of the removal of NTBs amounts
to 4.30 billion US$ for Turkey and 5.00 billion US$ for the EU. Including Turkey in the
EU also has welfare impacts on other countries. Asia in EXP1 and Latin America in
EXP2 experience welfare losses due to the decrease in their agro-food imports to the
EU. In both experiments, the overall welfare level of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) and the Rest of the World (ROW) increase considerably. In both cases, those
welfare gains can be predominantly traced to Turkey's adaptation of the EU Customs
Union's tariﬀ level.
As presented in Table 3, the transfer of aggregation bias from the econometric esti-
mations to the GTAP level simulations creates diﬀerences between the welfare results
of the two experiments. Using gravity estimates based on aggregated data results in
higher welfare gains for both Turkey and the EU. However, especially for Turkey, devia-
tions across experiments are higher (6.55 billion US$ vs. 5.20 billion US$ for Turkey
and 5.87 billion US$ vs. 5.49 billion US$ for the EU). Higher diﬀerences between EXP1
and EXP2 for Turkey can be traced back to the predominance of the higher AVEs of
NTBs in the gravity estimates using aggregated data (compare Table 1 and Table 2).
Using EXP1 as our reference situation, total welfare eﬀects deviate by 21% for Turkey
and by 7% for the EU. For Turkey, the deviation across experiments that resulted from
the reduction in NTBs (24%) is higher than the deviation due to the removal of tariﬀs
(-1%). In contrast, the diﬀerence in welfare gains between EXP1 and EXP2 caused by
NTB reduction for the EU is not highly pronounced (5%).
In Table 4, we present the impact of Turkey's membership in the EU focusing on the
trade balance of the total agro-food sector and the 16 individual food and agricultural
products. The ﬁrst part of the table shows changes in the trade balance when NTBs
stem from gravity estimates using aggregated data (EXP1). The second part demon-
strates the eﬀects of tariﬀ and NTB reduction between Turkey and the EU when NTBs
from the disaggregated gravity estimates are used (EXP2). The third part exhibits the
absolute and percentage changes of EXP2 from the reference situation, EXP1.
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Table 4: Trade Balance Results of Enlargement Experiments (million
US$)
EXP1 EXP2 EXP1 - EXP2
NTBs from aggregated NTBs from disaggregated
gravity estimates gravity estimates
Turkey EU ROW Turkey EU ROW Turkey EU ROW
Agro-food products 1598 -2350 -911 -162 -1856 897 1760 -494 -1808
(110) (21) (198)
Wheat -596 308 249 -559 277 245 -37 31 4
(6) (10) (2)
Cereal grain -478 306 136 -481 260 186 3 46 -50
(-1) (15) (-37)
Paddy rice -1 -10 10 -1 -10 11 0 0 -1
(0) (0) (-10)
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 2412 -2621 -188 1838 -1808 -287 574 -813 99
(24) (31) (-53)
Oil seeds -44 438 -408 -45 324 -293 1 114 -115
(-2) (26) (28)
Plant-based ﬁbers 119 -8 -105 45 8 -54 74 -16 -51
(62) (200) (49)
Crops -32 45 -71 -578 -104 572 546 149 -643
(-1706) (331) (906)
Other animal products -272 332 -87 -195 254 -80 -77 78 -7
(28) (23) (8)
Vegetable oils and fats 117 -444 229 -55 -466 412 172 22 -183
(147) (-5) (-80)
Dairy -2354 1617 593 -1526 963 465 -828 654 128
(35) (40) (22)
Processed rice -140 144 -21 -131 131 -17 -9 13 -4
(6) (9) (19)
Sugar 1712 -1085 -669 1505 -894 -659 207 -191 -10
(12) (18) (1)
Other food products 2156 -2180 -688 1358 -1389 -257 798 -791 -431
(37) (36) (63)
Beverages and tobacco -553 545 -68 -377 390 -70 -176 155 2
(32) (28) (-3)
Cattle meat -287 103 185 -864 120 720 577 -17 -535
(-201) (-17) (-289)
Other meat -161 160 -8 -96 88 3 -65 72 -11
(40) (45) (138)
Note: The numbers in brackets are the percentage deviations of EXP1 from EXP2. For instance, the percentage
change diﬀerence in Turkey's agro-food trade balance between EXP1 and EXP2 is equal to 110%.
Originally, we diﬀerentiated between Switzerland, Norway, Croatia, Rest of EFTA, Rest of Eastern Europe, Rest of
Europe, Belarus, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Rest of Former Soviet
Union, and Rest of the World (compare Table A1 in the Appendix). To simplify, we aggregated all regions other than
Turkey and the EU to ROW to present the results.
Source: Authors' calculations.
The aggregation level used to estimate NTBs with the gravity approach has diﬀerent
trade balance eﬀects on Turkey, the EU, and the ROW. For instance, the results of
EXP1 indicate that Turkey's membership in the EU causes an increase in Turkey's
agro-food trade balance by 1.60 billion US$ when the aggregated gravity estimates
are used to estimate the AVEs of NTBs. However, Turkey's agro-food trade balance
decreases by 0.16 billion US$ according to the results of EXP2. Hence, the deviation
between EXP1 and EXP2 amounts to 110%. The same eﬀect of aggregation bias, and
thus a deviation of 21%, is also observed for the EU agro-food trade balance. EU agro-
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food imports relative to exports decrease by 2.35 billion US$ in EXP1, whereas this
decrease is smaller and is equal to 1.86 billion US$ in EXP2. As expected, Turkey's
inclusion in the EU also has eﬀects on other economies, but the direction and magnitude
of the eﬀect again diﬀer according to the aggregation level that is used to estimate the
AVEs of NTBs. For example, Turkey's membership to the EU has a negative eﬀect on
the ROW agro-food trade balance when NTBs from aggregated gravity estimates are
used. However, the ROW trade balance in the food and agricultural sector increases
when NTBs from gravity estimates using disaggregated data are input in the GTAP
model. Here, the deviation amounts to 198%.
At the product level, the greatest changes to Turkey's and EU's agro-food trade balance
are observed in the vegetables, fruits and nuts, dairy and other food products sectors
in both experiments. The changes in the trade balance of the separate food and
agricultural sectors also drive the results for the total trade of food and agricultural
products. This is particularly true for vegetables, fruits and nuts as well as other food
products, which are highly exported from Turkey to the EU (GTAP database, version
8); NTBs are most frequently imposed in these sectors (European Commission, 2014b;
RASFF, 2013; Önen, 2008; Özdemir, 2008; Teknik Engel, 2014). Following Turkey's
membership in the EU, the imports of dairy products from the EU to Turkey increase
and result in a rise in the EU dairy trade balance.
For EXP1, the largest increase, 2.41 billion US$, in Turkey's agro-food trade balance
occurs in the vegetables, fruits and nuts sector. Remarkably, the increase in other
food exports from Turkey is relative to its imports by 2.16 billion US$. In accordance
with the relative increase in Turkey's exports of vegetables, fruits and nuts as well as
other food products in EXP1, the EU trade balance in these sectors decreases by 2.62
billion US$ and 2.18 billion US$, respectively. For the EU, the highest increase in the
agro-food trade balance occurs in dairy products (1.16 billion US$) accompanied by a
decrease in Turkey's trade balance (2.35 billion US$). However, using the NTBs from
the disaggregated gravity estimates leads to lower changes in the trade balances of
Turkey and the EU for the vegetables, fruits and nuts, dairy and other food products
sectors. In EXP2, Turkey's trade balance of the vegetables, fruits and nuts sector
increases by only 1.83 billion US$, which corresponds to a deviation of 24% from the
results of EXP1. The increase in the trade balance in other food products amounts
to 1.36 billion US$ for Turkey in EXP2, so the deviation between EXP1 and EXP2
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equals 37%. For dairy products, we calculate the EU trade balance changes in EXP2
to be equal to 0.96 billion US$, resulting in a deviation of 40% between EXP1 and
EXP2. These diﬀerences clearly reveal the eﬀects of aggregation bias, which stems
from the econometric estimates of trade costs at diﬀerent data aggregation levels and
is particularly prominent in those two sectors. For instance, the AVE of NTBs for dairy
products is estimated to be 84.14% with the aggregated gravity estimates, whereas the
number equals 56.98% when disaggregated gravity estimates are used (compare Table
2). We also observe similar diﬀerences in the AVEs of NTBs for the vegetables, fruits
and nuts sector (68.73% in EXP1 vs. 60.06% in EXP2). The only exception occurs in
the other food products sector, in which the estimated AVE of NTBs is lower in the
gravity estimates using aggregated data, but the reduction of the NTBs in this sector
results in higher changes in the trade balance in EXP2.
The predominant assumption of aggregation bias in the CGE analysis is that a higher
degree of sector disaggregation results in larger trade and welfare eﬀects in the simula-
tions performed with CGE models (e.g., Brockmeier and Bektasoglu, 2014; Charteris
and Winchester, 2010; Grant et al., 2007, 2008; Narayanan et al., 2010a,b). However, in
previous studies, NTBs are not considered, and the AVEs of NTBs that are calculated
at diﬀerent aggregation levels are not compared. In our analysis, the overestimation of
the CGE model traces back to the aggregation bias occurring in the estimates of AVEs
of NTBs. As demonstrated by several authors, it is common to observe the overesti-
mation eﬀects of gravity estimates on trade costs using aggregated data (e.g., French,
2012; Hillberry, 2002; Hillberry and Hummels, 2003). Because we use the exact same
structure of the GTAP database in both experiments and only change the implemented
AVEs of NTBs between our experiments, we observe the pure eﬀects of aggregation
bias from the gravity estimates in our results. Hence, our analysis is not comparable
to existing studies analyzing the eﬀect of data aggregation levels in CGE models.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we focus on the importance of NTBs in the analysis of RTAs and
the eﬀect of aggregation bias on the estimation of the AVEs of NTBs. We explore
the impact of diﬀerent data aggregation levels on the estimation of the trade costs of
NTBs. In addition, we reveal how the aggregation bias from the econometric estimates
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is transferred to the GTAP framework and thus aﬀects the results of policy simulations
analyzing Turkey's membership to the EU. In our analysis, we focus on food and
agriculture. First, we infer the trade costs of NTBs for 15 aggregated GTAP sectors
using the gravity approach and state-of-the-art econometrics. We apply the gravity
model to aggregated and disaggregated data. We choose a model speciﬁcation in
which we capture all policy measures that reduce regulatory divergence and eliminate
unnecessary restrictive NTBs in the European integration using a binary variable. We
convert the missing trade in the absence of EU membership into a tariﬀ equivalent
using the theoretical model structure.
Our results show that AVEs of NTBs vary substantially across sectors, particularly
when using disaggregated data. In addition, the AVEs of NTBs are signiﬁcantly higher
for some sectors when using aggregated data, indicating the overestimation eﬀect of
applying trade policies at the aggregated level. Considering average values, the AVEs of
NTBs resulting from aggregated gravity estimations are approximately 60 percentage
points higher than the AVEs of NTBs resulting from disaggregated gravity estimations.
In terms of sectoral diﬀerences, the overestimation ranges from 11 to 635 percentage
points.
Secondly, we incorporate the estimated AVEs of NTBs into the GTAP framework by
using the eﬃciency and import tariﬀ modeling approaches. In our experiments, we use
both the disaggregated and the aggregated gravity estimates to reveal the extent to
which the policy simulation results diﬀer when diﬀerent aggregation levels are used to
estimate the AVEs of NTBs. The results of our two experiments show that Turkey's
membership in the EU results in unambiguous welfare gains for both Turkey and the
EU in both experiments. However, there are considerable diﬀerences between the
experiments using NTBs from either aggregated gravity estimates (EXP1) or from
disaggregated gravity estimates (EXP2). The deviations of EXP2 from EXP1 amount
to 21% and 7% for Turkey's and the EU's welfare gains, respectively. Similar eﬀects
of aggregation bias are also observed in the trade balance results. The deviations
between experiments for the agro-food trade balance of Turkey and the EU are equal
to 110% and 21%, respectively. At the product level, the greatest diﬀerences between
the results of the two experiments are observed in the trade balance of the vegetables,
fruits and nuts, dairy and other food products sectors. This eﬀect of aggregation bias
clearly results from the predominance of higher levels of AVEs of NTBs obtained using
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aggregated data to the gravity approach. Therefore, using highly aggregated data
to estimate the eﬀects of NTBs predominantly results in an overestimation of trade
costs. The eﬀect of aggregation bias that already occurs in gravity estimations is then
transferred to CGE simulations. Hence, we also obtain deviating results in the policy
simulation conducted with the GTAP framework, which is especially observed at the
sector level when diﬀerent data aggregation levels are used to estimate the AVEs of
NTBs.
In this article, we are able to conﬁrm the importance of NTBs in the analysis of RTAs.
Our results show that the welfare gains from the reduction of NTBs outweigh the gains
from the elimination of import tariﬀs and export subsidies. Hence, the consideration of
NTBs in trade policy analysis should not be disregarded. Second, we conclude that the
aggregation level of the data inﬂuences the outcome of the estimation of the AVEs of
NTBs considerably. The implementation of diﬀerent values of estimated trade costs into
the GTAP model directly aﬀects policy simulation results. Consequently, researchers
and policy makers should be aware of aggregation bias in the in-depth analysis of trade
policies and be cautious when ﬁnding a compromise between spending resources to
gather disaggregated data and inaccurate results.
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Appendix
Table A1: Regional and Sectoral Aggregation
Regions Sectors
1 Turkey 1 Paddy rice
2 European Union
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, United King-
dom, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria
2 Wheat
3 Croatia 3 Cereal grains
4 Middle East and North Africa
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Is-
rael, Rest of North Africa, Rest of Western
Asia
4 Vegetables, fruit and nuts
5 Asia
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mongo-
lia, Taiwan, Cambodia, Indonesia, People's
Democratic Republic of Lao, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet-
nam, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan,




Canada, United States of America, Me-
xico, Rest of North America
6 Sugar cane, sugar beet
7 Latin America
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador,
Caribbean, Rest of South America, Rest
of Central America
7 Plant-based ﬁbers
Continued on next page
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Regions Sectors
8 Oceania
Australia, New Zealand, Rest of Oceania
8 Crops
9 Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nige-
ria, Senegal, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Rest
of African Customs Union, South Central
Africa, Rest of Eastern Africa, Rest of
Western Africa, Central Africa
9 Cattle
10 Rest of the World
Switzerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA, Rest
of Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe, Be-
larus, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Rest of Former Soviet Union, Rest of
the World








18 Vegetable oils and fats
19 Other food products
20 Beverages and tobacco
21 Extraction
Forestry, Fishing, Coal, Oil, Gas, Minerals
not elsewhere speciﬁed (nec)
Continued on next page
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Regions Sectors
22 Manufacturing
Textiles, Wearing apparel, Leather pro-
ducts, Wood products, Paper products,
Publishing, Metal products, Motor vehi-
cles and parts, Transport equipment nec,
Petroleum, Coal products, Chemical, Rub-
ber, Plastic products, Mineral products
nec, Ferrous metals, Metals nec, Electronic
equipment, Machinery and equipment nec
23 Services
Electricity, Gas manufacture, distribution,
Water, Construction, Trade, Transport
nec, Water transport, Air transport, Com-
munication, Financial services nec, Insur-
ance, Business services nec, Recreational
and other services, Public Administration,
Defense, Health, Education, Dwellings
Source: GTAP database, version 9, 2014
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With the reduction of tariﬀ barriers due to multilateral trade liberalization agree-
ments under the GATT and the successor WTO, NTBs and regulatory divergence
across countries have gained in importance in governing and inﬂuencing interna-
tional trade. Of this, food and agricultural trade is mainly aﬀected by NTBs due
to political and historical reasons and consumer safety issues. While past trade ne-
gotiations were dominated by the scope and progress of tariﬀ reductions, in recent
times, policymakers have been concerned about the plurality of NTBs across borders
limiting the evolvement and expansion of commercial exchange. Hence, NTBs have
become a priority topic of trade policy agendas. Because agreements on NTBs at
the multilateral level are a tedious and resource-intensive process, bilateral or re-
gional trade liberalization through reduction of NTBs appear more promising. The
more similar countries are in terms of economic development, investment structures,
political ties and cultural aﬃnity that negotiate for an FTA, the more likely they
succeed in agreeing on reduction of NTBs and regulatory convergence. However,
empirical prospective analyses on the potential eﬀects of FTAs considering detailed
agro-food sectors and allowing for simultaneous reductions of tariﬀs and NTBs are
rare to ﬁnd in the literature.
This cumulative dissertation includes six articles that address two critical issues in
international agricultural economics research, namely, the eﬀects of NTBs and the
assessment of FTAs by explicitly considering the reduction of NTBs in agro-food
sectors. In addition to the economics research questions, methodological objectives
with respect to the econometric approach and the CGE modeling are also followed.
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The ﬁrst two articles present a literature review about NTBs, their prevalence and
evolution over time. The following articles assess the importance of NTBs in the
outcome of FTA policy simulations by relying on the connection of the gravity model
of trade and the CGE model GTAP. The focus is on detailed food and agricultural
trade.
The ﬁrst article provides an overview of NTBs and reviews the methods to identify
and quantify the eﬀects of NTBs. The article also proposes an idea of how to
further extend the comprehensive analysis of NTBs by suggesting alternative indices
and combining diﬀerent approaches. Based on the calculation of frequency and
coverage ratios utilizing the most comprehensive database on NTBs, the conclusion
can be drawn that there is a high prevalence of NTBs in food and agriculture.
Particularly, South American countries, Australia, Canada and the US dominate
the application of NTBs worldwide. However, the results must be interpreted with
caution because they strongly depend on the quality of the data. Because most
NTBs are independent from multilateral commitments, there are no strict rules
in reporting implemented NTBs, so the results are an indication of the reporting
behavior of countries. In addition, the inventory approach gives no degree of the
restrictiveness of NTBs. Nevertheless, the approach might oﬀer a starting point for
further thorough analysis of NTBs.
The second article extends the analysis of NTBs. It also elaborates WTO's approach
in regulating NTBs and their role during the recent economic crisis. Direct proxies of
NTBs are incorporated into a gravity-like equation in a panel setting to investigate
the evolution over time and the restrictiveness on agro-food trade. The diﬀerentia-
tion between eﬀects on imports and exports across diﬀerent income level groups of
countries reveals considerable distinctions. Based on descriptive data analysis and
estimation results, an increase in NTBs and a signiﬁcant trade-hindering eﬀect can
be observed. Consequently, the empirical analysis conﬁrms the high relevance of
NTBs in agro-food trade. However, the outcome depends on the proxies that en-
tered the model so that the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the negative eﬀect strongly
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varies from one proxy to the other. Hence, there is still need for more comprehen-
siveness and quality of data with respect to NTBs to better isolate their eﬀects on
trade. Indeed, there are international eﬀorts to increase the availability and qua-
lity of information for NTBs. These eﬀorts have once again been intensiﬁed as the
consequence of the recent economic crisis. During the crisis, governments retreated
in implementing protectionist measures including a wide range of NTBs to protect
domestic industries and consumers. Though meant as short-term solutions, many
countries have kept the measures or reset them only slowly, especially in sensitive
sectors such as the agro-food sector. The databases on NTBs are meant to provide
clarity and transparency; however, diﬀerent objects and aims of the corresponding
organizations and methodological diﬀerences in the identiﬁcation and collection of
data make the comparison and usability very diﬃcult. Increased cooperation and
coordination among organizations and agreement on methodological and systematic
data issues would increase the conceptual clarity and deﬁniteness of the eﬀects of
NTBs in the future.
The following two articles further expand the assessment of NTBs by evaluating their
role in the outcome of FTA policy simulations. In doing so, a two-step approach
is employed. In the ﬁrst step, the theory-consistent gravity border eﬀect approach
is applied to indirectly estimate the eﬀects of NTBs in detailed agro-food sectors
and to calculate AVEs of NTBs with the help of the elasticity of substitution. In
the second step, the econometric results on NTBs enter the GTAP model. While
the third article assesses the potential impacts of Turkey's membership in either
the EU or GAFTA, the fourth article oﬀers an aﬃrmed analysis by assessing the
EU-India FTA. To consider the level of NTBs that is realistically reducible in the
FTA analyses, NTBs are benchmarked to the integration level of comparable FTAs.
NTBs are modeled as eﬃciency losses due to the focus on detailed agro-food sectors
and the predominance of technical NTBs in these sectors. With respect to the
research questions, both empirical analyses reveal that welfare gains from lowering
NTBs are of considerable importance and would generally be greater than the gains
stemming from the elimination of tariﬀs. The reduction of NTBs in the agro-food
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sector accounts for the highest proportion of the welfare gains coming from the
reduction of NTBs. Hence, both articles conclude that the inclusion of NTBs in
the evaluation of FTAs is essential and that detailed agro-food sectors have to be
considered in the analysis. Furthermore, the analyses point out that the elasticity
of substitution crucially inﬂuences the magnitude of AVEs of NTBs.
The ﬁfth article takes up the outcomes of the previous articles but considers metho-
dological advancements when analyzing the TTIP between the EU and US. In gra-
vity modeling, a diﬀerent strategy to identify NTBs is pursued. A categorical FTA
variable enters the gravity equation that diﬀerentiates the depth and scope of agreed
topics in the negotiations according to seven levels of the FTA partners in the past.
Consequently, ambitiousness in terms of reduction of NTBs and harmonization of
regulations and standards can be selected. Particular consideration is given to the
correction of endogeneity that results from selection bias. Assuming a mean inte-
gration level, TTIP simulations are conducted using the GTAP model. In contrast
to the two previous articles, the analysis in this paper applies both NTB modeling
techniques by diﬀerentiating between resource-wasting NTBs and rent-generating
NTBs. Thereby, rents of NTBs are completely established on the importer side.
The division is based on existing cost and rent shares for NTBs between the EU and
US. It also considers carefully elaborated spillover eﬀects for third countries. Since
the elasticity of substitution not only governs the magnitude of AVEs of NTBs but
also critically determines trade diversion and welfare eﬀects in CGE modeling, the
analysis is based on the econometric obtained elasticity of substitution derived from
the gravity model. The analysis also includes the related conﬁdence intervals to
generate a distribution of the model's results. Simulation results show considerable
gains for the EU and US that are predominantly driven by the reduction of NTBs.
At this, resource-wasting NTBs weigh much heavier in the overall large, positive wel-
fare gains than rent-generating NTBs. Third countries are only moderately aﬀected
because spillover eﬀects caused by regulatory convergence between FTA partners
outweigh the negative trade-diverting eﬀects. Finally, employing estimated elasti-
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city of substitution and the corresponding interval estimates enhances the conﬁdence
of the FTA policy analysis.
Finally, the sixth article analyzes the question of whether gravity estimates of NTBs
in the agro-food sector are aﬀected by diﬀerent data aggregation levels and whether
this would have an inﬂuence on policy simulations. AVEs of NTBs are calculated
using the gravity model and the FTA dummy approach to disaggregated and ag-
gregated data for 15 GTAP agro-food sectors. Subsequently, the GTAP model is
employed to perform two experiments of an expansion to the EU that would in-
clude Turkey, which vary by the integrated AVEs of NTBs. In NTB modeling, the
eﬃciency and import tariﬀ approach are applied by assuming that the majority of
NTBs are resource-wasting NTBs and that rent-creating NTBs make up only a small
portion of total NTBs. Econometric results suggest a high variation of NTBs across
the detailed sectors. AVEs of NTBs that are obtained with aggregated data are pri-
marily higher than the ones obtained with disaggregated data. The incorporation
of NTBs, which are estimated at diﬀerent data aggregation levels, for liberaliza-
tion scenarios leads to diverse simulation results. Hence, the aggregation level has
a noticeable eﬀect on the outcome of gravity estimates and on simulation results.
Results in terms of diﬀerentiation of alternative types of NTBs conﬁrm the outcome
of the previous study that resource-wasting NTBs predominate the positive welfare
outcome.
The empirical analyses included in this thesis illustrate and reaﬃrm the high preva-
lence and relevance of NTBs in the international agricultural trade. AVEs of NTBs
exceed tariﬀs and, hence, point to the necessity of including NTBs for sound policy
analyses. NTBs considerably determine the outcome of FTA policy simulations.
Importantly, the consideration of detailed agro-food sectors matters for the overall
results. The eﬃciency approach results in higher welfare gains than the import ta-
riﬀ approach to model NTBs. Both types of NTBs aﬀect the terms of trade in a
similar way, but resource-wasting NTBs do not exhibit trade diversion eﬀects in a
traditional Vinerian sense. Thus, in contrast to tariﬀs and rent-generating NTBs,
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reducing NTB-related costs represents a real resource saving and hence dominate
the high welfare gains. Consequently, the distinction of alternative types of NTBs
for modeling NTBs in CGE applications is important because of the diﬀerentiated
eﬀects on welfare analysis. By considering spillover eﬀects, third countries are also
exempted from NTB-related costs. This, in total, lowers the negative trade-diverting
eﬀects caused by reducing rent-generating measures and is a beneﬁt for the total
welfare outcome. That is why spillover eﬀects are of particular importance for the
results of FTA policy simulations.
With respect to methodological issues in the econometric approach, the theory-
consistent gravity model proves to be a strong empirical tool to measure the eﬀects
of NTBs and derive AVEs. Because of the limitations of high-quality direct measures
for NTBs so far, the applied identiﬁcation strategies enable one to indirectly obtain
the eﬀects of NTBs and to join them in one metric. The application of Poisson
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators proves to be qualiﬁed. Appropriate correction methods for
endogeneity and other unobserved heterogeneity assure unbiased estimation results.
The use of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the gravity model supports the stability of the
results. To avoid aggregation bias, the gravity model is adaptable to disaggregated
data. The presented analyses show that the correct econometric application of the
gravity model is insofar important that it also oﬀers estimates on the elasticity of
substitution. Because the magnitude of AVEs of NTBs is highly sensitive to the
chosen elasticity of substitution, this behavioral parameter needs also special con-
sideration in the analysis. Accordingly, taking the gravity estimates of the elasticity
of substitution from the same estimation procedure as the results for NTBs, oﬀers
the highest consistency in calculating AVEs of NTBs. The joint econometric-CGE
approach oﬀers an appropriate and comprehensive framework for evaluating the ef-
fects of the reduction of NTBs in the process of economic integration. A perfect
match of data in the econometric application and CGE policy analysis assures the
reliability and performance of the joint approach. Extending the CGE model and
augmenting the database with econometric estimates in terms of AVEs of NTBs and
the elasticity of substitution enhance the level of detail and quality of CGE-based
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assessments of FTAs. The reliability of the results is further increased by considering
the most disaggregated data level.
Future research analyses might apply even more disaggregated data and consider
direct measures of NTBs. This approach would take even better account of the
discrepancy between the level of real trade policy negotiations on NTBs and the level
of trade models and allow more detailed and accurate separation between diﬀerent
types of NTBs. In doing this, information from newly emerging databases on NTBs
can be utilized. To conduct CGE policy analyses, theory-based aggregation me-
thods, such as the calculation of the welfare-equivalent Trade Restrictiveness Index
and of the import-equivalent Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index, could be
applied to consistently obtain AVEs of NTBs at the CGE sector level. Finally, it is to
be kept in mind that model-based analyses play an important role in the assessment
of policies. With decreasing tariﬀs the demand for information about the impacts
of NTBs increases. Hence, the composite-method approach that was selected for
this thesis can meet these information needs and generally contributes to better po-
licy impact analysis. The joint econometric-CGE analysis can be transferred to the
prospective assessment of other deep FTAs. To take yet another step forward in this
connection, the econometric method that was selected for this thesis could be used to
construct a detailed database of AVEs of NTBs for the CGE framework that can be
connected with a module that is able to reduce the AVEs of NTBs and to aggregate
the AVEs to the desired CGE sector level. This would also enable one to conduct
reliable plurilateral and multilateral liberalization scenarios by considering NTBs.
In addition, the econometric method might contribute to the literature that tries to
meet the challenge in selecting the correct elasticity of substitution for trade policy
analysis. It could enable a structural consistent estimation of sector- and region-
speciﬁc elasticities of substitution that can be incorporated into the CGE database
to replace the region-generic parameter. In summary, augmenting the behavioral
parameter ﬁle with detailed estimated elasticities of substitution and considering
detailed AVEs of NTBs in the CGE framework would allow one to perform proposed
policy changes ex-ante more precise and reliable.
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